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Abstract 
 
This MA thesis is the first ever comprehensive study of Jìngzuò yàojúe 靜坐要訣 (”The 
Meditation Essentials”), a Chinese meditation treatise authored by Confucian scholar-
official Yuán Huáng (h. Liǎofán, 1533–1606) but largely based on a work lectured one 
millennium earlier by Buddhist Tiāntāi monk Zhìyǐ (538–597). Its main contribution is the 
discovery of a link between sitting meditation and the practice of keeping morality ledgers. 
The primary concern has been, through an analysis and contextualization of the text, 
to catch a glimpse of how Yuán Huáng conceptualizes and re-conceptualizes meditation, 
and what the answer to this question might impart in terms of new knowledge about the 
late Míng period (c. 1530–1644). One aspect in particular of this reconceptualization 
emerged as particularly significant, and thus became the argumentative focus. This is how 
meditation relates functionally to the author’s other self-cultivation practices, i.e. what role 
it plays in what I call his program of self-cultivation. Yuán Huáng is today known mainly 
for his practice of merit accumulation through the keeping of daily ”Ledgers of Merit and 
Demerit”. I argue that meditation as conceived by Yúan Huáng must be understood in 
relation to this practice, and that this relation consists in seeing meditation as an important 
prerequisite for the karmic efficacy of merit accumulation; meditation is, above all, a way 
to rid the mind of self-centred desire and cultivate humaneness (rén) in its place, thus 
instilling in the practitioner the selfless ”no-mind” required for good deeds to result in 
good karma. Accordingly, the original soteriological goal of Buddhist meditation is partly 
lost; it is secularized and confucianized, in the sense that it becomes part of a self-
cultivation program that aims for moral fulfilment and societal harmony in the here and 
now. 
This is demonstrated through a three-step process, with each step involving a 
progressively broadened perspective: First, I contrast the Meditation Essentials with the 
work on which it is based, pointing out the significant differences, as well as the likely 
underlying reasons for them. Second, I compare it to the author’s works on merit 
accumulation, demonstrating the overriding concern with selfless virtues in both through a 
discussion of the three fundamental concepts ”no-desire”, ”humaneness” and ”no-mind”. 
Finally, I use the resulting picture of Yuán Huáng’s conception of meditation to uncover a 
similar approach to meditation latent in preceding and contemporaneous Neo-Confucian 
meditators, centring on Liú Zōngzhōu in particular. Thus ending the thesis on a note of 
wider implications, I contend not only that the relation between meditation and morality 
ledgers is not exclusive to Yuán Liǎofán, but furthermore that the perceived efficacy of 
sitting meditation for the purpose of weeding out self-centred desire and intentions was one 
significant reason for its introduction into Neo-Confucianism. 
 
 
Keywords: Yuán Huáng, meditation, Ledgers of Merit and Demerit, Neo-Confucianism, egocentrism, 
no-mind, soteriology, secularism, individualism, syncretism. 
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 1 
 INTRODUCTION  
 
 
The era from the beginning of the Sòng 宋 (960) to the end of the Míng 明 dynasty (1644) 
roughly corresponds with the heyday in China of the philosophical movement termed (in the 
West) Neo-Confucianism. From Zhōu Dūnyí (b. 1017) to Liú Zōngzhōu (d. 1645), what 
characterises most Neo-Confucians more than anything else is at the same time a keen 
interest in metaphysical speculation and a near obsession with moral self-cultivation. One 
symptom of this orientation is the experimentation with sitting meditation that it brought 
about—which, though having been part of both the Buddhist and Daoist traditions, in 
Confucianism was a novelty. 
The culmination of that era has been claimed to anticipate certain elements of 
modernity—and even as witnessing the ushering in of the modern period in China.1 
Intellectually, the “Late Míng” (c. 1530 to 1644)2 stands among the most tolerant and vibrant 
periods, not only of that era, but also in the whole course of Chinese history. By way of 
illustration, it witnessed the publishing of the erotic novel The Plum in the Golden Vase, the 
flourishing of such preposterous intellectuals as Lǐ Zhì, and the eventual settling down of 
Matteo Ricci with his Jesuit mission in Beijing. It was, furthermore, the period when the 
syncretist concept and tendency of ”uniting the three teachings” (三教合一) reached its 
maturation. Some would argue that “the most remarkable development in the world of 
thought in the late Míng was the revival of Buddhism”,3 and that Buddhism and 
Confucianism played the main roles on this ecumenical scene. The two traditions came into 
unprecedented intimate contact when an economically and numerically invigorated gentry 
                                                 
1 de Bary, “Neo-Confucian Cultivation and Enlightenment”, 204; Gernet, A History of Chinese 
Civilization, 438. 
2 There is no consensus on the exact dating of the Late Míng, but in the few cases where it is 
explicitly dated, usually the starting point falls either between 1520 and 1530, or in 1573 with the 
ascendance of the Wànlì 萬曆 emperor (r. 1573–1620). Jacques Gernet, in his classic Le monde 
chinois, draws the line at 1520, by criteria of “a series of economic, social and intellectual changes” (p. 
388). Xú Shèngxīn 徐聖心 is so charitable as to provide a discussion (pp. 11–12) of the different 
options. He dismisses 1573 as paying regard merely to political changes, has a similar objection to 
1521, and lands finally on 1529, the year of Wáng Yángmíng’s passing. The reason offered, 
(presumably) other than economic and social changes, is the great intellectual influence exerted by the 
Wáng school in the ”150 years after his passing”. (Incidentally, the same author also extends the end 
point well beyond the fall of the Míng in 1644, maintaining that such a date obscures the fact that 
many intellectual tendencies continued long into the early Qīng 清. I agree, but there are also obvious 
reasons for selecting 1644. So having made this concession, in order to avoid unnecessary confusion I 
opt for 1644.) In a few cases I will use the term “very late Míng” to denote the last three decades of 
the late Míng. By lucky coincidence, Yuán Huáng’s year of birth (1533) corresponds neatly to the 
onset of the late Míng, and his year of death (1606) almost to the onset of the very late Míng. 
3 Araki 荒木, “Confucianism and Buddhism in the Late Ming”, 39. 
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sought ways to affirm their newly won power outside of the Confucian state realm. Culturally, 
the way that was chosen more than anything else, at least on the face of it, was lay Buddhism. 
Suddenly, limp Buddhist institutions saw money flowing in from new patronage, and gentry 
flowing into their monastery compounds, to savour the view, read sutras and drink tea.4 
Part of the basis for that ecumenicism was the development in the mid- and late Míng 
of what we might call a “Chinese individualism”, emerging from the philosophy of the most 
important Míng Confucian philosopher, Wáng Yángmíng (1472–1529). The late Míng was a 
period of great economic expansion and social instability, that saw the individual pitted 
against the established societal and moral order, and society against the established forms of 
government. This stimulated much intellectual speculation on the role of the individual, and 
lead to several attempts to reassess his moral value. Generally speaking, this would often 
entail either opposing or reaffirming the rigid hierarchical social status and restrictions on the 
individual, as represented by the Tàizhōu and Dōnglín movements respectively.  
Wholly different from that emerging in the West, and without any legal motivations 
or consequences, most varieties of this individualism still accorded great powers to each 
individual man, particularly his, if not right, then at least unquestioned ability to make his 
own moral—and intellectual—judgments, the discovery and application of which was 
indispensable for both personal fulfilment and societal perfection.5 
These three historical conditions—the obsession with moral self-cultivation, the 
cultural ascendancy of Buddhism, and a “Chinese individualism”—combined to create an 
atmosphere in which if a Confucian scholar were to write a treatise on Buddhist meditation, it 
would presumably be regarded as a highly natural, even eagerly anticipated, thing. 
As a matter of fact, that happened. At the turn of the 17th Century—when The Plum 
in the Golden Vase had recently reached its first publication, Matteo Ricci’s mission had just 
been firmly established in Beijing, and Lǐ Zhì’s spectacular suicide still lingered in the 
memories of the literati—Yuán Huáng 袁黃, another Confucian scholar and lay Buddhist 
wrote and had published his treatise on meditation, called Jìngzuò yàojué 靜坐要訣—
the ”Meditation Essentials”. 
 This MA thesis is a study of the Meditation Essentials. To my knowledge, there exists 
as yet no scholarly work devoted to this treatise. The only mention beyond a mere listing that 
I know of appears in an article on Neo-Confucian meditation in Song-Ming times;6 in a 
                                                 
4 Brook, Praying for Power. 
5 The term “Chinese Individualism” is from de Bary, “Individualism and humanitarianism in late 
Ming thought”. See also Brook, who uses the term “moral autonomy”, in Troubled Empire, 178–84. 
6 Mabuchi 馬淵, “Sòng-Míng shíqí rúxué duì jìngzuò de kànfǎ” 宋明時期儒學對靜坐的看法, 95–9. 
(Also forthcoming as “Quiet Sitting in Neo-Confucianism”.) 
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history on Neo-Confucian meditation;7 and in a recent article on the meditative practices of 
Hānshān Déqīng 憨山德清.8 The former, by Mabuchi Masaya, is the only one that can be 
said to offer an extensive treatment. It is nonetheless a small part of a larger study, and the 
author calls for more detailed studies than his article allowed for. Although I discovered 
Mabuchi’s article only towards the end of my work with this thesis, the result should be 
regarded as a response to that call. It may also be regarded as a continuation of Cynthia 
Brokaw’s study on another aspect of Yuán Huáng’s authorship, his “Ledger of Merit and 
Demerit”, without which the most fundamental contention and contribution of this thesis 
necessarily would have taken a longer time to discover—and not necessarily been discovered 
at all. 9 
 The Ledgers of Merit and Demerit (gōng-guò gé 功過格) are a genre of moral 
notebooks that assign numerical values to various good and bad deeds, and thus let one keep 
track of one’s total amassment of moral merit. Yuán Huáng reinterpreted this system through 
his theory of lì mìng, “Establishing Fate”, which affirmed every man’s boundless potential to 
dramatically alter (“establish”) his own fate, in this life, simply by virtuous conduct. There 
was, however, one important complicator to this simple system. This was the concept of wú 
xīn, ”having no mind”, or ”no-mind”. Presumably introduced to alleviate the ethical problems 
arising from doing good merely for one’s own sake, Yuán Huáng’s system placed great 
demands on the state of mind of the practitioner. In short, good deeds if performed with a 
conscious, calculated—self-centred—intention of their karmic effects, would not be 
efficacious. In other words, it would have little or no effect on one’s total merit, and thus be 
futile for the purpose of transforming one’s future fortune. This system of merit accumulation 
and its selfless selfishness is of course fraught with paradoxes, even more so than its earlier 
selfish altruism, but that will not concern us here. What I am concerned with is how this 
crucial yet seemingly impossible goal of a “no-mind” free of self-centred motivations was to 
be attained in practice. 
 The main purpose of this thesis is to show that meditation, as conceived by Yuán 
Huáng, must be understood in relation to the practice of merit accumulation through daily 
keeping of Ledgers of Merit and Demerit. Its main function, I contend, was precisely to instil 
the “no-mind” required for the Ledgers’ karmic efficacy. Through sustained meditation the 
Ledger practitioner may gradually rid himself of self-centred intentions, thereby enabling him 
(again paradoxically) to climb the social hierarchy much more effectively. 
                                                 
7 Nakajima 中嶋, Jìngzùo: Shíjiàn yǔ lìshǐ 靜坐: 實踐與歷史, 19–20. 
8 Eifring, ”Meditative Pluralism in Hānshān Déqīng”, 117, 126. 
9 Brokaw, The Ledgers of Merit and Demerit. 
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The question that led to this discovery was how Yuán Huáng conceptualizes and re-
conceptualizes meditation—what happens when Buddhist texts and practices stemming 
largely from the 6th century are recast in the hands of a self-proclaimed Confucian of the 17th 
century, and why? In other words, in addition to assessing the quality of the relation between 
meditation and merit accumulation (the ‘what’), I aspire moreover to uncover the underlying 
processes and the causes behind them (the ‘why’). I argue that the most important such 
processes—or rather conceptual tools for understanding them—are syncretism, 
individualization and secularization, three interrelated developments of late Míng China. Late 
Míng Chinese individualism and the syncretism10 of the Three Teachings I have already 
touched upon, and they will be revisited throughout the thesis.  
Even more pertinent to my research question and less explored in the secondary 
literature, however, is the question of secularization. Accordingly, it is also accorded a more 
focal place than syncretism and individualism in this thesis, notwithstanding that it cannot be 
                                                 
10 Following Berling, syncretism is here defined as “the borrowing, affirmation, or integration of 
concepts, symbols, or practices of one religious tradition into another by a process of selection and 
reconciliation.” The theme of syncretism recurs in much of the literature out there touching on this 
period. The culmination of the theoretical contention on the matter is as far as I know Timothy 
Brook’s 1993 article “Rethinking Syncretism: The unity of the Three Teachings and their joint 
worship in late-Imperial China.” In it Brook criticizes what to him is a conflation of terms, and the 
misguided assessments of late Míng intellectual trends that this leads to. For Brook syncretism is to be 
distinguished clearly from ecumenicism, compartmentalism, inclusivism and eclecticism. I agree 
wholeheartedly with Brook’s emphasis on the relevance of these other analytical tools for religious 
mixing and coexistence. Following Stewart and Shaw, I do not, however, agree with the contention 
that a broad definition of syncretism renders it analytically useless—we may still speak about degrees 
and variants of syncretism—nor that its negative connotations (of “impurity”, “ingenuineness”, etc.) 
make it somehow tainted. Even the claim that it does possess such negative connotations at all seems 
to me to be a projection by established scholars particularly within the field of anthropology, and is of 
little relevance for present generations, for whom the omnipresence and inevitability of religious and 
cultural borrowing is an undisputable truth—and the conceived “purity” of any tradition an illusion. 
That syncretism takes place everywhere and at all times, does not mean that the term is of no use, 
however. We may still speak of degrees and varieties of syncretism—and how else would we describe 
succinctly this trend during the late Míng? 
When we already possess the term ‘syncretism’ in our analytical toolbox to describe such 
influence and reconciliation between belief systems in general, I see no need to discard it. 
Accordingly, as opposed to Brook I do not distinguish it from the other forms of religious interaction, 
but rather use it as an overarching term that encompasses those more restricted concepts 
ecumenicism, inclusivism, eclecticism and compartmentalism, for which I employ Brook’s 
definitions. Brook’s interpretation of syncretism I would instead call ‘synthesis’. His definition of 
ecumenicism I should spell out, since ecumenicism in my opinion is the most common form of 
syncretism in the Míng, and I employ the term repeatedly: “Ecumenicism understands that truth is 
universal: Separate religious world views are sustained as separate traditions not by fundamentally 
different perceptions of truth, but by their external elements, such as ritual practices or modes of 
discourse. Beneath these distinctions lie the same truth and the same pursuit of truth.” 
Berling, The Syncretic Religion of Lin Chao-En, 9; Brook, “Rethinking Syncretism”, 13–5 
(for critique and definitions); Stewart and Shaw, Syncretism/Anti-Syncretism, 1–2. On the specific 
issue of syncretism in the late Míng, see also Yü, The Renewal of Buddhism in China; Xú 徐, Míng 
mò Qīng chū sānjiào huìtōng guǎnkuī 明末淸初三敎會通管窺; and for articles, Araki 荒木, 
“Confucianism and Buddhism in the Late Ming”; Mabuchi, “Sòng-Míng shíqí rúxué duì jìngzuò de 
kànfǎ yǐjí sānjiào héyī sīxiǎng de xīngqǐ”; and Fāng 方, “Wáng Jī de xīntǐ lùn jí qí Fó Lǎo sīxiǎng 
yuānyuán”. 
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strictly separated from them. In a similar fashion to how Huáng reconceptualized the Ledgers 
of Merit and Demerit, I argue that the original soteriological purpose of Buddhist meditation 
is partly lost through his refashioning. I use “secular” not as the opposite of “sacral” or 
“religious”—which in any case is a particularly problematic term when applied to China11—
but of “soteriological”, more relevant to this study and with a clearer and more restricted 
denotation (which is that which pertains to salvation and the afterlife). 
This secularization may also be described as a “confucianization”. One of the most 
common criticisms directed at Buddhism by “pure Confucians” (chún rú 純儒) was that its 
motivations were, in the end, selfish—because its ultimate goal remained, they claimed, the 
liberation of the individual from this world and all its obligations. (Of course, this claim is 
quite absurd to the Buddhist, for whom there is no self.) Ironic then that in the hands of Yuán 
Huáng, and partly due to a reconciliation with Confucianism, meditation—the symbol par 
excellence of Buddhist selfishness as perceived by Confucians—is turned self-centred in an 
entirely new way: No longer is the practitioner’s soteriological salvation the main concern, 
but rather, as I will show, his moral and material fulfilment in the here and now. This 
confucianization is quite different from how Buddhist elements were adopted into early Neo-
Confucianism, elements one scholar calls “carefully recontextualized traces of Chan skilfully 
woven into the relentlessly secular fabric of Confucianism”.12 In our case it is not traces but 
blatantly Buddhist practices and theories that are carelessly twined around a Confucian string. 
Or so it was later common to denigrate late Míng syncretism. What I am interested in are 
these Confucian vestiges, which I hope to show are more than just trifling echoes or mere lip 
service. They are partly responsible for a subtle yet radical reconceptualization of meditation.  
What I am accordingly not concerned with in this thesis is how this syncretism 
conversely leads to a “buddhicization” of Confucianism as well. This is not an insignificant 
question, but less pertinent to my main argument concerning the reconceptualization of 
meditation. Furthermore, an affirmative answer to that question is as I see it far more obvious 
than to the question of confucianization, inasmuch as the Meditation Essentials is a text on 
Buddhist practice. It goes without saying that Buddhism had a profound impact on the 
worldview of at least Yuán Huáng as an individual, and, in the case of ledger practice, also 
on other Confucians. Much less obvious is the impact his Confucian background engenders 
in his conception of Buddhist meditation—and that is what I hope to uncover. 
                                                 
11 And indeed everywhere in the non-western world. The term, which is based largely on modern 
Christianity, implies several categories that tend to misrepresent non-modern or non-western societies 
when forced onto them. In China, the concept of ”religion” (zōngjiào 宗教) never existed before the 
19th century introduction of modernity. The adjective ”religious” is slightly less problematic to define 
in an etic way, but I will still strive to avoid it. 
12 Allen, Vanishing Into Things, 165. 
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Yet another way of looking at the secularization taking place in the Meditation 
Essentials, is as a “laicization”, a term I will use in the sense of change owing to and 
reflecting concerns typical of laity. Traditionally, the amassment of good karma is a concern 
of laypeople more than monastics, for the rigorous of whom not only bad karma but karma in 
itself is what keeps us attached to and suffering in this world. By virtue of being fitted into a 
context of merit accumulation, I will argue that the Meditation Essentials is thus laicized.  
Inasmuch as most resourceful Buddhist laymen were Confucians by social status and 
intellectual commitment, confucianization and laicization are two sides of the same coin—the 
coin I call secularization. 
 
My exploration of these themes—the research question and its theoretical backdrop—is 
divided into four individual chapters. 
Chapter one is devoted primarily to the author Yuán Huáng, and secondarily to the 
late Míng intellectual landscape. As I see it, getting to know the man behind the book is vital 
for understanding why it was written and how it was used. The late Míng period witnessed a 
boom in writing, printing and publishing activity, and a considerable portion of the resulting 
works are still available to us today, so that we are actually not at a lack of sources when it 
comes to the biography of Yuán Huáng. However, an exhaustive treatment of the biography 
of this individual is beyond the limits of a work of this kind, and has moreover to a 
considerable extent been done already by Sakai (1960), Fang (1976), Okuzaki (1978), and 
Brokaw (1991), Okuzaki’s being the most extensive.13 Accordingly, I will focus on the 
aspects most relevant for this thesis: I start, in the subsection on his life, by describing his 
Confucian background and experience with the bureaucracy, while at the same time 
recounting his way into Buddhism, two processes that are in fact related. I continue with his 
bibliography, relating it to the intellectual landscape of the late Míng, particularly the Neo-
Confucian Tàizhōu school and the related broader movement to “unite the Three Teachings”, 
two developments following in the wake of Neo-Confucian philosopher Wáng Yángmíng 
(1472–1529). Finally, I relate this to his interest in meditation, though I will have more to say 
about that connection in chapter three. Except where I bring in meditation and the Meditation 
Essentials, this chapter on the individual Yuán Huáng offers nothing new in terms of research. 
(It does, however, reproduce into English some interesting findings in a recent Chinese article 
concerning Huáng’s service in the Korean-Japanese war of 1592–7, as far as I know until 
                                                 
13 Sakai 酒井, Chūgoku zensho no kenkyū 中國善書の研究 (the part concerning Yuán Huáng is 
translated in full into Chinese in by Yǐn 尹 as “Yuán Liǎofán de shēngpíng jí zhùzuò 袁了凡的生平
及著作); Okuzaki 奧崎. Chūgoku kyōshin jinushi no kenkyū 中國鄉紳地主の硏究, 129–206; 
Fang, ”Yüan Huang”, 1632–5; Brokaw, Ledgers, 64–109. 
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now not available in English).14 Being a background chapter, it instead draws broadly on 
autobiographical as well as primary and secondary sources, and tries to fit the essentials into 
the framework of this thesis. 
In chapter two I turn to one of Huáng’s specific works, and the subject matter of this 
thesis, the Meditation Essentials. Since this thesis as far as I know is the first study of the 
treatise, the chapter aims not only to reinforce the central argument of the thesis, but also to 
provide a fairly comprehensive presentation of the work.  
As it happens, the Meditation Essentials draws heavily and often verbatim on a much 
earlier and larger work, and thus the chapter begins not with the Meditation Essentials itself, 
but with the well-known 6th century Buddhist monk Zhìyǐ and his, not so well-known, work 
the Sequential Gateway (Cìdì fǎmén 次第法門). This work stays with us throughout the 
chapter, even when proceeding to zoom in on details in the Meditation Essentials. The reason 
for this is that when it comes to the question of Yuán Huáng’s conceptualisation of 
meditation, other than the content itself nothing is able to impart more answers than a 
comparison of the two. In fact, I would argue that it is actually of more significance than the 
actual practices per se, insofar as Yuán Huáng strictly speaking did not himself create the 
descriptions of them. Thus I ask: From the Sequential Gateway, what did he include, and 
what did he exclude? Where does he provide his own comments or editing, where does he 
rewrite Zhìyǐ’s passages, and how? What framework does he strip away, and what does he 
provide in its place? In short, how is it similar, and, more significantly, how is it different—
and why? By posing these questions, what I aim to catch a glimpse of, and show to the reader, 
is the process by which this originally Buddhist 6th century disquisition becomes a 
Confucian 17th century manual—the negotiation between Buddhism and Confucianism, 
monkhood and laity, Suí aristocracy and Míng gentry. 
The second purpose of chapter two is to provide an argumentative basis for chapter 
three, the argumentative core of the thesis, where I look at another aspect of Huáng’s 
conceptualization of meditation, namely the relationship of meditation to morality ledgers, 
the self-cultivation practice for which Yuán Huáng is mainly known. For one of the 
conclusions drawn from the questions in chapter two is that in the Meditation Essentials 
soteriology is downplayed whereas cultivation of compassion, partly reconceptualized as the 
Confucian virtue of ”humaneness”, is brought to the fore—or rather to the end, where in 
sequential meditation the most essential practices are located. I argue that in order to 
understand this transformation, it is necessary to take a broader look at Yuán Huáng’s general 
take on self-cultivation—and particularly his works related to the practice of keeping a 
                                                 
14 Zhāng 張, “Shíliù shìjìmò zhōng-hán shǐjié guānyú Yángmíng xúe de lùnbiàn jí qí yìyì” 十六世紀
末中韓使節關於陽明學的論辯即其意義. 
 8 
Ledger of Merit and Demerit. By comparing these works with the Meditation Essentials, I 
show that there is much to indicate that meditation possesses a function in Yuán Huáng’s 
broader program of self-cultivation—which is to instil a perfectly selfless mind—a ”no-
mind”—that in turn will provide karmic efficacy to ledger practice. Huáng was a firm 
believer in every man’s limitless power to alter his own fate. This was to be achieved through 
the accumulation of merit and the minute recording thereof. However, good deeds if 
performed with a conscious calculated intention of their karmic effects, would not be 
efficacious. This is where Buddhist meditation comes into play. Through sustained 
meditation the practitioner may gradually rid himself of self-centred desire and intentions, 
thereby enabling him, paradoxically, to climb the social hierarchy much more effectively. 
I furthermore propose that a way of understanding this relationship is through 
the ”root-and-branch” (běn-mò 本末) analogy made famous by the Great Learning, a classic 
on self-cultivation. This scheme not only exerted immense influence by virtue of the status of 
the Great Learning as one of the Four Classics, but as I will show was also explicitly drawn 
upon by one contemporary of Yuán Huáng with a conspicuously similar bibliography on self-
cultivation. 
The first part of the chapter is devoted to comparing the Meditation Essentials with 
his (more famous) works on merit accumulation, focusing particularly on the central concern 
for virtues and intentions in both. Whereas a selfless and compassionate mind is portrayed as 
the most important effect of meditation, it is an indispensable prerequisite of ledger practice. 
The second part is an exploration of the terms used to express this state of mind in the 
Meditation Essentials (”no desire”, ”humaneness”, “pure mind”) on the one hand and the 
Four Admonitions of Liǎofán (”no-mind”) on the other. By showing the intimate and non-
incidental connections between these concepts, I aim to reinforce the argument that they are 
expressions of the same fundamental concern and thus lend credence to my theory of there 
being a ”root-and-branch” relationship between meditation and morality ledgers. 
The exploration of these fundamental concepts concerning state of mind, as well as 
their relation to meditation, is continued in chapter four. Here I broaden the view to look at 
their occurrence in meditation texts written by important earlier and contemporaneous Neo-
Confucian thinkers. Through the examples, I show again the quality of the connection 
between the three concepts, and furthermore that they were all part of the concerns of these 
Neo-Confucian masters in their dealings with meditation. Doing so, I demonstrate that Yuán 
Huáng’s particular conceptualisation of meditation—as a way of weeding out desire and 
cultivating ”humaneness” in its place—is not so idiosyncratic after all. Rather, it has clear 
both antecedents and succedents in the Neo-Confucian discourse on meditation. The presence 
of such concepts in that discourse, as well as their relation to the quasi-soteriological ultimate 
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goals of these meditators—expressed through such terms as ”discerning the minute 
distinctions of our root source”, “matching heaven”, ”recognizing from experience the 
original form of our root nature” and ”returning to one’s nature”—is something utterly 
neglected in the existing secondary literature on Neo-Confucian meditation. Thus, one 
important broader implication of the Meditation Essentials as I see it, is that by virtue of 
foregrounding this function of meditation as weeding out desire and cultivating humaneness, 
it draws our attention to the fact that even in cases where this function is placed further in the 
background, it is still present—as demonstrated by the examples in this chapter. Since the 
examples are from somewhat different time periods, I strive to combine the discussion of 
them with a superficial historical treatment of the Neo-Confucian dealings with meditation as 
a whole. By providing this historical context, it is hoped that the reader will be able to better 
appreciate not only the significance of the mentioned three concepts and their relation to the 
goal of Confucian meditation, but also the place of the Meditation Essentials within that 
context. 
Finally, in Appendix A I have translated the original preface and the chapters most 
germane to my main argument: chapters one (”Distinguishing the Will”), five (”Eliminating 
Desire”) and six (”Expanding Love”). In Appendix B the reader will find a copy of the 
complete original text, with page numbers to which the references in this thesis correspond.15 
 
Before getting on with the Chapter 1 and Yuán Huáng’s biography, some words should be 
said about the terms ‘meditation’ and “sitting in meditation”. As applied in this thesis the first 
is mostly an etic term used as an analytical tool, whereas the second is an emic term, used to 
translate the Chinese term jìngzuò 靜坐. I say “mostly”, because in some of my translations 
jìngzuò is for stylistic reasons instead rendered as “meditation”—as for example in the very 
title of our text, “Meditation Essentials”. In such instances, the reader can be sure that 
“meditation” refers to jìngzuò, and not some other meditative practice. For example, unlike 
many other writers on related topics, I consistently steer away from having “meditation” refer 
to chán 禪, and ”sitting meditation” to chán zuò 禪坐 (chán being a term specific to Buddhist 
meditation). Instead, chán is predictably rendered as dhyāna, the original Sanskrit term it 
translates, except where its referent is clearly the Chinese Chán tradition, in which cases the 
Chinese word is used, with a capital C. 
                                                 
15 The edition copied is that included in the 1605 collection Liǎofán zázhù 了凡雜著, as reprinted in 
Yuán Liǎofán wénjí 袁了凡文集. Page referrals are to the page number in Yuán Liǎofán wénjí, which 
may be located at the bottom right of each copied page pair (“a” referring to the page on the right, “b” 
to the page on the left). For philological information on the Liǎofán zázhù as well as and the different 
editions of the Meditation Essentials, see present thesis, ch. 2, sect. 5. 
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As for ’meditation’ as en etic term, it is necessary to provide a working definition. In 
other words, what is meditation? One does not have to delve deep into this question before its 
complexity becomes apparent, and no final answer may be given to it, but there have been 
some efforts to provide it with an operable definition in recent decades. Throughout this 
thesis I will employ and imply one rather broad definition developed by Halvor Eifring: 
 
Meditation may be defined as attention-based techniques for inner transformation.16 
 
An earlier version of this definition has been shown to be operable both in an East Asian and 
global context.17 It also works well with my argument, inasmuch as one of the things I argue 
is that Yuán Huáng conceived of meditation precisely as a means to “transform” himself—
eliminate desire and expand humaneness. 
 I should disclose that by opting for this definition, by implication I also reject a 
different trend of perceiving meditation developed in later decades, especially in Buddhist 
studies. “Buddhist Modernism and the Rhetoric of Meditative Experience” is the title of an 
article that has been particularly seminal for this trend. In it Robert Sharf polemicizes against 
the tendency to treat Buddhist meditation phenomenologically—as an inherently personal 
experience, with distinct “states” taking place in the mind of the meditator. He argues instead 
that Buddhist meditation is fundamentally a ritual phenomenon—a social  “enactment” of 
Buddhist doctrine.18 In order to bring out the difference between these two ways to treat 
meditation, we might call the perceived experience and its states of the former approach 
“transformative”. I do sympathize with Sharf’s project to counter the psychologization of 
Buddhism. I moreover accept his critique of the commonly concomitant view that Buddhist 
experiences of enlightenment and the stages (mārga) on the path towards it are 
phenomenologically constant, and that written accounts of them are inherently descriptive 
rather than prescriptive. I even admit that the lack of consideration for ritual might be a 
weakness in the definition I employ here as applied to meditative techniques in a pre-modern 
context. However, I believe Sharf goes too far in his “de-psychologization” of Buddhist 
meditation. Wanting to break down our Cartesian epistemic commitments, it seems that by 
distinguishing so distinctly ritual from experience he commits the self-same fallacy himself, 
separating mind clearly from body, and inner psychological phenomena from outer 
phenomena.19 
                                                 
16 Eifring and Holen, “The Uses of Attention: Elements of Meditative Practice”, 1. 
17 Eifring, ”Characteristics of East Asian Meditation”, 133–6. That version was: “Meditation is a self-
administered technique for inner transformation” (ibid., 130). 
18 Sharf, "Buddhist Modernism and the Rhetoric of Meditative Experience", 269. 
19 Appreciations to Guttorm Gundersen for our discussions on this topic. 
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That being said, delving fully into this discussion would lead us too far astray. 
Whatever the case for Buddhist meditation as narrowly understood, I feel confident that in 
our case at hand—Yuán Huáng and his Meditation Essentials, of which one characteristic is 
to consciously borrow a practice and place it in a partly new doctrinal as well as personal 
framework—the emphasis on “inner transformation” in our definition is not misplaced. Due 
to the antagonisms towards Buddhism, the Confucians were habitually careful not to, at least 
overtly, incorporate ritualistic aspects of meditation into their “sitting in meditation”—
slightly parallel, I would say, to “secular” applications of meditation in the modern word. 
Although he does not share this antagonism, Yuán Huáng is to some extent influenced by this 
rhetoric and hermeneutic, stressing as he does how sitting in meditation should not be 
restricted to time, place or posture. 
 Moving on to the emic term “sitting in meditation”, this is a very unorthodox 
rendering of jìngzuò, the more literal “quiet-sitting” having become the conventional English 
translation.20 “Sitting in meditation” was used by Wing-tsit Chan in his pioneering 
translations of Neo-Confucian works, but I have never seen it in other works.21 As for “quiet-
sitting”, as far as I have been able to discern, it was coined by William de Bary. In a 1975 
article, de Bary—laudably I should say—makes explicit his reasons for using this 
translation—thus enabling me more easily to point out why I think it is misguided. De Bary 
opposes Wing-tsit Chan’s “sitting in meditation”, arguing that it associates jìngzuò to closely 
with Buddhist ”sitting in meditation” (chánzuò 禪坐 or zuò chán 坐禪), what I render 
as ”sitting in dhyāna”. 22 However, there is much reason to associate the two—as the 
Meditation Essentials is one example of, jìngzuò there being used to describe a wholly 
Buddhist meditative practice as far as technique is concerned. Moreover, there is no reason to 
render zuò chán as “sitting in meditation”. Chán is a far more denominationally specific 
word, carrying heavy Buddhist connotations—thus poorly represented by a word such as 
“meditation”. Of all the terms for meditative practices in Chinese, it is in fact jìngzuò that is 
the least denominationally specific. That the term was restricted only to Neo-Confucian 
meditation is a misconception. For sure, it was the term the Neo-Confucians opted for, and it 
has a certain Neo-Confucian bias, but it was occasionally used in Buddhism and Daoism as 
well. Furthermore, whenever meditation was discussed in general terms, often in a context 
comparing the Three Traditions, it seems that jìngzuò was the preferred term.23 In this 
respect, it is in many ways similar to the English term ‘meditation’ of today. Indeed, 
                                                 
20 If we add its variant “quiet sitting”, among the sources used in this thesis that glosses jìngzuò, I 
have come across none who does not employ this gloss, except for Chan. 
21 Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. 
22 de Bary, “Neo-Confucian Cultivation and Enlightenment”, 170–2. 
23 See for example Chén Chún 陳淳, student of Zhū Xī, quoted in Nakajima, 108. 
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“jìngzuò” is today a common way to translate ‘meditation’ back again to Chinese, as well as 
one of the two preferred ways of referring to meditative practices in an all-embracing.24 
Lastly, jìng by itself is certainly best represented by English “quiet” or “quiescence”. Indeed, 
I employ the latter one myself in this thesis. Still, it should be remembered that jìng is a 
metaphysically far more potent word than English “quiet”, and this was carried over into 
jìngzuò from the very outset of its historical application.25 
 In order to capture these qualities of jìngzuò —especially its all-embracing, non-
denominational quality—I thus opt instead for “sitting in meditation”. Wing-tsit Chan got it 
quite right, and there was no reason to scrap his translation. 
 
  
                                                 
24 The other being míngxiǎng 冥想. Jìngzuò makes one specification that the English term meditation 
does not, namely spelling out that sitting is a requirement. (Indian Hatha yoga, for example, is not 
jìngzuò.) 
25 In “The Ten Faults” (十過), the tenth chapter of the legalist Hán Fēi Zǐ 韓非子 (c. 202–c. 136 
BCE), which is the first known instance of the term, a court musician is by way of ”jìng zuò” able to 
hear and memorize a song from the realm of demons. 
For a book length genealogy of jìngzuò (centred around numerous and lengthy quotations) see 
Nakajima, Jìngzùo; for a shorter one plus some reflections about its present usage, see Eifring, 
“Sitting Quietly in China”. Nakajima also has a section on the genealogy of jìng itself, 66–80. 
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CHAPTER 1:  
YUÁN HUÁNG AND LATE MÍNG CHINA 
 
 
1.1. Life: Establishing the fate  
Just as his work the Meditation Essentials was a product of its time, Yuán Huáng was a man 
of his age. Indeed, many characteristics of the late Míng era are reflected rather well in his 
biography.26 Yet of course it also includes more idiosyncratic aspects—the most important of 
which is inherently related and will point to his works on self-cultivation. 
 Born to a gentry family of Jiāshàn county 嘉善縣 in the province of Zhèjiāng 浙江 in 
1533, Yuán Huáng hailed—as did the majority of officials during the Ming dynasty27—from 
the economically and culturally dominant Jiāngnán 江南 area (”south of the Great River” i.e. 
the Yangzi). Ever since his Great-great-grandfather Yuán Qìshān 袁杞山 was implicated 
in—but survived—the draconian purges following the 1402 coup d’état by the third Míng 
emperor Yǒnglè 永樂, the Yuán family had made medicine their family profession. Often 
portrayed as a humble craft,28 during the Míng medicine was in fact the most honoured of all 
professions, when we leave out the bureaucracy and agriculture.29 It had become a major 
alternative for aspiring gentry during the Yuán 元 dynasty, when imperial examinations were 
rarely held; and remained one during the Míng, when both the economy and the general 
population—and consequently the number of gentry—expanded abruptly, without a 
corresponding upscaling of the examination system and the bureaucracy.30 
Whether it was this felt esteem or the family’s scepticism towards office that was the 
main motivation behind his mother’s decision to keep him from pursuing a career as an 
official despite the fact that the family’s ban from the examinations had finally been lifted, 
                                                 
26 For secondary material on Huáng’s biography, see works in note 13, as well as the TV drama 
Liǎofán de gùshi 了凡的故事 (aired 2009), which, though it of course has its historical inaccuracies, 
is surprisingly well-made.  
For historical sources on his biography, see his entries in the gazetteers Jiāshàn xiàn zhì 嘉善
縣志 (from 1677 CE), f. 8, p. 21a–22a; Jiāngnán tōngzhì 江南通志 (1675 CE), f. 140, p. 51b; Jiāxìng 
fǔ zhì 嘉興府志 (1721), f. 14, p. 9; in the unofficial history of the Míng dynasty by Chá Jìzuǒ 查繼佐, 
Zuì wéi lù 罪惟錄 (1672), f. 48, p. 67; and in the collection of laymen biographies Jūshì zhuàn 居士
傳 (1775), p0266b15–p0268c21. For autobiographical material, see Yuán, “Lì mìng zhī xué” 立命之
學, in Liǎofán sì xùn 了凡四訓, 876a–883b. 
27 Brook, Troubled Empire, 32–38. 
28 E.g. in the TV drama on Yuán Huáng’s life mentioned in note 26. 
29 Brook, Troubled Empire, 152.  
30 Ibid. According to Joanna Handlin, towards the end of the Wànlì reign (1572–1620), which was the 
period when Yuán Huáng served, the bureaucracy actually shrank, due to the emperor’s refusal to 
assign new officials to vacant posts. See Handlin, Action in Late Ming Thought, 106. 
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we cannot be sure. By Huáng’s own account, his mother’s decision was motivated by the 
weight of the medical calling of saving, curing and caring for other people, and compelled by 
the will to this end of Huáng’s father, who had died when Huáng was a child.31 We might 
further speculate that she was also worried about economic and social stability, her son now 
being the only male in the household—and such stability was better sought in medicine than 
office, as indicated above. Furthermore, her personal belief was predominantly Buddhist,32 
which might have made her reluctant to send her son into the bureaucratic battlefield. Quite 
likely, it was a mixture of all these considerations.  
What we do know, in quite some detail due to Huáng’s own minute recounting of 
them,33 are the circumstances leading up to the reversing of this decision—and thus the 
continuation of our story. Unclear in which year, but early in his life and probably during his 
adolescence, Huáng ran into a Daoist fortune teller surnamed Kǒng 孔 outside a Buddhist 
monastery,34 who impressed him enough with his predictions that Huáng agreed to be his 
student and later receive a complete divination of his life’s future fortunes and misfortunes. 
Thus it was proved that Huáng’s fortune included passing both the county and provincial 
level examinations. If the decision to consequently resume classic schooling was made by his 
mother, this lends credence to my speculation about her consideration for stability (since she 
now could rest assured, granted she believed Kǒng, that Huáng would respectably pass the 
first two levels). At this point, however, he himself might have had a say in the matter; the 
only information he provides us with in this regard is that he “developed an aspiration to 
study [for office]”.35 This he did, and before long the first predictions made by prognosticator 
Kǒng were verified. Considering how the prophecy included such misfortunes as having no 
son and dying by the age of 52, we can only imagine the growing uneasiness Huáng must 
have felt when the increasingly specific predictions were confirmed one after the other. His 
subsequent fatalism and apathy we need not imagine, as he relates such feelings extensively 
himself. Particularly noteworthy with regard to the present study is his comment that he did 
not bother to read at all during his one year scholarship at the National Academy in Běijīng 
(Guózǐjiàn 國子監), but merely whiled away his days sitting in meditation.36 His dejection 
                                                 
31 Yuán 袁, Liǎofán sì xùn, 876a3. 
32 Brokaw, Ledgers, 72. 
33 In “Lì mìng zhī xué”, first chapter of Liǎofán sì xùn. 
34 Anyone familiar with the three traditions will recognize the curiousness of this incident. 
Incidentally, the Daoist fortuneteller shared surname with Confucius. Less incidentally, he happened 
to kick his heels outside a Buddhist monastery. This was probably in the 1550s, just when late Míng 
syncretism was in its incipient stage. For his encounter with Kǒng, see Yuán, Liǎofán sì xùn, starting 
at 876a4. 
35 Yuán, Liǎofán sì xùn, 876a. 
36 Yuán, Liǎofán sì xùn, 877a.  
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when it came to reading we can easily gather (reading could, in his view, not affect his 
examination results), but why meditate instead? Had he resigned to his fate in this life, 
pursuing instead liberation from saṃsāra? Does this slightly dismissive mention of 
meditation imply that it was not an important part of his religious practice after his rejection 
of fatalism? 
In 1569, on his way to the National Academy in Nánjīng (Yōng 雍), Huáng stopped 
over at Qīxiá Monastery 棲霞寺 just outside the city to pay a visit to Chán Master Yúngǔ 
Fǎhuì 雲谷法會禪師. This was just five years after one of the four great monks of the Míng 
dynasty, Hānshān Déqīng 憨山德清, had stayed there. Hānshān, at the time only 18 years old 
and still not ordained, was there partly to study meditation with the Master; Yuán Huáng, 
though he did sit in meditation opposite of the Master three days on end before any one of 
them uttered a word, learned something quite different, yet of comparable transformative 
import. It was the theory of ”establishing [one’s] fate” (lì mìng 立命), and the concomitant 
practice of keeping a ”Ledger of Merit and Demerit” (gōng-guò gé 功過格).37 Before 
continuing with Huáng’s biography, it is necessary to linger for a moment on these two 
concepts. Both are on the face of it fairly straightforward: Lì mìng is the ethical aspect of 
karmic law framed within the perspective of a person’s lifetime: Sow good deeds, and you 
will reap good rewards, thereby possibly altering your own fate (predominantly in the present 
life). A ”ledger of merit and demerit” was a chart by means of which the practitioner 
recorded and summed up his daily good and bad deeds—merits and demerits. This aided 
him—or her—in keeping track of his/her amassment of merit, and thus also, when coupled 
with the lì mìng theory, what fortune to expect for the future. It was originally a Daoist 
practice, based on the 12th century book Ledger of Merit and Demerit of the Tàiwēi Immortal 
(太微仙君功過格), but was in the syncretist environment of the Late Míng adapted and 
modified by Buddhist revivers, and then popularized by such figures as Yuán Huáng also 
among the Confucian literati.38 
For Yuán Huáng the lì mìng theory and gōng-guò gé practice were intimately 
connected: the prospect of altering one’s own fate was ultimately his rationale for keeping 
                                                 
37 For an extensive book length study of morality ledgers see Brokaw, Ledgers. There is also the 
classic 1960 study by Sakai, Chūgoku zensho no kenkyū; as well as a recent study in German, 
including a translation, by Lehnert, Partitur des Lebens: die Liaofan si xun von Yuan Huang (1533–
1606), but my lacking language proficiency prevents me from appraising either. 
38 There were also inspirations for this first Ledger of Merit and Demerit in the famous 4th century 
Daoist work Bào pú zǐ 抱樸子 (“The Master Who Embraces Simplicity”) by Gě Hóng 葛洪 (283–
343), as well as several similar works on the practice of merit accumulation that appeared in the ten 
intervening centuries. Many of these incorporated concepts and deities from both the Daoist and 
Buddhist corpus. On the early tradition of merit accumulation and its later Ledger variety, see Brokaw, 
Ledgers, ch. 1. (Interestingly, for my central claim of there being a functional relation between merit 
accumulation and meditation in Yuán Huáng, the Bào pú zǐ contains also meditation practices.) 
 16 
such ledgers. Yet they are not inherently connected; at least not in Yúngǔ and Yuán Huáng’s 
interpretation of lì mìng. For this concept is a bit more complicated than what appears. Lì 
mìng originates —as so many popular Confucian concepts during the Míng dynasty—from 
Mencius. As Brokaw demonstrates, Yúngǔ and Huáng deviates from Mencius’ understanding, 
which is not so much that man may transform his fate in terms of external benefits, but rather 
that he may choose to cultivate himself and act morally within the fate heaven has decreed for 
him (mìng literally means “decree”). This is to fulfil his nature (xìng 性), which in turn will 
bring happiness to himself and others. Brokaw calls Huáng’s idiosyncratic version “material 
fate”, and Mencius’ version “moral fate”.39 I might add that these two conflicting 
understandings of lì mìng, granted that they in fact are so different, seem in fact to be slightly 
different syntactically: whereas lì becomes transitive in Huang’s understanding, with mìng as 
its object (“establishing the fate”, i.e. actively altering it), for Mencius mìng seems rather to 
be a place adverbial, where the establishing takes place, “establishing oneself in one’s fate” 
(lì [yú] mìng 立[於]命). I should also mention, however, which Brokaw does not, that even 
though most sayings on this matter in Mencius goes against the morality, desirability and 
possibility of altering one’s material fate, there are also sections that are easily interpreted as 
amounting to the contrary—making the novel interpretation by Huáng and Yúngǔ less 
aberrant than Brokaw deems it, and plausibly even not entirely novel.40 Whether the belief 
that it is possible for man through virtuous conduct to alter his own “material” fate was in 
Confucianism heterodox or not, should perhaps rather be left an open question. Whether such 
motivations were moral, on the other hand, is much more clear-cut, this being the main 
opposition towards Huáng’s ledger practice. 
Another, more blatantly wrong, misconception in recent literature that we might bring 
up at this point, is that Huáng’s conception of karma was of the completely mechanical type, 
as opposed to the mystic, “organic” understanding represented by Oǔyì Zhìxù 藕益智旭 
(1599–1655), the last of the Four Great Monks of the late Míng.41 As a matter of fact, Huáng 
is first of all far from strange to the importance of repentance as a means of influencing 
karma.42 Moreover, as we shall see shortly, anterior to the actual execution of good deeds, 
Huáng is careful to ritually vow to perform them. This shows that he trusts the common 
Buddhist doctrine that actions are more potent karmically if vowed at an earlier point in time. 
                                                 
39 Brokaw, Ledgers, 79–84. 
40 In the first two chapters of Mencius, in his efforts to motivate the rulers Mencius repeatedly appeal 
to how humane governance (仁政) will naturally lead to benefits also for the ruler and his state 
themselves, bringing with it strength, reputation and leverage over the other states. 
41 McGuire, Living Karma, 11–12; 10. 
42 Not only does repentance play an important integral role in his Ledger system, but he also authored 
a whole work devoted to repentance, The Repentance Method of Mr Yuán (Yuán-shēng chànfǎ 袁生
懺法). 
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Finally, when discussing lì mìng and morality ledgers he repeatedly refers to the presence of 
gods in the meeting out and readjustment of fate (which, though far from un-Buddhist, might 
be one of the few remnants of the predominantly Daoist origin of ledger practice).  
That the gods control the application of the law of karma does not mean, however, 
that the workings of that law are not predictable. Huáng is adamant that if you start 
transforming your conduct through ledger practice, you can be certain to be rewarded a future 
fortune perfectly corresponding to the merit put in (at least if you vowed to do them). And 
this will happen to you now, in your present life—in contrast to the earliest ledgers where the 
focus was more on pleasing the gods and the prospect of becoming an immortal.43 Still, I 
challenge Brokaw’s view that there is a contrast between the early Daoist ledgers and 
Huáng’s reinterpretation of them when it comes to the concern for longevity.44 This 
traditionally Daoist concern is rather also something that is retained and lives on in his 
application—indeed, his life span was one of the main aspects of his allotment that he 
succeeded in altering, as we shall see. The conclusion by Brokaw, that the ledgers were on 
the whole secularized in the hands of Yuán Huáng, is nevertheless valid.45 Although his 
encounter with them led to his changing his sobriquet to ”Ending the This-Worldly” (Liǎofán 
了凡), it is clear that the this-worldly is precisely his main concern, the core of his motivation 
for using them in the first place—at least judging by how he sells it to his reader, which 
among other things features extensively stories about successful people, who owed the 
success of themselves and their descendants to infallible, humane conduct.46  
Yes, descendants were also included—an important qualification to my previous 
statement that lì mìng pertains only to one’s own individual fate. Even with an individualist 
as Yuán Huáng, the Confucian concern for family—past, present and future—is so ingrained 
in the way of thinking about everything—even the individual—that the mìng of a person is 
conceived as inseparable from the broader mìng of one’s kin. This was the case in all earlier 
theories and practices of merit accumulation practice as well—the belief in the inheritability 
of merits and demerits serving in the one end as an explanation of the apparent discrepancy 
                                                 
43 Still, I challenge Brokaw’s view that there is a contrast between Huáng and the early Daoist ledgers 
when it comes to the concern for longevity. One of the things he explicitly states (in “Lì mìng zhī 
xué”) that he was able to alter is precisely his life span. He was destined to die at age 52, but lived on 
to age 73. 
44 Brokaw, Ledgers, 105. 
45 Ibid. 
46 In the version of ”Merit for Accumulating Goodness” (Jī shàn zhī fāng 積善之方) found online the 
first half is dedicated to ten such anecdotes, whereas “The Efficacy of Humility” (“Qiāndé zhī xiào” 
謙德之效), as indicated by the title, consists mostly of similar stories. For reasons I have not had the 
occasion to probe, in the Liǎofán sì xùn version of “Jī shàn zhī fāng” that I have in front of me these 
stories are not included. The curious reader is therefore referred to the version at the homepage of 
monk Chin Kung 淨空: http://www.amtb.org.tw/pdf/19-16g_word.pdf.  
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between conduct and fortune (his parents must have been bad, that is why he despite virtuous 
conduct is still poor) and in the other end as a deterrent to bad conduct (not only you will 
suffer, but your children too).47 It would seem that it is in line also with the Neo-Confucian 
ontology of the day, according to which all humans (and everything else) have a common 
source (yuán 源), or principle (lǐ 理). As we shall see in chapter three, Chéng Hào’s 程顥 
preferred analogy for ”humaneness” (仁 rén), the Confucian cardinal virtue, was that of 
sensory feelings of the human body: Not feeling commiseration for other people was like 
being numb in parts of one’s own body. Somehow however, in Confucianism kin was in the 
end always closer, a more vital body part so to speak. Huáng does not relate how exactly he 
thinks about this—how one’s own mìng is part of and influences the mìng of one’s 
descendants—but there is no question that they do. He merely refers to commensurate 
formulations in the Confucian classics, especially this one from the Book of Changes, which 
he cites twice: “The family that accumulates good is bound to have abundant fortune. The 
family that accumulates evil is bound to meet with abundant misfortune”.48 
Bringing this finally back to Yuán Huáng’s biography, it was not the stupendous odds 
against the continued accuracy of Kǒng’s prophecy that led to his rejection of it, but rather 
the realization that one’s fate is one’s own to alter. In fact—and this is seldom stressed in the 
secondary literature—Yuán Huáng never rejected his fortune telling in the sense that he 
thought it was inaccurate or plain quackery: It had proved true, time and time again—but, as 
he now realized and later had confirmed, only while he did not actively try to change it. 
Fortune telling was possible—Yuán Huáng in fact dallied with it himself—and Kǒng had 
clearly reached supreme mastery, but it nonetheless represented a limited understanding of 
the world. With the help of Chán Master Yúngǔ, Huáng had managed to reach a deeper 
understanding—much like a Buddhist meditator’s transcendence of ordinary knowledge and 
attainment of perfect gnosis through dhyāna. This was Yuán Huáng’s enlightenment. And 
that he wanted to be known far and wide: From that day onwards he would be known not as 
“Ocean of Learning”, his previous sobriquet, but as Liǎofán 了凡—”[He who has] Ended [or 
overcome] Mundanity”. 
                                                 
47 Brokaw, Ledgers, 34–5. 
48 Yì jīng, ch. 2, para. 10. Modified based on translation by Legge. The first part is cited by Huáng as 
an introduction to “Jī shàn zhī fang” (”Method of Accumulating Goodness”, ch. 2 of Liǎofán sì xùn), 
and is also cited once in “Lì mìng zhī xué” (ch. 1). I might also add that although Yuán Huáng is 
largely unconcerned with the afterlife, it is my impression that one aspect with regard to kinship merit 
accumulation is that virtuous conduct will lead to filial sons and grandsons (etc.), who in turn will 
fulfil their sacrificial obligations towards their virtuous ancestor. This will in turn be beneficial for the 
ancestor. (If his outlook on the matter is Buddhist, then the perceived reason is that it will influence 
positively on his karma in future rebirths.) 
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As we have seen, most Buddhist schools teach that good deeds are karmically more 
potent if you at some point prior to their effectuation vowed to do them. And so one of the 
first things Yuán Huáng did as Liǎofán was to pledge the performance of three thousand good 
deeds—in order to “repay the virtuosity of [his] ancestors” and with the lì mìng goal of 
succeeding in the imperial examinations.49 The next year, 1570, he gained first place in the 
provincial examination, not third as Kǒng had predicted, thus earning him the jǔrén 舉人
degree—and proving to him the efficacy of his new-born philanthropy.50 Nine years later he 
performed the last of the three thousand good deeds. The following year, 1580, he then made 
another vow of three thousand deeds, this time with the supplication to finally have a son 
born to him. His faith in the boundless possibilities resting in the transformation of one’s fate 
must have been great at this point, as he was already 47 years old, his wife presumably only a 
couple of years younger. His confidence could have been no less unwavering one year later, 
when his wife bore him not only a child but a son, thereby securing the Yuán blood line for at 
least another generation.51 
Confidence is no less evident in Yuán Liǎofán’s last vow, undertaken in 1583: Ten 
thousand good deeds, with the wish to pass the highest imperial examination and thus earn 
the vital degree of jìnshì 進士. This he did in 1586, and was subsequently appointed 
magistrate of Bǎodǐ county (寶坻縣) in North Zhílì province (北直隸府) in 1588. The 
consummation of his last vow during these years in office must have manifested well in his 
merits of service,52 for after having served for five years he was appointed to a minor position 
in the Ministry of War53—in 1593, his sixtieth year. This was the year the Ming court finally 
decided to go all in on Korea’s side in the Korean-Japanese War of 1592–1597, and Liǎofán 
was soon dispatched to the front to serve as advisor (zànhuà 贊畫) to the highest civil officer 
                                                 
49 Yuán, “Lì mìng zhī xué”, 880a. 
50 Again we have a possible parallel in meditation, viz. how meditative visions were interpreted and 
used as indicators (xiàng 相) of progress on the path. 
51 There is a parallel here in one of the earliest recounts of a system of merit accumulation: Yào xiū 
kēyì jièlǜ chāo 要修科儀戒律超, an early Táng text, tells of a man who had committed 530 evil deeds 
and thus could expect his children to be stillborn, while another who had done 720 would, as Brokaw 
phrases it, “be cursed with an even graver misfortune—many daughters, but no sons.” Brokaw, 
Ledgers, 33. 
52 The breaking down of the lǐ jiǎ 里甲 system of rural organization in the previous decades had left 
unprecedented large room for dynamic local officials (Handlin, Action in Late Ming Thought, 35). 
Liǎofán seems to have been an example of such, as he is remembered to this day as one of the most 
conscientious magistrates in the history of Bǎodǐ county. After he died, both a sacrificial altar and a 
memorial stele were erected to his memory. Securing his stature in particular, was his feat of 
managing to lower the tax and corvée burden of the county, through a memorial to the throne (which 
also secured him the remaining merits of his last wow). See Yáo 姚, ”Bǎodǐ shànzhèng”.  
53 His position was that of zhǔshì 主事 (”manager”) in the zhífāng sī 職方司, a bureau under the 
Ministry of War (bīng bù 兵部) dealing with geography and tribute.  
 20 
in the war, Sòng Yīngchāng 宋應昌. Liǎofán is portrayed as having opposed on moral 
grounds several of the decisions by the highest military officer Lǐ Rúsōng 李如松, thereby 
provoking Lǐ to impeach Liǎofán on false grounds, leading to Liǎofán being stripped of his 
office later that year.54 In this he was one example among many, as the chaotic, fractious state 
of Late Míng court politics reached a climax during the last decades of the 16th century.55  
During the reign of the Tiānqǐ 天啟 emperor (1620–27)  the war was reassessed, prompting a 
rehabilitation of Liǎofán and an acknowledgement of his contributions.56 
Dismissal was perhaps not an unwelcome event, as it allowed him to return south to 
his home village Jiāshàn to spend his remaining years there and concentrate on his writing.57 
Several of his works were written in this period, including the most important 
autobiographical source that later became the first chapter of the Four Admonitions of 
Liǎofán—and probably parts of the Meditation Essentials. Liǎofán died here in 1606, 73 
years old—at least according to the conventional dating, which there is some reason not to 
trust unreservedly.58 
 
                                                 
54 Péng 彭, ”Yuán Liǎofán zhuàn” 袁了凡傳, p0267a22. 
55 Handlin, Action in Late Ming Thought, 31. 
56 Zhāng, “Shíliù shìjìmò zhōng-hán shǐjié guānyú Yángmíng xúe de lùnbiàn” 十六世紀末中韓使節
關於陽明學的論辯, 67. Liǎofán was bestowed the title of 寶司少卿. 
57 Jiāshàn xiàn zhì 嘉善縣志, revised 1677 edition, fasc. 8, p. 22a. 
58 As far as I can tell, the year stems from the biographic encyclopaedia of prominent Buddhist 
laymen, Jūshì zhuàn (”Biographies of Laymen”), finished in 1775, and it seems impossible to know 
what that dating is based on. Of his extant biographies written prior to this, none mentions year of 
death (Jiāshàn xiàn zhì 嘉善縣志; Jiāxìng fǔ zhì 嘉興府志; Jiāngnán tōngzhì 江南通志; Zuì wéi lù 
罪惟錄). As a matter of fact, the Meditation Essentials includes evidence for the falsity of this dating. 
In the preface, after mentioning his association with the monks Yúngǔ and Miàofēng, Liǎofán states: 
“The Great Dharma has been abandoned for a long time, and I wish to contribute to its revival. The 
two masters, too, have both passed away. […]” The Miàofēng he refers to, must, according to my 
research, be Miàofēng Fúdēng, 妙峰福燈 (1540–1612) of Mount Wǔtái 五台山. The fact that 
Miàofēng died in 1612 indicates that the terminus post quem of the Meditation Essentials is 1612—i.e. 
after his year of death, which is surely impossible. This means that either Liǎofán is wrong about 
Miàofēng being dead at the time of writing the preface, or the preface was written after 1612, which 
means in turn that Liǎofán’s year of death too must be after 1612. The reasons for choosing for the 
latter option are quite compelling: First, the Biographies of Laymen, from which the conventional 
dating derives, was compiled as late as 1775. Second, the entry on Liǎofán in this work includes 
another misconception, namely that he was from Wújiāng 吳江, which has later been disconfirmed. 
However, the evidence for the latter option—that Liǎofán mistakenly believed that Miàofēng was 
dead—is even more compelling. For the first publication of the Meditation Essentials that we know of 
was in 1605. This redaction includes said preface with said comment, making 1605, not 1612, the 
terminus post quem for the Meditation Essentials. And so the evidence for the falsity of the 
conventional dating of Liǎofán’s passing was not compelling evidence after all; 1606 is still a 
possibility, and should remain the conventional dating.  
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1.2. Works and legacy: Ocean of Learning; School of Mind 
Today, Yuán Liǎofán is remembered primarily as the single most important individual for the 
dissemination of the Ledgers of Merit and Demerit; and among the originators of the related 
genre of Shàn shū 善書 (“[exhorting] good books”), through his four texts that circulated 
both independently and as part of other works, and that we today know by the title Liǎofán sì 
xùn 了凡四訓, the “Four Admonitions of Liǎofán”. He is remembered as Liǎofán, the 
Buddhist layman who ”overcame” his ”ordinary” understanding of fate and fortune, and 
contributed to the inception of a movement that would later make a great impact on Chinese 
civil society. 
 Yet, though he had formally dropped this sobriquet, Liǎofán was still Xuéhǎi 學海, 
an ”ocean of knowledge”. He is described as a prodigy and as being of great learning (bóxué 
博學) in several of the biographical sources, and wrote extensively on highly diverse topics. 
In the historical county and prefectural gazetteers where his biography was included, his 
fields of expertise are said to cover Xiàng-wěi divination (象緯), calendar science (lì fǎ 曆法), 
philological evaluation of historical texts (參訂古今圖史), geography (yúdì 輿地) and 
medicine and prophecy (yī bǔ 醫卜). Looking at the works included in Miscellaneous 
Writings of Liǎofán (Liǎofán zázhù 了凡雜著) we might add to this list edification, poetry, 
unofficial biography, water conservancy, agronomy, administration, “praying for progeny”—
and, repentance and meditation.59 According to Brokaw he also wrote commentaries on the 
Confucian Four Books (Analects, Mencius, Great Learning and Doctrine of the Mean).60 In 
his entry in the Dictionary of Ming Biography, his works and interests are summarized into 
three categories: ”Government-administrative writings, moral-religious writings, and 
reference books mostly aimed at students preparing for the examinations.”61 To this should 
perhaps be appended a category “personal writings”, so that his poetry, biographies and 
letters are not excluded.  
 Alternatively, another possible categorization of his works, stressing their function 
and interrelatedness, could be drawn along the classical interior/exterior (nèi-wài 內外) 
distinction, yielding: (1) self-cultivation, (2) statecraft and preparations for service, (and 3, 
                                                 
59 Represented by the following titles (in the corresponding order): Xùn ér súshūo 訓兒俗說 
(”Popular sayings for educating sons”); Qǐ sì zhēnquán 祈嗣真詮 (”The true principles of praying for 
progeny”); Jìngxíng biépǐn 浄行別品 (”Alternative chapters on pure practice”); Hé tú luò shū jiě 河圖
洛書解 (”An explication of the Hé tú luò shū”); Quàn nóng shū 勸農書 (”Letters for the 
encouragement of farming”); Huáng dū shuǐ lì 皇都水利 (“Water conservancy in the capital”); Shī 
wài bié zhuàn 詩外別傳 (”Unofficial poems and biographies”); Bǎodǐ zhèngshū 寶坻政書 (”Texts on 
the government of Bǎodǐ”); Yuán-shēng chànfǎ 袁生懺法 (”The repentance method of Mr Yuán”) 
and Jìngzuò yàojué 靜坐要訣 (”Meditation essentials”). 
60 Brokaw, Ledgers, 70n29. 
61 Fang, ”Yüan Huang”, 1634. 
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personal writings). Another way of conceptualizing this distinction is through the root-and-
branch metaphor of the Great Learning, one of two self-cultivation chapters extracted from 
the Book of Rites (c. 100 CE62) and included among the Four Books (sì shū 四書) of the new 
Neo-Confucian state orthodoxy. The main point the Great Learning makes is that good 
governance and moral behaviour is predicated upon the statesman’s perfected virtues and 
state of mind, calling the latter běn 本 (“root”) and the former mò 末 (”treetop” or ”tip of 
branch”). Self-cultivation follows a series of sequences, from cultivation of the mind (root) to 
moral action and good governance (branch), every step being a prerequisite for the next.  
 In the self-cultivation category I would then place the Meditation Essentials along 
with the works later published as the Four Admonitions of Liǎofán, as well as Qǐ sì zhēnquán 
祈嗣真詮 (”The true principles of praying for progeny”); Jìngxíng biépǐn 浄行別品 and 
Yuán-shēng chànfǎ 袁生懺法 (”The repentance method of Mr Yuán”). The ”root-and-branch” 
distinction can be conveniently applied here as well. As I will argue in later chapters, there is 
a functional relationship between meditation and merit accumulation (represented by the 
Four Admonitions of Liǎofán) wherein the former is a prerequisite of the former. This 
relationship is succinctly encapsulated, I believe, by conceiving the former as root and the 
latter as branch. There is even some evidence that meditation and merit accumulation was 
conceived of in exactly this way in Liǎofán’s own time, as I will show when comparing 
Liǎofán to Liú Zōngzhōu in chapter four.  
 Thus, there are two levels to this root-and-branch distinction as applied to Yuán 
Liǎofán’s authorship: first a general level, indicating the relationship between self-cultivation 
and statecraft; and then a more specific one, indicating the relationship between his works 
within the category of self-cultivation.  
These functional distinctions have the added benefit of throwing light on the function 
of meditation within Liǎofán’s program of self-cultivation and the Meditation Essentials 
within his authorship, a theme that will be pursued in chapter four. 
 The root-and-branch distinction corresponds almost to the conceptual pair “ideal-
centred” and “fact-centred” that Joanna Handlin uses to distinguish diverging approaches to 
self-cultivation in the late Míng. The “ideal-centred” approach, as defined by Handlin, 
emphasised abstract ideals based upon scholarly learning from the Classics, whereas the 
“fact-centred” approach is characterized by an emphasis on personal experience, concrete 
events, and the scrutiny and perfection of faults.63 Let us now see if this framework is 
applicable to Yuán Liǎofán, specifically his meditation and merit accumulation.  
                                                 
62 Brooks and Brooks, “An Overview of Selected Classical Chinese Texts.” All the datings in this 
thesis of historical texts are based on the revisionist datings by Brooks and the Warring States Project. 
63 Handlin, Action in Late Ming Thought, 186. 
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The Meditation Essentials is a bit difficult to place, inasmuch as Handlin’s categories 
are based on the Confucian self-cultivation discourse (as narrowly understood). However, 
even though it expounds a practice, personal experience is almost entirely absent from that 
text, while appeals to authority, textual as well as previous sages (the Buddha and 
bodhisattvas) and present masters (meditation teachers for guidance), are conspicuously 
present. So are abstract virtues and ideals. There is no place, explicitly at least, for the unique 
experience of the individual. And so, on further scrutiny the Meditation Essentials fits into 
the ideal-centred genre in this framework. 
As for the Four Admonitions of Liǎofán, although they cite extensively from 
particularly the Book of Changes and Mencius, these works still fit relatively neatly into the 
“fact-centred” genre. Indeed, Liǎofán is one of Handlin’s examples of intellectuals adhering 
to this approach.  
 The main problem with Handlin’s distinction is that it obscures the possible functional 
and integrated relationship between these two approaches to self-cultivation. Admittedly, she 
does state that the two are not mutually incompatible, but her actual discussion of them 
nonetheless treats them as being in opposition. As a matter of fact, she invokes both Yuán 
Huáng and Liú Zōngzhōu as belonging to the “reorientation” of the fact-centred side, despite 
the fact, which will become clear through the course of this thesis, that they both spanned the 
whole root-and-branch continuum, including the “ideal-centred” practice of cultivating moral 
virtues through sitting in meditation. 
The exceptionally perceptive reader will have noticed that even though divination 
must surely have been part of the original “moral-religious writings” category, I have not 
included it in my revised category of “self-cultivation”. This must imply that I categorize it as 
“statecraft”, which might strike the reader as odd. However, Korean sources from the 1592–
97 war offer us a window through which we can detect its perceived utility in a governmental 
context: During his assignment in Korea Liǎofán somewhat bewildered the Korean king by 
fervently practicing a branch of Chinese geomancy called wàng qì 望氣, which Fang glosses 
as ”prognostication involving study of the atmosphere”.64 This he did to determine the 
prognosis for battle—parallel, I might add, to one important usage of turtle shell divination 
(the origin of the Chinese script) in antiquity.65  
                                                 
64 Fang, ”Yüan Huang”, 1633. 
65 For an example of turtle shell divination used in a war context, see Ebrey ed., Chinese Civilization: 
A Sourcebook, 4. 
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Zhāng Kūnjiāng has further explored Korean sources to show Liǎofán’s contribution 
to Korean philosophical discourse at the time, through his advocacy of the Wáng Yángmíng 
王陽明 School of Mind (xīn xué 心學) of Neo-Confucianism.66  
This last finding is especially significant for the purposes of this paper, because it 
reveals Liǎofán’s predilections regarding the Neo-Confucian schools, which are scarcely 
offered us by Liǎofán himself in his writing. The few mentions he does offer, Zhāng also 
locates, thus elaborating the descriptions from the Korean sources with a couple of details: 
First, Liǎofán lamented the contemporary situation of state orthodoxy, in which Zhū Xī 朱熹 
(1130–1200) was accorded uncontested supremacy while Lù Jiǔyuān 陸九淵 (1139–1192), 
Wáng Yángmíng’s doctrinal forerunner, was simply discarded. (This situation did indeed not 
reflect the intellectual trend in China at the time.) Second, his understanding of key concepts 
from the Great Learning corresponded with that of Yángmíng, who opposed Zhū Xī’s 
interpretation. And third, he studied for a while under Wáng Jī 王畿, one of the most 
influential disciples of Wáng Yángmíng.67 
This third detail is further attested to by the obituary Wáng Jī wrote of Liǎofán’s 
father, Yuán Rén 袁仁 (1479-1546), with whom he was close friends. In this obituary we 
also learn that Wáng Gěn 王艮 (1483–1541), another student of Yángmíng, recommended 
that Yuán Rén go study with Yángmíng—though Rén never did, for whatever reason.68  
It is not surprising that a Confucian scholar with Buddhist sympathies would adhere 
to the Neo-Confucian School of Mind rather than the School of Principle (lǐ xué 理學)—or 
said the other way around: that an adherent of the School of Mind might have Buddhist 
inclinations. Both schools were undoubtedly influenced by Buddhism (and exerted influence 
back again), but the common ground was more obvious in the School of Mind.69 A 
superficial indication of this is the fact that ”school of mind” was also a designation of a 
denomination within Buddhism, namely the Chán school, which had been the leading 
Buddhist tradition ever since the late Táng 唐. 
However, when it comes to meditation, the question of which Neo-Confucian school 
had most common ground with Buddhism is much less clear-cut. According to Rodney 
Taylor, meditative practices were predominantly associated with the Chéng-Zhū school, and 
                                                 
66 Zhāng 張, “Shíliù shìjìmò zhōng-hán shǐjié guānyú Yángmíng xúe de lùnbiàn” 十六世紀末中韓使
節關於陽明學的論辯即其意義. 
67 This is corroborated by the Míng history Zuì wéi lù by Chá Jìzuǒ (f. 48, p. 67), where Liǎofán is 
said to have ”harshly condemned [the] Chéng-Zhū [school]” (”極詆程朱”).  
68 Zhāng 張, “Shíliù shìjìmò zhōng-hán shǐjié guānyú Yángmíng xúe de lùnbiàn jí qí yìyì” 十六世紀
末中韓使節關於陽明學的論辯即其意義, 68–9. 
69 Araki, “Confucianism and Buddhism in the Late Ming”, 39–40. 
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in fact deemed irrelevant by Wáng Yángmíng’s School of Mind.70 How then did Yuán 
Liǎofán, advocate of this school, come to practice meditation? 
As we shall later see, demonstrated by examples such as Chén Báishā, Wáng Jī, Luó 
Hóngxiān and Liú Zōngzhōu, and as also pointed out by Mabuchi,71 Taylor’s assertion is not 
entirely correct. But let us first look for a partial answer in Liǎofán’s life and Yuán’s family 
history. Brokaw, basing herself on Okuzaki, observes that their forced position outside of the 
examination system allowed the Yuán family to stay relatively free in their intellectual 
propensities and clear of distinct doctrinal affiliations in the realm of Neo-Confucianism, yet 
remain active in contemporary debates.72 In time, this intellectual independence and moral 
purity, untainted by the corrupting influence of first pursuit then holding of office, became 
inexorably linked with the family identity. Herein lies perhaps also the reason why Liǎofán’s 
father, although on a social footing with disciples of Wáng Yángmíng, decided not to go 
study with him personally. To me it seems that this intellectual freedom ultimately can be 
traced at least partly to the socio-economic conditions during the late Míng, and that the 
Yuán family serves as a good example of how economic conditions might influence 
intellectual trends. 
Although Liǎofán brought the Yuán family back onto the examination treadmill (his 
son too became a jìnshì), and trust in the examination system and bureaucracy are evident in 
his moral philosophy, this heritage of intellectual independence would no doubt have made 
its influence on him.  
His works in the shàn shū genre furthermore evince an extraordinary personal faith in 
the power of the individual. As we saw in the previous section, man has the power to alter not 
only his moral fate, in the sense of reaching moral perfection, but also his material fate, 
climbing the social ladder. This moral individualism presumably secured a certain belief in 
intellectual individualism. 
We see then that both his individual and familiar situation secured a certain openness 
towards “heterodox” doctrines and practices. This openness would certainly have been 
strengthened by the intellectual climate of the time. Indeed, without an appeal to that climate, 
the particular forms of intellectualism his openness took cannot be begun to be understood—
and that brings us back to the Neo-Confucian debate of the time. Wáng Yángmíng had 
democratized the notion of sagehood, affirming everyone’s ability to reach moral perfection 
through the uncovering of his or her perfect inner innate knowledge or conscience (liángzhī 
良知). Accordingly, he also relativized the moral significance of the classics and the 
                                                 
70 Taylor, ”Meditation in Ming Neo-Orthodoxy”, 149. 
71 Mabuchi, “Sòng-Míng shíqí rúxué duì jìngzuò de kànfǎ”, 64n. 
72 Brokaw, Ledgers, 64–71. 
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historical (and mythic) sages, subordinating them to the moral judgement of each man’s own 
conscience. The Tàizhōu 泰州 school (named after the birthplace of its founder Wáng Gěn), 
the most radical of the School of Mind branches growing out of Yángmíng’s theories, 
brought this stream of his thought into what it perceived to be its logical conclusion: It is up 
to every man to seek out moral truth, and this quest should not be inhibited by random 
delineations of doctrines or judgments of orthodoxy versus heterodoxy. Some professed 
Confucians even believed that Buddhist and Daoist conceptions of the mind came closer to 
the truth and could be more helpful in the quest to uncover one’s ”original nature” (běnxìng 
本性) than the Confucian classics.73 Buddhism and Daoism could thus in some respects be 
more ”confucian” than Confucianism itself, if Confucianism meant sticking prescriptively to 
the established scriptures and doctrines as decided by later interpreters. A section in the 
Meditation Essentials reveals Yuán Liǎofán’s allegiance to this trend: 
 
Some might ask: “How is this [the compassion of the bodhisattva] different from Mòzǐ’s 
theory of ‘Impartial Love’ (jiān ài 兼愛)?” My answer is: [Yangist] ‘Self-preservation’74 and 
[Mohist] Impartial Love are both commendable. Impartial Love is ‘humaneness’ (rén 仁); 
Self-Preservation is ‘righteousness’ (yì 義)—how indeed are these not virtues! Mencius’ 
reason for being hostile towards Yángzǐ and Mòzǐ was simply their clutching to one [extreme]: 
Either clutching to Self-Preservation and neglecting Impartial Love, thereby harming rén; or 
clutching to Impartial Love and neglecting Self-Preservation, thereby harming yì. It is merely 
for this reason that Mencius remained hostile towards these doctrines. 
 The scholars of antiquity practiced Self-Preservation; so how can Confucians not be 
Self-Preserving? ’Humaneness’ is loving other people; so how can Confucians not practice 
Impartial Love? Confucianism regards striving for rén as the ethos of its doctrinal 
transmission. At the same time it has never abandoned yì. The parallel application and mutual 
compatibility of rén and yì is what is regarded as the Middle Way. If one did not practice self-
preservation or Impartial Love, then how indeed could one do what is right? Clutching to the 
theories of Yáng and Mò, and clutching to Confucianism, are equally perverse! (ME 34b7–
35a5)  
 
                                                 
73 Mabuchi, “Sòng-Míng shíqí rúxué duì jìngzuò de kànfǎ”, 64. See for example the case of Xuē Huì 
薛慧 (1489–1541), as quoted in Mabuchi, p. 78. According to Araki, during the period in which 
Wáng Yángmíng (1472–1529) was active, it was impossible for a Confucian to hold such blatantly 
ecumenical views (“Confucianism and Buddhism in the Late Ming”, p. 43). If we do not regard Xuē 
Huì as an exception, it seems then that the 1520s and 1530s must have been decades of pronounced 
change in this regard. This is another reason, I think, for taking 1530 as the starting point of the late 
Míng. Bear in mind also that our Yuán Liǎofán was born in 1533—straight into late Míng syncretism 
in its incipient stage. 
74 wèi wǒ 為我. A gloss that is more faithful to the meaning of this concept, but less faithful the 
terseness of the paragraph as a whole, is “Doing for Oneself”. Opting for “self-preservation” I must 
specify that this Yangist concept has little to do with Wáng Gěn’s bǎo shēn 保身, which is also 
glossable as ”self-preservation”. On the Yangist school and wèi wǒ, see Graham, Disputers of the 
Tao, 53–64. 
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Here I believe that “Confucianism", in the italicized phrase “clutching to Confucianism” (zhí 
rú 執儒), must be understood in the mentioned ”taizhouan” way of random, restricting 
partisanship.  
Such judgements go back too to an age-old syncretist intellectual tradition, epitomized 
in “All Under Heaven” (Tiān xià 天下), final chapter of the Zhuāngzǐ 莊子 and the first 
instance of an intellectual history in China (probably dating from the early Hàn 漢 dynasty).75 
There too ”clutching to one [extreme]”  (zhí yī 執一)—in that case of fragmented traces of 
the ancient sages that can be found in contemporary doctrines—is what is regarded as 
particularly intellectually perverse. The sages of old, according to the author of Tiān xià, did 
not let themselves be restricted from the Way by such constructions as doctrinal affiliation; 
the sages of new, in the view of the Tàizhōu school, transcended all notions of orthodoxy and 
heterodoxy. 
Hence, if meditation, even Buddhist meditation, aided Yuán Liǎofán in his quest for 
moral excellency, then it should not be regarded as incompatible with the Confucian quest for 
sagehood. Many Tàizhōu affiliates used Buddhist doctrine in this way. Possibly, many of 
these also practiced Buddhist meditation, considering its essential role in Buddhist practice (a 
hypothesis which to my knowledge is yet to be explored). Buddhist meditation might even 
have been simpler to accept than an integrated Confucianized practice. Indeed, the meditative 
practice found in Wáng Jī, not strictly of the Tàizhōu school but habitually linked to it, has 
clearer Buddhist characteristics than those found among Dōnglín affiliates, such as Gāo 
Pānlóng 高攀龍 and Liú Zōngzhōu 劉宗周 (whom we will meet in chapter four). At the 
same time, paradoxically, it seems to have played a much less central and integrated role 
(raising the question of which of the two strategies was in the end more syncretistic.) This 
last fact—the discrepancy in degree of “confucianization”—is presumably also the reason 
behind Taylor’s assertion that ”quiet-sitting” was mainly associated with the Chéng-Zhū 
School of Principle. 
This tolerance for Buddhist practices is of course not only attributable to the 
theorizing of philosophers in the Tàizhōu School of Mind. The cultural ascendancy of 
Buddhism, detailed by Timothy Brook in Praying for Power, played a crucial role as well. 
Figuratively speaking, from the tea pavilions of a Buddhist monastery, where trendy 
Confucian scholars came to drink tea and even read sutras, the distance to the dhyāna hall 
was not far. Not owing merely to the intellectual developments within the school of mind, 
this had also to do with economic and social developments that lead the invigorated gentry to 
seek ways to affirm their newly won economic power outside of the Confucian state realm.  
                                                 
75 ICS Zhuangzi 33/97/13–33/102/2. Brooks and Brooks, in “An Overview of Selected Classical 
Chinese Texts,” call the Tiān xià a librarian’s colophon rather than an actual chapter. 
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Or rather: these developments are all interrelated—the economic conditions also influencing 
the trajectory of the development of Neo-Confucianism. Still, it is possible to distinguish 
between the two when it comes to the shift in the gravitation in Liǎofán’s eclecticism from 
Daoist—where it had been with his ancestors (not uncommon for people dealing with 
medicine)—to Buddhist.76 This is clearly better explained by the economic and cultural 
ascendancy of Buddhism than the intellectual trends of the Tàizhōu school, which affirmed 
the role of Daoism as much as it did Buddhism. 
Yuán Liǎofán was indeed identified with the Yángmíng School and Tàizhōu branch 
by later critics, and routinely linked with Lǐ Zhì 李贄 (the erratic figure mentioned in the 
introduction), “as an example of the type of irresponsible and ‘depraved’ literatus responsible 
for the fall of the Ming.”77 This was despite the fact that the two never associated and had 
little in common intellectually other than their affirmation of Buddhism. For example, Lǐ Zhì 
left no works on meditation. He furthermore “lamented the dominance of market values in 
the formation of human relationships”, 78 which bears resemblance to the criticism most 
commonly directed against Liǎofán’s use of merit ledgers: that this subjected ethics to market 
logic and reduced moral goodness to profit-seeking.79 Their common fault then must have 
rested in their readiness to look for moral authority beyond the Confucian classics and 
beyond the contemporary state of Confucianism. 
And yet, whenever concrete critique was directed towards Liǎofán, it was always his 
shàn shū and the keeping of ledgers that was criticized—or endorsed. As I will show in the 
next chapter, to my knowledge, prior to 1929 no one ever appraised his meditation practice. 
Liú Zōngzhōu (1578–1645), perhaps the most important Neo-Confucian philosopher of the 
very late Míng, and part of the Dōnglín reaction to the Tàizhōu school, offered the most 
detailed criticism of Liǎofán, and even designed his own self-cultivation program in 
response.80 In this program, meditation plays a surprisingly essential part, meaning that this 
could not be a part of his opposition to Liǎofán, at least not meditation per se. Does this mean 
                                                 
76 One exception to this shift is his Qǐ sì zhēnquán 祈嗣真詮 (”The true explication of praying for 
progeny”), perhaps the most syncretic of Liǎofán’s works, where there arguably is an overweight of 
typically Daoist practices. The shorter abridgement Shè shēng sān yào 攝生三要 (”Three essentials 
for the nourishment of life” describes how to nourish the body’s qì 氣 (”ether”), jīng 精 
(”quintessence”) and shén 神 (”spirit”), unmistakably Daiost practices. 
77 Brokaw, Ledgers, 112. In the biographical section of the unofficial Míng history Zuì wéi lù, the two 
are grouped together under one entry (“李贄袁黃”), as the only ones as far as I can see. Yet the actual 
biographies are separated, and no relation between them is explicated. See Chá Jìzuǒ, Zuì wéi lù, f. 48, 
p. 67. 
78 Ibid., 126. 
79 Handlin, Action in Late Ming Thought, 200, 202. 
80 Brokaw, Ledgers, 130–8. 
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that Liǎofán and/or his audience regarded the two as separate? Or might it be that his critics 
missed a crucial part of his program of self-cultivation? 
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CHAPTER 2:  
THE MEDITATION ESSENTIALS AND THE SEQUENTIAL GATEWAY 
 
 
Having introduced the author’s biographical, bibliographical and intellectual context, let us 
now turn to the subject matter of the thesis, his Jìngzuò yàojué 靜坐要訣 (”The Meditation 
Essentials”). It is a common misconception either that Liǎofán authored the treatise himself 
or, more commonly, compiled and edited it from a base of different Buddhist meditation texts. 
And in the latter case, the text he does in fact base himself on is curiously never among the 
texts mentioned.81 Liǎofán himself provides no clues as to what parts of the texts are 
quotations, where they are extracted from, or to what degree they are condensed or rewritten. 
Some segments are quite obviously his own writing. Without the preface a reader without 
mastery of Buddhist meditation texts might be mislead to think that his pen is present 
throughout the text. The preface is where he reveals his own role: 
 
For the sake of expounding the purport of the teachings [masters Yúngǔ Fǎhuì and Miàofēng 
Fúdēng] left behind, as well as exploring the legacy of the Tiāntāi [school], I have compiled 
(輯) this treatise. I now share it with the aspiring. (ME 33b6–7, my emphasis) 
 
For a long time I too believed that much of the content in the Meditation Essentials was 
gathered from different meditation texts, and tried to ascertain which paragraphs in the 
Meditation Essentials this was, as well as which texts they were extracted from. After having 
done this for a while, however, I had only found fragments from one meditation text. On the 
other hand, these fragments started to cover a considerable portion, found in every chapter. 
Thus came the realization that the Meditation Essentials is not an edited compilation of 
different meditation texts, but (with one exception) rather a reworked abridgment of one 
single meditation text, Zhìyǐ’s Sequential Gateway.82 I find no better word than ‘abridgement’ 
to describe this process and the resulting text, but there are many qualifications to such a 
description; and for the complicated role of Liǎofán in this process there simply exists no 
word (though I am of course forced to refer to it repeatedly, opting then for ”author”). The 
quality of this role will emerge gradually in the following presentation. 
I begin it by treating Liǎofán’s possible reasons and motivations for choosing the 
basis text he did, and continue with a discussion of the genre of the Meditation Essentials 
                                                 
81 Yán Wèibīng 嚴蔚冰, editor of the most recent publication of the Meditation Essentials, claims 
intimate understanding of it yet says that it is based mainly on the Liù miào fǎmén and Xiǎo zhǐ-guān 
(both of which I will come back to below). Yán, ed., Yuán Liǎofán Jìngzuò yàojué  袁了凡靜坐要訣, 
102. 
82 As far as I know, or later came to learn, this discovery was first made by Mabuchi, in “Sòng-Míng 
shíqí rúxué duì jìngzuò de kànfǎ” (from 2013), 96. He does not, however, mention the exception, 
which I will return to below. 
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through comparisons with other similar preceding as well as contemporary works. Then I 
turn to the core of this chapter, which is to analyze the content and structure of the Meditation 
Essentials, as well as the methodology Liǎofán employs to abridge and recast Zhìyǐ’s text. 
Gradually, the ways in which Liǎofán’s Meditation Essentials differs from Zhìyǐ’s Sequential 
Gateway will begin to emerge. Generalizing these will in turn facilitate a discussion of the 
reasons behind them, and that is where this chapter points to and provides a basis for chapter 
three and four. Although Liǎofán introduces no new practices, I contend that the meditation 
of the Meditation Essentials is fundementally different from that of the Sequential Gateway, 
by virtue of the new Confucian framework Liǎofán erects for it, after having dismantled the 
original. I conclude the chapter with a philological treatment of the text’s provenance and 
transmission, bringing it all the way up to our day, when the Meditation Essentials can still 
be read. 
 Before all this, however, it is necessary to get to know this meditation treatise to 
which the Meditation Essentials is so greatly indebted. 
 
2.1. Zhìyǐ and Explaining the Sequential Gateway to the Perfection of Dhyāna 
Explaining the Sequential Gateway to the Perfection of Dhyāna83 is a treatise on meditation 
based on a series of lectures held by Zhìyǐ 智顗 (538–597) sometime during his eight years 
                                                 
83 Shì chán bōluómì cìdì fǎmén 釋禪波羅蜜次第法門 (T46n1916). In Chinese the work is often 
referred to by one of its shortened titles Cìdì chán mén 次第禪門 (”Sequential gateway of dhyāna”) 
or Chán bōluómì 禪波羅蜜 (”The perfection of dhyāna”). In this thesis it is henceforth referred to 
as ”Sequential Gateway”. Direct references come in-line with the acronym SG followed by page and 
line number based on the concordance code in CBETA. 
Since the work has never been translated into English, there is no fixed rendering of the title. 
The three scholars that I know of who have worked on the treatise in English all render it slightly 
differently than I do—and different from each other: Greene uses ”Explanation of the Sequential 
Method of Cultivation of the Perfection of Dhyāna”; Wang prefers “An Exposition of the Methods to 
Achieve the Stages of Meditative Perfection”; whereas Donner and Stevenson glosses it as 
“Elucidation of the Graduated Approach to the Perfection of Dhyāna”. (Stevenson has later, in an 
informal setting, described it as “Sequential Approaches for the Perfection of Dhyāna”. I have two 
main objections to these renderings, one concerning the word shì 釋, and the other the word fǎmén 法
門: First, I insist that shì 釋 (“explain/explanation”) is verbal in this title. As for Fǎ 法, it is a 
complicated word, but its two main denotations in Chinese are “law” and ”model, method”; in 
Buddhism it is in addition used to translate Sanskrit dharma. Mén 門 means ”gate” (the graph is a 
pictogram), with the additional metaphorical meaning ”means, method”. In my opinion 
English ”gateway” best covers both the literal and the metaphorical meanings of mén. For the 
compound fǎmén, ”dharma gateway” as Apple uses for Liù miào fǎmén 六妙法門 (”Six Subtle 
Dharma Gateways”), is possible, but is perhaps a bit too awkward with its four syllables and mixing 
of languages. It furthermore slightly obscures the fact that fǎ, too, has the meaning of ”method”. I thus 
land on ”gateway”, which in any case is better than simply ”method”. Lastly, in the introduction I 
have already mentioned one decisive reason for avoiding “meditation” as a gloss for chán 禪. 
See Donner and Stevenson, The Great Calming and Contemplation, 6–7; Greene, “Meditation, 
Repentance, and Visionary Experience in Early Medieval Chinese Buddhism”, 203; Wang 王, 
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stay at the Chén 陳 capital of Jīnlíng (金陵, today’s Nánjīng) from 567 to 575 AD. Zhìyǐ is 
regarded as the fourth patriarch and founder of the Tiāntāi school (天台宗, Jap. Tendai). He 
is without question one of the most important figures of East Asian Buddhism as a whole, his 
works—especially those on meditation—having been read and exerting influence not only 
within Tiāntāi but throughout the East Asian Buddhist world for the last 1400 years. Though 
wary of guru status, Zhìyǐ was a major figure in his own day as well, owing significantly to 
the lectures on meditation that were to become the Sequential Gateway.84 As with most of the 
works attributed to him, Zhìyǐ did not write the treatise himself; rather it was based on notes 
taken down by one of the attendants, in this case by the monk Fǎshèn 法慎, incidentally 
making it the sole such work that was not recorded by fifth patriarch Guàndǐng (灌頂, 561–
632)—though Guàndǐng was responsible for the editing, which according to Tiāntāi scholar 
Ando Toshio was quite considerable.85 As maintained by Guàndǐng in his biography of Zhìyǐ, 
the lectures series lasted one year.86 In a colophon attributed to same Guàndǐng, that year was 
571.87 The extant redaction is supposed to consist of ten chapters, but the last three are 
missing. The reason for this is disputed, as is the question of how extensive it was before 
Guàndǐng’s editing.88 
 The Sequential Gateway may be regarded as the culmination of Zhìyǐ’s early years of 
studies and practice, especially his seven years under Huìsī (慧思, 515–577, second Tiāntāi 
patriarch), from whom he inherited the priority of the “perfection of dhyāna” over “the 
perfection of wisdom” (as well as the four remaining perfections). They studied together the 
Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra89 as well as its even more influential commentary Dàzhì dù lùn 
大智度論90, the two works on which the Sequential Gateways is predominantly based.91 
(Huìsī’s bibliography moreover contains a one-fascicle work intriguingly titled Sequential 
Dhyāna Essentials (Cìdì chán yào 次第禪要), unfortunately no longer extant.) A massive 10 
fascicle work, the Sequential Gateway incorporates and systematizes the array of Buddhist 
meditative practices that had been brought into and further developed in China from the 
second to sixth centuries CE, the period commonly referred to as “Early Chinese Buddhism”. 
                                                                                                                                                        
“Zhiyi's Interpretation of the Concept ‘Dhyāna’ in His Shi Chan Boluomi Tsidi Famen”, 13, 15; 
Stevenson, “Buddhism in China–Connecting with the Source”, part 9; Apple, Value Of Simple 
Practice, 1.  
84 Ando 安藤, Tiāntāi xué 天台學 [Tiāntāi studies], 512, 521–3. 
85 Ibid.  
86 Wang, “Zhiyi's Interpretation of the Concept ‘Dhyāna’,” 27. 
87 Ibid., 26. 
88 Ibid., 25–27. One common claim is that it consisted originally of 30 fascicles; Ando regards this as 
unlikely. Tiāntāi xué, 510. 
89 Ch. Dàpǐn bōrè jīng 大品般若經 (“Scripture on great wisdom”), T07n0220. 
90 Skt. Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra (“Commentary on the great perfection of wisdom”), T25n1509. 
Possibly apocryphal, which is why I use its Chinese title. For its apocryphal status, see Digital 
Dictionary of Buddhism (“大智度論”). 
91 Ando, Tiāntāi xué, 509, 511–2. 
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It situates all these practices within a comprehensive, theoretical—and Mahāyānist—
framework, as such being the first of its kind. Many of these practices made their first 
appearance in shorter manuals—some being translations, other apocrypha, most a blend of 
the two—without providing such a framework. Conceivably, these fragmented texts on 
meditation practice were in Zhìyǐ’s eyes a symptom of the larger contemporary state of 
Chinese Buddhism, which in his opinion was fraught with narrow-minded specialization in 
either theory or practice, in turn a situation that he and Tiāntāi Buddhism sought to remedy.92 
The Sequential Gateways represents one of the three main overarching schemes for 
meditation that Zhìyǐ developed, namely the ”gradual śamatha-vipaśyanā” or ”gradual 
calming and contemplation” (jiàncì zhǐ-guān 漸次止觀). ”Gradual”, which we see as 
”sequential” in the title, here means starting from simple, shallower meditation practices—or 
even preparatory practices, as in the Sequential Gateway—and incrementally, progressively 
and meticulously approaching the complex and deeper, eventually arriving at enlightenment 
itself. The other two schemes are ”unfixed calming and contemplation” (bú dìng zhǐ-gūan 不
定止觀), of which the shorter Six Wondrous Gateways93 is the representative work, and 
”complete and sudden calming and contemplation” (yuán dùn zhǐ-guān 圓頓止觀), which is 
elaborated in the equally massive Great Calming and Contemplation94. Since Zhìyǐ 
developed the ”gradual” approach before the other two, and this ostensibly happened before 
his final awakening, the Sequential Gateway has been a relatively neglected work. There is 
consensus among present scholars that it deserves much more attention that it has been 
accorded in modern scholarship.95 However, their reason for such a statement is commonly 
due to its indirect significance: Either as a work through which we may catch a glimpse of 
even earlier Buddhist meditative practices and conceptualizations in China (Greene), or as a 
work indispensable to a full understanding of Zhìyǐ’s other, more important, works, most 
notably the Small Calming and Contemplation96 and the Great Calming and Contemplation, 
which repeatedly refers to it (Stevenson). What the 16th century Meditation Essentials by 
Yuán Liǎofán shows us is that the Sequential Gateway, even one millennium later, was used 
and studied also in and of itself, and thus warrants our attention in its own right. 
Owing to its immense scale and technical complexities, and the comparatively small 
scope of this thesis, I myself however am forced to turn my focus now to the Meditation 
Essentials (though I will keep comparing the two). 
 
                                                 
92 Ibid., 34. 
93 Liù miào fǎmén 六妙法門 (T46n1917). 
94 Móhē zhǐ-guān 摩訶止觀 (T46n1911). 
95 Ando, Tiāntāi xué, 499, 510; Greene, "Meditation, repentance, and visionary experience”, 203; 
Stevenson, “Buddhism in China”; Wang, “Zhiyi's Interpretation of the Concept ‘Dhyāna’”, 16–20. 
96 Xiǎo zhǐ-guān 小止觀 (Xiūxí zhǐ-guān zuòchán fǎ yào 修習止觀坐禪法要, T46n1915). 
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2.2. The Meditation Essentials by Yuán Liǎofán 
Almost exactly one millenium after Zhìyǐ’s lecturing of the Sequential Gateway, the 
Confucian scholar and lay Buddhist Yuán Liǎofán authored a meditation treatise on its basis, 
calling it eventually Jìngzuò yàojué 靜坐要訣, ”Essential Knacks of Sitting in Meditation”, 
or as I render it, the ”Meditation Essentials”. One fascicle and about 14 000 characters long, 
it is roughly 1/9 the scale of the ten fascicle and 120 000 character long Sequential Gateway, 
and comparable in size to the Small Calming and Contemplation, a text Zhìyǐ authored 
himself later as a more accessible version and which has been one of the most widely read 
texts on meditation in East Asia.97 I think it would be surprising to most Buddhologists to 
learn that it is not this text layman Liǎofán uses, but rather the momentous and comparatively 
obscure (at least from a current perspective) Sequential Gateway. Liǎofán’s motivations we 
can only guess at. Perhaps he was first recommended the Small Calming and Contemplation 
by his meditation teacher, but left unsatisfied by it and thereupon requested to see something 
more elaborate? Or perhaps he studied this text regularly and over several years in concert 
with his teacher? In the preface he writes: ”My teacher, Great Master Yúngǔ, meditated for 
over twenty years, and possessed subtle understanding of the Tiāntāi legacy, which he 
discussed in detail with me.” (ME 33b4–5, my emphasis) What we may say for certain is that 
the Sequential Gateway, as compared to the Small Calming and Contemplation, left him with 
many more options regarding which practices to include and which to exclude, as we shall 
see later. After all, the Small Calming and Contemplation was already heavily condensed. 
Moreover, it is clear that the unequivocally and explicitly gradual approach to meditation in 
the Sequential Gateway caught his interest. As he states in the preface: ”Generally speaking, 
as for the methods of meditation, there are steps through which one embarks on cultivation 
(...)”. (ME 33b2) As I will return to later in this chapter and also in chapter three, the only 
overarching scheme that Liǎofán retains from Zhìyǐ is precisely the gradualness (although he 
makes one very significant reordering, as we shall see). 
 Almost as surprising as Liǎofán’s selection of this text at the expense of other Tiāntāi 
works, is the fact that he avails himself of Tiāntāi material at all. It is generally agreed upon 
that Chán 禪 and Pure Land (jìngtǔ 淨土) were the two dominant traditions during the late 
Míng, Tiāntāi suffering a general decline ever since its revival in the Sòng dynasty.98 Typical 
Chán practices, such as gōng’àn (公案, Jap. kōan) or silent illumination (mòzhào 默照), are 
blatantly absent from the Meditation Essentials, and so is Buddha recitation (niàn Fó 念佛) 
of Pure Land Buddhism. The only reference to such practices is in a section called 
”restraining the mind by tying [it] to objects” in the second chapter “On Preparatory 
Practices”: ”In the end, Buddha recitation, keeping mantras, investigating huàtóu99 and the 
                                                 
97 Ando, Tiāntāi xué, 36. 
98 Ando, Tiāntāi xué, 2. 
99 話頭, the central phrase of a gōng’àn, by synecdoche also used to refer to the gōng’àn itself.  
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like are all [instances of] deluded thoughts. Nevertheless, one avails oneself of this one 
delusion to suspend the flock of delusions.” (ME 38a4–6) They thus feature only as a 
preparatory expedience of stilling the mind. 
Again one wonders what the motivations of Liǎofán were. I say the motivations of 
Liǎofán and not of his teacher, because Yúngǔ was known for his joint mastery of all the 
traditions, as well as for his proficiency in “expedient means” (fāngbiàn 方便, upāya), i.e. in 
each particularity recognizing the most appropriate way to lead someone towards 
enlightenment. Moreover, if Yúngǔ did incline in any way, it seems to have been in the 
direction of Chán and Pure Land practices.100 In the works on meditation by Hānshān 
Déqīng, whose primary instructor was also Yúngǔ, we see none of the practices we see in 
Liǎofán, and vice versa.101 These circumstances make it difficult not to conclude that the 
choice of the Sequential Gateway reflects the inclinations of Liǎofán rather than his teacher 
Yúngǔ—notwithstanding that it was most likely Yúngǔ who introduced and instructed him in 
the text. I think one reason for the choice of a Tiāntāi text might be that, although an avowed 
adherent of the anti-bookish-learning Wáng Yángmíng School of Mind, Liǎofán’s biography 
and bibliography both clearly show that he was a man of books and scholarship. This might 
have made him sceptical towards the ambivalent attitude to textual learning within the Chán 
school, and at the very least would not have deterred him from approaching the massiveness 
of Zhìyǐ’s teachings. The devotional meditation within the Pure Land tradition, on the other 
hand, might have appeared too easy; it is likely that the uncompromising faith in the power of 
each individual that we see in his lì mìng theory—Liǎofán’s variety of individualism—
rendered him less susceptible to the Pure Land doctrines of the degenerate age (mò fǎ 末法) 
and the impossibility of attaining nirvāṇa through own effort. 
One last thing we might look at in order to get a clue of the reasons behind Liǎofán’s 
choice of text, is the differences in the persons of Hānshān Déqīng and Yuán Liǎofán that 
might in turn explain the differences in their meditative practice. The most obvious and 
significant contrast between these two is that Hānshān was a monk whereas Liǎofán was a 
layman. Generally speaking, today monks do not advice lay-people to practice gōng’àn 
meditation, as it usually necessitates the delimitations in space and time that only a monastic 
life can provide. Although one should be wary of projecting present practice four centuries 
back in time, I wonder if this was the case for late Míng also.102 
                                                 
100 Hānshān 憨山, ”Yúngǔ dàshī zhuàn” 雲谷大師傳 (“Biography of Great Master Yúngǔ”), 
p0673b14–b16 and p0674a10–a12. Yúngǔ was also well versed in Huáyán (p0674b05) and Yogâcāra 
theory (p0673b16). See also Brokaw, Ledgers of Merit and Demerit, 78. 
101 Eifring, “Meditative Pluralism in Hānshān Déqīng”, 117, 126. 
102 All the meditative traditions in China agree that wrong meditation is not only futile, but can be 
harmful. Liǎofán shows his adherence to this view in the preface: “If we skew out of course, and have 
no wise teacher to guide us and to show us the cruces, then some of us will regard what little we have 
obtained as complete, others will on the contrary contract illnesses.” (ME 33a–b) And then in chapter 
1: "As soon as there is a slight error in the will, one will descend into evil ways.” (ME 33b) 
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If this is the case, it shows that the fact that these two men each practiced their own 
unique form of meditation does not imply that Yúngǔ did not play a role in guiding them 
towards it. He seems at least to be part of the reason why Liǎofán did not practice gōng’àn 
meditation, and we know for a fact from Hānshān himself that his reputed Buddha recitation 
gōng’àn (“Who is reciting?”) stems from Yúngǔ.103 It should be interesting (in a different 
study) to compare Liǎofán with the numerous other well-known laymen of the period, and 
see if a pattern emerges.104 Other than Buddha recitation and the too generic label “chán”, 
what kinds of meditation did they actually practice? Could it be that the Sequential Gateway 
is in fact not an anomaly at all? Was perhaps Zhìyǐ’s gradual scheme for meditation, as 
represented in the Sequential Gateways and the Small Calming and Contemplation, rather 
regarded as particularly suitable for lay practitioners? There is no indication of the 
plausibility of such hypotheses in Sheng-yen’s late Míng study, but I wonder how deep he 
has been able to dig in such a wide-ranging study.105 
The last aspect I would like to look at with regard to Liǎofán’s motivations—and the 
most significant for this study—is his consideration for selfish intentions and desires. Since I 
will return to and argue for this point later, I will here simply note that I think one reason for 
Liǎofán selecting the Sequential Gateway—and at least for deeming its content the very 
quintessence of potent meditation—is its inclusion of practices devised to counteract desire 
and reinforce compassion. 
 
2.3. Genre and title 
Some words should be said about the genre of the Meditation Essentials. One fascicle in 
length, heavily practice oriented and claiming to convey an essence of some kind, the 
Meditation Essentials is what I would deem a manual, more specifically a meditation manual. 
As such it harks back to the genre of short meditation manuals called “Dhyāna scriptures” 
(chán jīng 禪經) of Early Chinese Buddhism. This is a fascinating historical coincidence 
                                                                                                                                                        
 As for gōng’àn being a monk’s practice, in Sòng times it may have been the other way around, 
according to Sharf: “As for Rinzai [Línjì 臨濟], the notion that kōans, which developed as a literary 
genre, could serve as objects of seated contemplation dates no earlier than the Song, and even then it 
may originally have been intended as a simplified exercise for laypersons rather than a practice 
befitting elite monks who aspired to become abbots.” See Sharf, “Mindfulness and Mindlessness in 
Early Chán,” 933–4. 
103 Hānshān, ”Yúngǔ dàshī zhuàn”. 
104 Sheng-yen 聖嚴 does something of the kind in his “Study of late Ming Buddhism” (Míngmò fójiào 
yánjiù 明末佛教研究, 285–6), but under the larger rubric of “practice”, not solely meditation per se. 
Dividing the laymen into the categories of  (1) “Pure Land”, (2) “Chán”, (3) “First Chán, then Pure 
Land”, (4) “Buddha recitation samādhi” and (5) “Joint Chán and Pure Land”, he finds that by far the 
most sort under the Pure Land category (28 laymen), with Chán coming in as a clear number two (12), 
followed by the three others (8; 6; 5). Unfortunately, he says nothing of what particular kind of chán 
meditation the Chán practitioners practiced. 
105 Ibid. 
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considering that such manuals were part of the basis for Zhìyǐ’s 6th century Sequential 
Gateway—on which in turn the Meditation Essentials is based. In fact its title is very similar 
to some of these works, the character yào 要 (”essential”) recurring in many of them. We 
have for example the Scripture on the Esoteric Essential Methods of Dhyāna (Chán mì yàofǎ 
jīng 禪祕要法經, shortened ”Chan Essentials” by Greene)106, an important apocryph by 
Kumārajīva that exerted much influence in its time, including on Zhìyǐ.107 The title is also 
strikingly similar to two single fascicle meditation works attributed to Zhìyǐ himself, Chán 
mén yàolüè 禪門要略 (”Essentials of the dhyāna gate” or simply ”Dhyāna essentials”) and 
Chán mén kǒujué 禪門口訣 (”Mnemonic formulas of the dhyāna gate” or ”Dhyāna 
formulas”).108 The latter is quoted briefly twice in the Meditation Essentials as “Tiāntāi chán 
mén kǒujué”, but none of them serves as the basis for the Meditation Essentials—except, it 
would seem, as possible titular inspirations. Although not plain to see, even the much more 
well-known Small Calming and Contemplation—which, as described above, in common with 
the Meditation Essentials is basically a shortened version of the Sequential Gateway—is 
titularly similar; its (seldom used) full title is Xiūxí zhǐ-guān zuòchán fǎ yào 修習止觀坐禪法
要 (”The essential methods for practicing calming/contemplation and sitting in dhyāna”). 
  An early, or working, title of the Meditation Essentials was in fact Zuòchán yàojué 坐
禪要訣 (”Essentials of sitting in dhyāna” or ”Dhyāna essentials”),109 which almost mirrors 
several of both the early “dhyāna scriptures” and Zhìyǐ’s manuals, especially the last four 
characters of the full title of the Small Calming and Contemplation. On the basis of this 
working title alone it would have been impossible to distinguish it from the, in some cases 
1300 years older, Dhyāna Scriptures. 
 There was also at least one similarly titled work in Liǎofán’s own time. In one of the 
only two bibliographies mentioning the Meditation Essentials that I was able to locate, the 
entry right next to it is one Cān chán yàofǎ 參禪要法, “The Essential Method for 
Investigating Dhyāna”.110 In common with the Meditation Essentials, it is listed as consisting 
of one fascicle. 
 The only aspect of the title, then, that makes the Meditation Essentials stand out from 
other ancient as well as contemporary Buddhist works on meditation, is the jìngzuò part, 
”quiet-sitting” or ”sitting in meditation”. This term for meditation was not commonly used in 
Buddhism, nor any other traditions, before the 11th century. It became the preferred term for 
meditation in Neo-Confucianism straight from its inception in the 12th century. We find it 
                                                 
106 T15n0613. 
107 Greene, “Meditation, Repentance, and Visionary Experience,” 79–80. 
108 T46n1919 and X55n0908 respectively. 
109 As quoted in the 1594 work Jìngtǔ zīliáng quánjí 淨土資糧全集 (X61n1162), fasc. 6, p0610a15. 
110 The listed author is not entirely obscure. Wáng Kěntáng 王肯堂 (?–1638) was a scholar-official, 
physician and Buddhist layman—much like Liǎofán himself. For this exact text, however, I have 
found no clues. 
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used by most of the renowned Neo-Confucians, both those preceding and those more or less 
contemporaneous with Liǎofán; in some cases even in the title of independent chapters or 
works. For example, Gāo Pānlóng (1562–1626) and Liú Zōngzhōu (1578–1645), two 
mastodons of late Míng Confucianism, both had short works entitled Sayings on Meditation 
(Jìngzuò shuō 靜坐說) in their respective authorships (first published 1615111 and 1633112 
respectively). Although it is wrong as is commonly claimed or assumed that the term jìngzuò 
was exclusively Confucian, from Liǎofán’s use of this particular term it is clear that his 
intended readership is not primarily Buddhist. I would not claim that his readership is 
therefore strictly Confucian (which is tempting), because jìngzuò seems to be the most 
denominationally neutral word available to him. Instead, we should say that the application of 
this word indicates that his intended readership was the general gentry.113 Still, belonging to 
the gentry had ever since Hàn 漢 times been closely tied to identification with Confucianism. 
When we later take a closer look at the usage of terms and the framing of the content, we will 
see that Liǎofán addresses primarily Confucian readers. 
 As the early working title Dhyāna Essentials indicates, however, the actual practices 
described in the book are unmistakably Buddhist, as already briefly discussed above. It is not 
only the title and genre that harks back to the Buddhist meditation manuals of the 4th and 5th 
centuries but also much of its content. Inasmuch as Zhìyǐ incorporated many of these in his 
great systematization that became the Sequential Gateway, the practices retained in in the 
Meditation Essentials are predominantly the same practices as you find in those early 
manuals. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the systematization and theorizing that Zhìyǐ 
superposes on these practices—and the multifarious connections he draws between them—
were not developed yet in these manuals. When Yuán Liǎofán, one millennium after Zhìyǐ 
and 1300 years after the manuals, strips most of that theoretical framework away again, we 
end up with the paradoxical result that this 16th century treatise on meditation is in many 
respects similar to the meditation manuals of Early Chinese Buddhism. Not only that, but it 
consequently also bears comparison to Hīnayāna meditation practices, seeing as except for 
bodhi-citta (the aspiration to become a bodhisattva) there was in the early period of Chinese 
Buddhism little that separated the meditation practices of the two wagons.114 
 
                                                 
111 Taylor, “Meditation in Ming Neo-Orthodoxy,” 175n39. 
112 Fān 潘, “Liú Zōngzhōu duìyú ‘zhǔ jìng’ yǔ ‘jìngzuò’ de fǎnxǐng” 劉宗周對於 “主靜” 與 “靜坐” 
的反省, 63. 
113 Probably including the lower gentry and possibly even commoners. In one of the most popular 
works of popular meditation literature in modern China, Jǐang Wéiqiáo 蔣維喬 (1873–1958) notes 
that the word jìngzuò (as understood by him in 1955) is very transparent, “in keeping with the vulgar 
and easy to understand”. Jiǎng, Yīnshìzi wèishēng shíyàn tán 因是子衛生實驗談, 101. “Vulgar” in 
the sense of popular. 
114 Greene, “Meditation, Repentance, and Visionary Experience,” 46. 
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2.4. Structure, methodology and content 
Let us now look more closely at how these practices are presented in the Meditation 
Essentials: the structuring of the work and the editing methodology that Liǎofán uses—all 
along comparing the presentation with its basis text Sequential Gateway. 
The Meditation Essentials is ordered into seven parts: a preface and six chapters (piān 
篇), of which the first two deal with preparatory considerations, and the last four with 
meditation proper, each focusing on one particular type of meditative practice. Each chapter 
typically opens with a short introductory note by Liǎofán himself, after which follows 
descriptions of the concrete practice, which are typically long citations from the Sequential 
Gateway, often omitting or condensing especially verbose or abstruse parts in the original, 
exchanging some vocabulary, rewriting some passages, and occasionally inserting in between 
them a few sentences by Liǎofán himself. Some of the chapters are then wrapped up with 
another short comment by Liǎofán. As we have seen, in the preface Liǎofán calls his role that 
of “editing” (jí 輯). It is a striking feature of the Meditation Essentials, however (at least to 
modern Western eyes), that nowhere throughout the entire text is the Sequential Gateway or 
its author ever mentioned, even in the preface where such information would perhaps be 
natural to provide. Neither are any of the citations from it marked in any way. (I first 
discovered them by inserting snippets from the Meditation Essentials into the ”range” search-
engine of CBETA Lexicon Tool.115) 
As for the vocabulary, some changes are of a linguistic nature, such as systematically 
exchanging xíngzhě 行者 with xuézhě 學者, both meaning ”practitioner”. More interesting 
for this study are the changes that arise due to the differences between the Buddhist and 
Confucian lexica, since they again reveal the Confucian identity of the author and his 
readership. The most prominent example in this regard is the reluctance to use the word ài 愛 
negatively. In Confucianism, ài is an unconditionally positive feeling, in line with its original 
common meaning in Chinese, and usually translated into English as ”love”. (I will come back 
to Confucian ài in chapter 4.) In Buddhism, however, ài is used as a translation of Sanskrit 
tṛṣṇā, ”craving”, or as in the Sequential Gateway, of rāga, ”desire”, one of the ”three poisons” 
(tri-dosa) along with ”nescience” and ”anger”. I have come across sections in the Meditation 
Essentials where phrases with such an ài are edited out; or, stated differently: where 
Liǎofán’s grounds for editing out a passage seems to be the presence of ài.116 I should 
                                                 
115 Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Association (中華電子佛典協會), Lexicon Tool: Range. 
http://140.112.26.229/cbetalexicon/range.py. 
116 ME 36b/5 (“既顛倒想斷。則無無明。亦無三毒。罪從何生”), comp. SG p0486b08–09 (“既顛
倒斷。則無無明及以愛恚。無此三毒。罪從何生”). This sentence in fact gets somewhat awkward 
in Liǎofán’s rendition, “[...] then there will be no nescience, nor the three poisons” suggesting that 
nescience is not part of the three poisons, when in fact it is. The full paragraph, where 愛 recurs in 
Zhìyǐ but not in Liǎofán’s rendition is SG p0486a22–b09 and ME 36a/6–36b/5. (On the three poisons, 
see also entry 17 in the appendix glossary.) 
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emphasise that these are not necessarily conscious acts by the editor; he might have simply 
found such passages inelegant, not necessarily for any specific conscious reason. Indeed, the 
fact that these changes are not systematic—there are also several instances of his retaining 
such usage of ài, even actively using it himself—seems to point in that direction.  
More striking than his reluctance to include ài in such contexts, however, is his 
blatant active use of the word in a positive, Confucian sense. This happens first and foremost 
in the final (and in the gradual, progressive scheme thus very important) chapter ”On 
Expanding Love”. The ”love” in the chapter title is precisely the character ài, and is here 
used to represent the Buddhist cí 慈 (maitrī) and bēi 悲 (karuṇā), both of which Liǎofán also 
uses in the chapter. Now, for more eclectic practitioners of Buddhism among commoners and 
gentry, this conflation of terms might not have appeared particularly dissonant, but among 
more rigid practitioners and definitely among monks, the mere appearance of this title would 
presumably be sufficient grounds for repudiating the work all-together. If they needed an 
abridged version of the Sequential Gateway they could simply go to the Small Calming and 
Contemplation. Surely, Yuán Liǎofán would be aware of this. Those less likely to pick up 
that work were the Confucian gentry—except, perhaps, those already overtly engaging with 
Buddhism. 
 
Having made these general remarks on the structure and methodology, let us now continue by 
looking specifically at each chapter, introducing now also the actual content of the chapters, 
and all the while comparing them with the corresponding chapters in Sequential Gateway. 
The first chapter “Distinguishing the Will” (“Biàn zhì piān” 辨志篇) is based on the first 
chapter of the Sequential Gateway titled “General Purpose of Practicing the Perfection of 
Dhyāna” (“Xiū chán bōluómì dà yì” 修禪波羅蜜大意), where Zhìyǐ presents the reasons for 
practicing this most (as according to Zhìyǐ) essential of the perfections. Zhìyǐ introduces his 
chapter by listing what should not be reasons for practicing meditation and which in fact 
makes it inefficacious. Liǎofán opens in the same manner, only abridging the originally ten 
into four, and calling them “wills” or “intentions” (zhì 志), between which one 
must ”distinguish” (biàn 辨). Where Zhìyǐ goes on to describe the correct approach to 
meditation, the two diverges, Zhìyǐ focusing his discussion on the ”four great vows” (sì hóng 
shìyuàn 四弘誓願), Liǎofán instead turning his gaze to the Confucian reader by appealing to 
the Confucian concept of rén 仁 (as applied in this period often glossed as ”humaneness” 
or ”benevolence”), which in his opinion ”encapsulates” and should guide all meditation 
practice, i.e. the only proper, well-advised “will”. In ecumenical fashion he then goes on to 
liken this virtue with the will of the bodhisattva, as well as the ancient Mohist concept of 
“impartial love” (jiān’ài 兼愛). The two corresponding chapters converge again in their 
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endings, with Liǎofán elegantly bringing Zhìyǐ’s discourse back again with a reply to a 
question of why meditation practice is not in the end selfish (a passage originating from the 
Dà zhì dù lùn).117 
The second chapter, “Chapter on Preparing Practice” (”Yù xíng piān” 預行篇), 
continues this pattern of walking in and out of Zhìyǐ’s discourse. In this case it is the sixth 
chapter “Preparatory Expedient Means” of the Sequential Gateway that serves as the basis. 
Despite being the sixth out of ten, this chapter in fact covers fascicles number two through 
four, making it one of two main parts of Zhìyǐ’s work. It is divided into “external” (wài 外) 
and “internal” (nèi 內) expedient means (fāngbiàn 方便). The former consists of the “25 
Preparatory Expedient Means”—a well-known Zhìyǐ creation118—that are not directly linked 
with meditation practice but will nevertheless aid it. The latter are of themselves meditative 
practices, but in this context used as means to ascertain karmic “roots”, before meditation 
proper begins. Liǎofán is only interested in the “external” part, picking out as a basis for his 
chapter no more than two of the 25 expedient means, discarding that whole scheme along 
with the internal/external distinction. The first of the two is what Zhìyǐ calls “Maintaining the 
Precepts and Purity” (chíjiè qīngjìng 持戒清淨). Despite constituting only one out of twenty-
five, this section is in the Sequential Gateway rather extensive, and so Liǎofán shaves it even 
further, first focusing in on one of its three aspects, “repentances” (chànhuǐ 懺悔), and then 
singling out one of the three types of repentances, namely what Zhìyǐ calls the ”Repentance 
of Contemplating Non-Arising” (guān wúshēng chànhuǐ 觀無生懺悔). (SG 486a16) Liǎofán 
cites this section almost verbatim, but calls it instead “Profoundly Reaching the Source of Sin” 
(shēn dá zuìyuán 深達罪源), and interestingly refrains from using the word “repentance” 
throughout the chapter (and the whole treatise for that matter).119 This repentance is a kind of 
analytical meditation on the ultimately “empty” (kōng 空) nature of sin. 
The latter part of Liǎofán’s chapter deals with ”regulating the mind” (tiáo xīn 調心), 
which is also one of Zhìyǐ’s 25 preparatory expediencies but is completely rewritten by 
Liǎofán—as such representing an anomaly in the Meditation Essentials, the norm being one 
of either subtle editing or short new sections of novel commentaries. It does not look like 
Liǎofán draws this section directly from some other work than the Sequential Gateway either 
(which we shall find an example of in chapter 5), although it is hard to be absolutely sure; 
what we can be certain of is that it is not a reproduction of anything found in the Chinese 
Buddhist canon.120 As a matter of fact, this section on regulating the breath is found in the 
                                                 
117 See Appendix I for a complete translation of Liǎofán’s chapter, as well as for chapter five and six. 
118 But based on the Dàzhì dù lùn. They are replicated in both the Small ... and Great Calming and 
Contemplation. See Ando, Tiāntāi xué, 511. 
119 Possibly due to a wish to keep the rubric of repentance distinct from meditation. Liǎofán has a 
separate work on repentance called The Repentance Method of Mr Yuán (Yuán-shēng chànfǎ 袁生懺
法), which should merit a study of its own. 
120 According to my searches in CBETA Lexicon Tool. 
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Canon, but not because Liǎofán quoted some other work. Surprisingly, it is because Liǎofán 
is the one being quoted by a work found in the Supplement Canon (Xù zàngjīng 續藏經)—
the section in its entirety is included in the Pure Land compilation Complete Collection of 
Pure Land Provisions [of Merit] (Jìngtǔ zīliáng quánjí 淨土資糧全集)121. This work was 
compiled by a contemporary of Liǎofán, Zhuāng Guǎnghuán 莊廣還, also a layman from 
Zhèjiāng, and proofread and prefaced in 1594 by Yúnqī Zhūhóng 雲棲祩宏 (1535–1615), 
another of the Four Great Monks of the late Míng, based in Hángzhōu.122  
For these two reasons—i.e. its originality and its inclusion in another work—I would 
like to take a somewhat closer look at this section on “regulating the mind”: 
Liǎofán introduces and frames his discussion of the regulation of the mind by 
observing that for most people the chores of ordinary life can be a hinder to finding time for 
meditation, and that ”the practitioner [therefore] must regulate his mind at any time”. (ME 
37b6–8) (Again we have a clue to the difference in readership, this being apparently tailored 
to laymen, not monks.) He then goes on to explain the three different methods for such a 
situation-independent regulation, calling the first ”Restraining the Mind by Tying [it to] 
                                                 
121 X61n1162, fasc. 6, p0610a15– b19. 
122 Some information on these two gentlemen: Zhuāng Guǎnghuán was, according to Biographies of 
Laymen, from the town Tóngxiāng 桐鄉, which is separated from Liǎofán’s hometown Jiāshàn only 
by the prefectural city of Jiāxìng. Dates of birth and death are unknown, but we know that he was 
quite old (way beyond 40) before being drawn to Buddhism and meeting (an already reputed) 
Zhūhóng in Hángzhōu 杭州. He then took the bodhisattva vows at an age of 80 in Zhūhóng’s 
presence, i.e. before Zhūhóng died in 1615. This means that Guǎnghuán was older than Liǎofán (who 
died at an age of 73 in 1606), but probably not much. In all likelihood the two knew each other. 
Biographies of Laymen tells us that Guǎnghuán too was a Confucian (rú 儒) and studied medicine, 
and that he experimented with the Daoist arts of yǎng shēng 養生 (”life nourishment”) before 
awakening to the impermanence of things late in life (while looking at a withering flower). 
Péng, ”Zhuāng Fùzhēn” 莊復真, Jūshì zhuàn, p0259b02. 
 Yúnqī Zhūhóng 雲棲祩宏, being one of the “four great monks of the late Míng” (明末四大
高僧) is a much more known figure. Incidentally (or perhaps not), aside from Liǎofán, Zhūhóng is the 
most famous popularizer of the Ledgers of Merit and Demerit. In 1604 he published Records of Self-
Knowledge (Zìzhī lù 自知錄), a revision and expansion of the 1171 Ledger of Merit and Demerit by 
the Tàiwēi Immortal, the work on which most Ledgers of Merit and Demerit were based, including 
those given to Liǎofán by Yúngǔ. As did Liǎofán (1569), Zhūhóng encountered the Ledgers early in 
his life. He was immediately delighted and extensively recommended the practice, though any 
publication on it had to wait until 1604 when he was 69 years old. As for Liǎofán, he waited until age 
68 to produce Lì mìng piān 立命篇—in 1601, according to Chun-fang Yü (p. 120). The parallels 
between Zhūhóng and Liǎofán and their dealings with the morality ledgers, as well as their link in the 
Complete Collection of Pure Land Provisions, I find intriguing, and wonder whether there was any 
contact between them, a conjecture for which I have come across no explicit evidence. At the very 
least, they are both part of a common network somehow; one node of connection is the mentioned 
layman Zhuāng Guǎnghuán (certainly knew Zhūhóng; lived close to Liǎofán). Another possible node 
is monk Yúngǔ. Was perhaps he the one introducing Zhūhóng too to ledger practice? On the whole, 
Yúngǔ Fǎhuì’s role in the dissemination of morality ledgers appears to me to be a commonly 
neglected and critically understudied topic. (And even the object of some basic misunderstandings: In 
one monographic study with morality ledgers and related practices as an important integrated topic, 
he is preposterously called a “Daoist recluse”. Handlin, Action in Late Ming Thought, 195.) 
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Objects”, the second “Disciplining the Mind by Way of Ordinary Affairs” and the 
third ”Nurturing the Mind at Any Place”.123 (ME 37b8–9) ”Restraining the Mind by Tying [it 
to] Objects” is classic śamatha (”calming”, zhǐ 止) practice. What is perhaps slightly novel, 
and seemingly somewhat dismissive, is that ”Buddha-recitation” and kōan are both 
mentioned as such expedient calming, regulating practice—as the only place where they 
figure throughout the entire work. (ME 38a4–6) The second ”Disciplining the Mind by Way 
of Ordinary Affairs” opens with the comment ”the mind of ordinary people is tangled up with 
selfish intentions, its desire dense and thick” (ME 38b1–2), before describing how one may 
counteract this desire by way of self-discipline. In ”Nurturing the Mind at Any Place” the two 
related practices of regulating the breath and regulating the body receive brief mention, thus 
ending the chapter. 
For Zhìyǐ, any discussion of regulating the mind is inseparable from these two 
preceding expediencies of ”regulating one’s body” (tiáo shēn 調身) and ”regulating the 
breath” (tiáo xí 調息). This is due to their mutual influence, especially in the direction from 
the body, via the breath to the mind, meaning that an unregulated body (improper posture) 
will lead to an unregulated (uneven) breath, which in turn will lead to an unregulated mind 
(scattered, torpid or restless). Conversely this means that a regulated proper posture will be 
conducive to an attenuated breath, which in turn is required for reaching a concentrated mind. 
A concentrated mind in turn is a preparatory requirement for entering into dhyāna in 
meditation proper. This final dichotomy encapsulates much meditation practice, and is what 
is represented in Zhìyǐ’s later works as zhǐ-guān 止觀, ”calming and contemplation” 
(vipaśyanā-śamatha). 
Incidentally, of the practices more or less openly borrowed from Buddhism into Neo-
Confucian meditation, regulation of the breath was as far as I can judge one of the most 
common. Zhū Xī wrote a very short text on the Buddhist practice of focusing on the breath 
and the tip of one’s nose.124 Liǎofán’s teacher Wáng Jī put down on paper the fourfold 
gradation of breath that Zhìyǐ expounds in the Sequential Gateway and which is later 
included unabridged in his Small Calming and Contemplation. In a fashion strikingly similar 
to Liǎofán’s method, Wáng Jī quotes them almost verbatim (without ever referring to 
Zhìyǐ).125 Probably he is basing himself on the popular Small Calming and Contemplation, 
yet one wonders whether Wáng Jī, and not only Yúngǔ, played a part in introducing Liǎofán 
to both these works.  
                                                 
123 Respectively: Xì yuán shōu xīn 繫緣收心, jiè shì liàn xīn 借事錬心 and suí chù yǎng xīn 隨處養
心. 
124 Zhū Xī, “Tiáo xí zhēn” 調息箴, in Zhū Xī wénjí 朱熹文集, fasc. 85, p. 6a. 
125 Called “Tiáo xí fǎ” 調息法 (”Method for regulating the breath”), quoted in Nakajima, Jìngzuò, 
119–20. 
 44 
One wonders also if a familiarity with this practice on the part of the Neo-Confucians, 
i.e. its lack of novelty, was one reason why Liǎofán chose to virtually exclude it, and focus 
more exclusively on regulation of the mind. Regulation of the breath is mentioned in the last 
part ”Nurturing the Mind at Any Place”, but in one mere sentence: ”The one sitting in dhyāna 
(or ”when sitting in dhyāna”, an inherent ambiguity of Classical Chinese) must regulate the 
breath and collect the primordial ether (氣)”. (ME 38b7–8) And what Liǎofán calls 
“regulating the breath” in the title of his fourth chapter is a different breathing practice. 
The rest of the chapters, i.e. three to six, are all based on the seventh and main chapter 
of the Sequential Gateway titled “Explaining Practice and Realization of the Perfection of 
Dhyāna” (“Shì chán bōluómì xiū-zhèng” 釋禪波羅蜜修證). This chapter, which is also the 
last chapter in the extant version and covers fascicles 5 to 10, is where Zhìyǐ finally arrives at 
meditation proper, ”explaining” its ”practice” and concomitant ”realization”.126 Liǎofán 
singles out roughly ten more or less discrete practices, and groups them together in categories 
that become four separate chapters. The relative order of these practices is nevertheless 
retained from the Sequential Gateway, except for one important reordering that I will come 
back to. 
Chapter three in the Meditation Essentials, its longest, is called “On Practice and 
Realization” (“Xiū-zhèng piān” 修證篇). It covers the two related practices of the ”Four 
Dhyānas” (sì chán 四禪)  and the ”Four Formless Attainments” (sì wúsè dìng 四無色定), 
which together constitute the most classical example of gradual meditation practice in both 
Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna Buddhism (sometimes also called the Eight Dhyānas). 
Three important amendments in this chapter merit our attention. First is Liǎofán’s 
own (unmarked as always) introduction to the chapter, which begins as follows:  
 
“No meditation is restricted to full lotus or half lotus position; simply sit down as is 
convenient.” (ME 39a6) 
  
                                                 
126 The last three missing chapters in the Sequential Gateway are called (8) ”Demonstrating the 
Retribution of the Perfection of Dhyāna” (顯示禪波羅蜜果報), (9) “Developing Pedagogy from the 
Perfection of Dhyāna” (從禪波羅蜜起教) and (10) “Concluding the Ultimate Purpose of the 
Perfection of Dhyāna” (結會禪波羅蜜歸趣) (these glosses of mine are naturally based only on the 
titles, without knowledge of the specific contents of the chapters). Supposedly, they are missing not 
because the notes were lost, but beause Zhìyǐ never got to actually lecturing on them. On the reason 
for this, there are competing explanations, one being that what they were supposed to explicate 
represented a mastery that not even Zhìyǐ, by his own judgement, had attained, another that he simply 
did not have time before he left Jīnlíng. As for why he left Jīnlíng for Mount Tiāntāi in the south, 
there are also competing explanations, including: the prosecution of Buddhism in the Northern Zhōu 
state (557–581); the dire situation of Buddhism in south China as perceived by Zhìyǐ; his discomfort 
with celebrity; and his growing discontent with his audience at Jīnlíng. These are not mutually 
exclusive. Ando emphasises the first two explanations, and adds to them the possibility that Zhìyǐ also 
feared personal prosecution, after a Northern Zhōu general who had earlier assisted him financially 
was caught and decapitated. See Ando, Tiāntāi xué, 34–5. 
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This is actually diametrically opposite of what the Sequential Gateway prescribes, proper 
seated posture being the subject of “Regulating the Body”, which as we saw is inseparable 
from regulating the mind. In fact, Sequential Gateway is the first, or one of the first, texts of 
Chinese Buddhism to give detailed descriptions of posture.127 This was then replicated in 
both the Small ... and the Great Calming and Contemplation, thus exerting an immense 
influence on later Buddhist meditation in China. Neo-Confucian meditation, however, was 
commonly less attentive to and more flexible with regard to posture.128 It would thus seem 
that Liǎofán has been influenced on this matter by the Neo-Confucian dealings with 
meditation. Indeed, a text on Buddhist meditation practice explicitly stating that posture is not 
important as long as one sits comfortably, seems to be something truly exceptional. 
Second is a small comment Liǎofán inserts in between the descriptions of the first and 
second dhyāna, concerning the meditative experience of the perhaps most important mid-
Míng Neo-Confucian Chén Báishā 陳白沙 (1428–1500): ”The revered Mr Chén meditated 
for twenty-odd years at Jiāngmén 江門. Alas, he had no wise teacher to guide him, and so 
when while meditating (靜中) he saw a clue manifesting itself, he became deeply attached to 
it. Shortly afterwards even this clue was lost to him, and he did everything he could to retrace 
it. However, it was never to be seen again.” (ME 42b3–6) From where it is placed, it is 
evident that Liǎofán believes that the meditative accomplishments of Báishā never exceeded 
first dhyāna.  
Third is the wrapping up of the chapter. Here Liǎofán anticipates the ”Nine Sequential 
Concentrations” (jiǔ cìdì dìng 九次第定, navânupūrva-samāpattayaḥ) that appear later in the 
Sequential Gateway and adds to the Four Dhyānas and the Four Attainments a ninth and final 
state, the ”Attainment of Extinguishing Sensation and Perception” (miè shòu xiǎng dìng 滅受
想定, nirodha-samāpatti). Where Zhìyǐ ends his discussion of the eighth attainment (SG 
523c07), Liǎofán continues:  
 
From this point on one neither grasps nor clings, thus shattering nescience, entering the 
[ninth] ”Attainment of Extinguishing Sensation and Perception”, and attaining arhat-hood.  
[Referring to all the preceding descriptions in the present chapter:] These are what are 
called the ’Nine Sequential Attainments’. To summarize, the first dhyāna parts from the realm 
                                                 
127 According to Ando, Sequential Gateway is the first. According to Greene, this honour should 
rather be accorded Kumārajīva’s fourth century Scripture on the Esoteric Essential Methods of 
Dhyāna, on which all later descriptions was based. See Greene, “Meditation, Repentance, and 
Visionary Experience”, 80n13. 
128 de Bary, as summarized by Shǐ 史 in “Dōng-Yà rúxué jìngzuò yánjiù de gàikuàng” 東亞儒家靜坐
研究的概況, 32. However, I think it is important to note that in the late Míng there are exceptions to 
this trend, almost to the point where the exception becomes the trend. Gāo Pānlóng in particular and 
also Liú Zōngzhōu (in his repentance-like method) have prescriptions for posture—and also for 
temporal and physical setting. This means that Liǎofán’s disregard for posture is doubly ironic, 
inasmuch as posture was emphasised not only in Buddhism, but in this period also in Neo-
Confucianism. 
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of desire and enters the realm of form; the second, third and fourth dhyāna are all [in] the 
realm of form. The Four Attainments part from the realm of form and enter the formless 
realm. The ‘Attainment Of Extinguishing Sensation And Perception’ in turn parts from the 
formless realm, and [by it the practitioner] realizes arhat-hood, is [re-]born in the West and 
enters the Pure Land. This is the gateway of the shortest route. [End of chapter] (ME 50a–b) 
 
The summation of the analogy between the stages of dhyāna and the cosmology of the three 
realms, though not drawn verbatim from the Sequential Gateway are very much in line with 
Zhìyǐ’s conception (indeed, it is one of very few places where Liǎofán retains a Zhìyǐ 
scheme). The very last part, however, where arhat-hood is likened with rebirth in the Pure 
Land, is not; and is perhaps something quite peculiar, the Pure Land usually being described 
in opposition to arhat-hood, as the last step before becoming a bodhisattva. 
The next practices in both Zhìyǐ’s and Liǎofán’s schemes are the three practices that 
for Zhìyǐ go by the label “Pure Dhyāna” and are classified as “Both Mundane and 
Supramundane Dhyāna”. Liǎofán instead calls his chapter (four) “On Regulating the Breath” 
(“Tiáo xí piān” 調息篇). It is the chapter Liǎofán is the least present in, and so I will not 
elaborate any further than saying that the three practices are the ānâpāna based practices of 
“Six Wondrous Gates” (liù miào fǎmén 六妙門, a few years later elaborated in the Six 
Wondrous Gateways mentioned above), “Sixteen Superior [Forms of Meditation]” (shíliù 
tèshèng 十六特勝) and ”Contemplation of the [six] Supranormal Powers and [three] 
Illuminating Insights” (tōngmíng guān 通明觀). 
In chapter five, ”On Eliminating Desire” (“Qiǎn yù piān” 遣欲篇), Liǎofán selects 
three practices of the kind ”Contemplations on Impurity” (bú jìng xiǎng 不淨想). He starts 
with the ”Nine Contemplations” (jiǔ xiǎng 九想), which is a visualization of a human corpse 
in nine stages of decay. Then he skips Zhìyǐ’s ”Eight Mindfulnesses”, and moves straight to 
the ”Ten Contemplations” (shí xiǎng 十想), a more composite collection of contemplations 
on important Buddhist doctrines, the three first, for example, being impermanence (wú cháng 
無常), suffering (kǔ 苦) and anātman (wú wǒ 無我). For both these contemplations, 
Liǎofán’s methodology is to summarize Zhìyǐ’s original detailed descriptions of the stages of 
visualization into one single sentence for each, making them appear more like lists.  
The third practice of chapter five, ”White Bone Contemplation” (bái gǔ guān 白骨觀), 
is unique in that it constitutes the only lengthy citation in the entire Meditation Essentials that 
stems not from the Sequential Gateway. Zhìyǐ too has visualizations of bones and skeletons 
following the Ten Contemplations, as part of the ”Eight renunciations”, but although very 
similar, Liǎofán’s ”White Bone Contemplation” is clearly taken from the late fourth century 
Scripture on the Esoteric Essential Methods of Dhyāna, the apocryphal three fascicle work 
attributed to Kumārajīva that I already mentioned in the section on genre and title.129 Much 
                                                 
129Chán mì yào fǎ jīng 禪祕要法經 (T15n0613), p0243b27–p0245a10. Again, CBETA Lexicon Tool 
was used for this discovery. 
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more fleshed out than the two previous practices, the description of this contemplation is 
largely verbatim (unmarked) citations from Kumārajīva’s work, the omissions consisting 
mainly of especially repetitive phrasings. It is likely that Zhìyǐ’s exposition of skeleton 
contemplations is based on this work, which makes Liǎofán’s decision, who also had an 
interest for philology, of going straight to the source understandable—even more so when we 
consider that this work by Kumārajīva had a very practical rather than theoretical orientation, 
and was a popular meditation manual for centuries even after Zhìyǐ.130 I only wonder whether 
Liǎofán tracked it down himself or if the monk Yúngǔ presented it to him. 
The last chapter, “On Expanding Love” (“Guǎng ài piān” 廣愛篇) focuses exclusively 
on the practice called ”Four Boundless Mentalities” (sì wúliàng xīn 四無量心, apramāna-
citta). As already mentioned, in the Sequential Gateway this practice is situated in between 
the Four Dhyānas and the Four Formless Attainments. Zhìyǐ thus categorizes it as part of the 
“Concentrations of the Realm of Form”, which in turn is part of the “Contaminated Methods”. 
In the Meditation Essentials it comes last, ending the entire meditative crescendo. 
Liǎofán opens the chapter with a quotation from Confucius in the Analects (Lúnyǔ 論
語): ”The Master said: ‘[My aspirations are:] To bring peace to my elders, to place trust in 
my friends, and to take good care of my juniors.’” (ME 64a5) He continues by elaborating on 
the differences between these essential relationships and gradations within them, before using 
them as a point of departure for the actual practice, gradually moving into Zhìyǐ’s discourse. 
The general point is to use the gradations of affinity and responsibilities that belong to man’s 
nature as a starting point for ”expanding” one’s love and overcoming such boundaries. Zhìyǐ 
makes a similar point, but speaks only of ”beloved relatives”, not of ”elders”, ”friends” 
and ”juniors”. (SG 517b17) Perhaps this framework that Liǎofán erects for the Four 
Boundless Mentalities is also a clue to understanding his discussion of the relationships 
between bodhisattva-hood, Mohist ”Impartial Love”, Yangist ”Doing for Oneself” (or Self-
Preservation”) and Confucian humaneness and righteousness, which are all objects of his 
praise. Commencing in the visualization from one’s natural empathy for one’s ”elders, 
friends and juniors” in order to ”expand” it to everyone in the world seems to me to be a way 
of acknowledging both the Confucian insistence on the naturalness of familial and 
hierarchical relationships and the Mohist (and Buddhist) call for overcoming such hierarchies 
and being completely impartial. The one does not exclude the other—there is no point 
in ”clutching to one” (ME 34b9). 
 
Having introduced the practices Yuán Liǎofán chooses to include in his abridgement, the next 
interesting question becomes which main practices from the Sequential Gateway he did not 
include—and why. As I have not had the occasion to examine the omitted practices in detail, 
in addition to simply listing them I will only share some of my preliminary observations, 
                                                 
130 Greene, “Meditation, Repentance, and Visionary Experience”, 79–80.  
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leaving to others to explore the complete significance of their being omitted. The practices 
omitted are, in order of appearance in the Sequential Gateway: “Eight Mindfulnesses”, (most 
of the) “Eight Renunciations”, ”Eight superior points”, ”Ten universal points [of 
concentration]”, ”Nine Sequential Concentrations”, ”Forceful Lion Samādhi” 
and ”Transcendental Samādhi”.131 The most conspicuous connection between these practices 
is that they all occur towards the end of the Sequential Gateway, the “Eight Mindfulnesses” 
being the only practice that Liǎofán simply skips. They are thus part of the final 
soteriological culmination in Zhìyǐ’s grand scheme of gradual meditation, all of them 
belonging to the “Uncontaminated Methods” (yǒu lòu fǎ 有漏法) and the last category of 
“Supramundane Dhyāna” (chū shìjiān chán 出世間禪).132 They are the very last steps before 
attaining bodhisattva-hood. Liǎofán ends instead with a meditation which according to Zhìyǐ 
in the grand scheme of things is still in the “realm of form” (sè jiè 色界) and ”contaminated” 
(yǒulòu 有漏). (SG 480a14–481b03) This again points to Liǎofán’s relative disinterest in 
theory and soteriology, as well as his own unique conception of gradual meditation, which 
culminates instead in the weeding out of desire and cultivation of compassion/humaneness, 
the significance of which I will return to in the next chapter. 
It is not only many important practices from the Sequential Gateway that are left out 
by Liǎofán’s editing, but also most of the theoretical framework. As far as I can discern, what 
is partly retained is only the overarching scheme of gradual meditation, as well as the related 
emphasis on the indispensable importance of bodhi-citta (or rén, “humaneness”, in Liǎofán’s 
terminology). Both these schemes are in fact partly recast by Liǎofán. We have already seen 
his reordering of the sequences, and in the next chapter we will see what implications the 
introduction of the Confucian virtue humaneness entails. 
The overarching schemes that are omitted includes: 
• The distinction between “mundane dhyāna”, “both mundane and supramundane 
dhyāna” and ”supramundane dhyāna”.133 
• The distinction between ”contaminated dhyāna” and ”uncontaminated dhyāna”. 
• The fundamental ”principle/phenomena” (lǐ/shì 理⁄事) dichotomy. 
                                                 
131 Respectively: Bā nìan 八念, Bā bèishě 八背捨, Shí yíqiè chù 十一切處, Jiǔ cìdì dìng 九次第定, 
Shīzǐ fènxùn sānmèi 獅子奮迅三昧 and Chāoyuè sānmèi 超越三昧. Based on Ando’s list of all the 
practices in SG. Ando, Tiāntāi xué, 510. 
132 See the table of contents in Guàndǐng’s preface to SG (p0475b02) (in Chinese), and Wang’s 
(“Zhiyi's Interpretation of the Concept ‘Dhyāna’,” 249–61) even more elaborate table of contents (in 
English), as well as Zhìyǐ’s own explanation of these sequences and categories in SG chapter 
4, ”Distinguishing the Relative Sequences in the Perfection of Dhyāna” (“Biàn chán bōluómì quáncì” 
辨禪波羅蜜詮次) (Beginning at SG p0475b02). 
133 Respectively: Shìjiān chán 世間禪, yì shìjiān chán yì chū-shìjiān chán 亦世間禪亦出世間禪 and 
chū-shìjiān chán 出世間禪. 
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• The intimate connection between dhyāna (chán 禪) and repentance (chàn huǐ 懺悔), 
and what Greene calls “visions of karma”, i.e. meditative experience used as a tool to 
assess, or “divine”, one’s karma.134 
• Related to the former, the distinction between practitioners of sharp (lì 利) and blunt 
(dùn 鈍) faculties (gēn 根), i.e. spiritual talent, which must be assessed through 
various practices, and according to which the practitioner adjusts his or her specific 
practice. That Liǎofán discards this distinction is somewhat surprising, considering 
that Wáng Yángmíng in his later years borrowed it into his own teachings on innate 
knowledge (liángzhī 良知). It was also picked up by Wáng Jī, who in turn had 
Liǎofán as a student for several years.135 It must then be Liǎofán’s staunch belief in lì 
mìng that makes him reject this distinction. Anyone, regardless of social status and of 
talent, has the same ability to take control of his own moral life, and thus also his 
material fate. 
• The relationship between “calming” and “contemplation” (dìng 定 and guān 觀 or zhǐ 
止 and guān), which in the Sequential Gateway is not yet fully matured as an 
exhaustive hermeneutic term to replace dhyāna,136 yet which nonetheless recurs in it.  
In addition, although mentioned sporadically, the two following distinctions as threads 
running throughout the entire work, are also missing: 
• the three realms (jiè 界): ”realm of desire”, ”realm of form” and ”realm of non-form” 
(occurs only at the end of chapter four). 
• the three vehicles (shèng 乘): ”voice-hearer”, ”individually enlightened” and 
bodhisattva (occurs only once in chapter one).137 
 
Furthermore, as the full title Explaining the Sequential Gateway to the Perfection of 
Dhyāna hints at, Zhìyǐ has a habit of explaining (shì 釋) all practices from different 
perspectives and in terms of different themes, occasionally even negating himself as a means 
of avoiding dualism (èr 二). The result is a vast recursive hierarchy of subsections and lists. 
He even has a typology of different kinds of explications, such as “explaining” (shì 釋), 
“distinguishing” (biàn 辨), “demonstrate” (biǎo 表), “illuminating” (míng 明) and “directly 
illuminating” (zhèngmíng 正明). It seems to me that this methodology must have been highly 
demanding of the reader, making it almost impossible to keep track of where he is in the 
hierarchy at any one point, unless he is taking notes and studying it full-time—as a monk 
might do. Liǎofán is no opponent of lists, but he usually abstains from embedding them into 
each other, and he describes each practice in a much more linear manner. Locating the 
                                                 
134 Greene, “Meditation, Repentance, and Visionary Experience,” 203–18. 
135 Zhāng, “Shíliù shìjìmò zhōng-hán shǐjié guānyú Yángmíng xúe de lùnbiàn,” 68. 
136 On this term and its replacing, in the Great Calming and Contemplation, dhyāna as the central 
hermeneutic for meditation, see Donner and Stevenson, The Great Calming and Contemplation, 7–8.   
137 śrāvaka (shēngwén 聲聞), pratyekabuddha (yuánjué 緣覺), bodhisattva (púsà 菩薩). 
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descriptions of actual practices is a much more straightforward undertaking in Liǎofán’s 
abridgement. 
What this all entails is first of all that Zhìyǐ’s attention to theory, and the placement of 
each practice within it, makes the Sequential Gateway virtually impossible to read for anyone 
without a firm grasp of the Buddhist Tripiṭaka; and secondly, that the sheer scale of it, as well 
as its meticulous methodology, makes it inaccessible to anyone but specialists—or else 
exceptionally resourceful dilettanti, such as Yuán Liǎofán himself. That being so, by virtue of 
lacking those characteristics the Meditation Essentials was a work accessible to virtually 
anyone, provided that they possessed a rudimentary understanding of Buddhism and 
functional literacy—in fact even illiterates, if they had an instructor. Ironically, if anyone is 
excluded by this work, it is Buddhist specialists. This is further corroborated by the 
application of Confucian terms and frameworks (e.g. ”Chapter on Expanding Love”), as 
elaborated above. 
 
2.5. Provenance, transmission and afterlife 
Now, a gentry orientation would by no means make the Meditation Essentials in any way 
niche or irrelevant to mainstream Buddhism in the late Míng, of which a characteristic is its 
heavy lay orientation—lay associations gaining power at the expense of monasteries.138 It 
might, however, help explain why the Meditation Essentials faded into relative obscurity for 
a long time after its first (extant) publication in 1605. For the general gentry, which 
composed the main readership, blatant interaction with Buddhism and Buddhist texts became 
much more problematic around and after the dynastic transition, because this interaction was 
seen retrospectively as a contributing factor to the corruption and eventual downfall of the 
Míng.139 
 That being said, the texts constituting the Four Admonitions of Liǎofán also contain a 
great deal of Buddhist material; and that work, though controversial in Confucian circles, has 
been hugely popular up to this day. I think one reason for the difference in reception of these 
two works might lie in the subject matter. We should remember that meditation throughout 
history has commonly been restricted to a kind of spiritual elite. This is true also for Buddhist 
meditation, although it is often neglected due to the kind of bias in favour of meditation that 
easily arises in Buddhist studies when (prescriptive) texts is used as the main evidential basis. 
Clearly, the potential readership for a work of the kind of the Four Admonitions of Liǎofán, 
which centres on issues pertaining to everyday morality, is considerably greater. What’s more, 
for this more numerous stratum of the Chinese populace, religious tolerance, syncretism and 
                                                 
138 Yü 于, The Renewal of Buddhism in China, 6. 
139 That this was the predominant view is an established historical fact. See for example Brook, 
Troubled Empire, 183. 
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eclecticism had always been the rule rather than the exception. What is special about late 
Míng syncretism is not the presence of syncretism per se, but its spread to the upper strata 
(which, incidentally, thus seems to be an instance of intellectual bottom-up influence). This 
development made possible such syncretistic works as the Meditation Essentials, but the 
same fact also made the Meditation Essentials vulnerable if the development reversed, which 
it did in the mid-17th century. On top of that, it was not only the syncretistic development that 
turned in that period; the intense concern with sagehood of the Sòng and Míng Neo-
Confucians, too, ebbed away. Meditation was an integral part of this concern. Accordingly, 
the Meditation Essentials was doubly vulnerable. The Four Admonitions of Liǎofán and the 
genre of morality books, on the other hand, enjoyed a much wider audience less dependent on 
the intellectual fluctuations of the elite, for whom syncretism was the rule, and for whom 
“becoming a sage” had never been a concern. A basis for understanding that Yuán Liǎofán is 
the author of both works, I think, is that he was intellectually situated in a medial position—
in two respects: First, socially he belonged to the expanded late Míng lower gentry, with 
connections both downwards and upwards in the hierarchy. Second, historically, he was a 
man of the late Míng, a transitional period between the Sòng-Míng obsession with sagehood, 
and the Míng-Qīng focus on practicality. In fact, the focus on both sagehood, virtues and 
quiescence on the one hand and practicality, deeds and action on the other is a trait I see in 
this period in more Confucians than Yuán Liǎofán. Gāo Pānlóng (1562-1626), famous for his 
creative and detailed meditation methods, was not incredulous to the benefits of keeping 
morality ledgers, and the most important late Míng Neo-Confucian philosopher Liú 
Zōngzhōu (1578-1645) had morality ledgers and meditation as essential parts of his self-
cultivation scheme. In my opinion, this joint focus on both the “root” and “branch” of self-
cultivation in several late Míng figures is lost from sight in a seminal work on the late Míng 
intellectual landscape, Action in Late Ming Thought by Joanna Handlin. Notably, Yuán 
Liǎofán and Liú Zōngzhōu are both invoked in that work as evidence of the “reorientation” 
towards practicality, by virtue of their respective works on morality ledgers—omitting 
mention of the important qualification that both of them were in fact avid meditators.140 I do 
not question the central tenet of a “reorientation”, neither that Liǎofán was part of it, but I 
think the interesting transitional quality of this period and particularly the continued presence 
of more “introvert” self-cultivational methods, is somewhat obscured. Handlin admits the 
continued existence of such introvert conceptualizations of self-cultivation, and discusses the 
controversy between it and the new focus on practicality, but fails to notice that there was not 
only controversy between them (and their respective advocates), but also negotiations, and 
many who did not necessarily see any opposition between the two—Liǎofán being one of 
                                                 
140 See Handlin, Action in Late Ming Thought, ch. 8. On Liǎofán: pp. 194–5, 200; on Zōngzhōu: pp. 
200–3. 
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them. I would argue that many viewed them rather in a functional relationship. That this was 
the case for Liǎofán I will attempt to show in the next chapter. 
 Before that, however, we should continue our look at the actual textual transmission 
of the Meditation Essentials. For although there is no indication of it being an appreciated 
work during the Qīng 清 dynasty (1644–1911)—except for its unbroken transmission—this 
changed again with the Republican period (1912–1945) and the unmitigated onset of 
modernity. 
 From what we may know from extant sources, the Meditation Essentials began its 
life—at least of publicity—as the Dhyāna Essentials in 1595, when it was cited in the 
Complete Collection of Pure Land Provisions.141 The first (extant) complete edition appears 
ten years later, when it is included as a two fascicle work under its updated title in the 17-
fascicle Miscellaneous Writings of Liǎofán142, the year being 1605, one year before his 
probable date of death. In the following decades and centuries many people read and 
critiqued his Four Admonitions of Liǎofán, but there is no evidence for a similar 
appreciation—or depreciation—for the Meditation Essentials. Before 1929, there are no signs 
of life at all except for its existence in two bibliographies, both of which are featured in the 
late 18th  century Qīng “Complete Library of the Four Branches”143. First is the catalogue of 
the private library of Huáng Yújì 黃虞稷 (1627–1691) called Bibliography of the ‘Thousand 
Item Studio’ (Qiānxiàngtáng shūmù 千項堂書目). The bulk of these items were collected 
during the Míng-Qīng transition and the library’s bibliography published sometime during 
the early Qīng. We find the Meditation Essentials in the philosopher (zǐ 子) category, 
interestingly under the subcategory of ”Buddhism” (shì jiā 釋家). It is listed by itself, not as 
part of any collection, and as consisting of only one fascicle.144 Second is the bibliography 
part of the 1736 CE second edition of the Zhèjiāng Comprehensive Gazetteer.145 There the 
Meditation Essentials is listed not as a separate work, but as part of a ”Collected Works of Mr 
Yuán” (Yuán shì cóngshū 袁氏叢書). This entry too is sorted under zǐ. Unsurprisingly, since 
it is a collection of works, the subcategory is not Buddhism, but instead “miscellaneous” (zá 
jiā 雜家). In terms of titles included, this collection equals the extant Miscellaneous Writings 
of Liǎofán (Liǎofán zázhù) mentioned earlier.  
 What we may gather from this bibliographical information is that the Meditation 
Essentials circulated both separately (at least for a while) and as part of the collection 
variously titled Miscellaneous Writings of Liǎofán and Collected Works of Mr Yuán. 
Furthermore, these two editions vary in length, and there is thus a possibility that they are 
                                                 
141 Jìngtǔ zīliáng quánjí (X61n1162). The Meditation Essentials excerpt is in fasc. 6, p0610a15–b19. 
142 Liǎofán Zázhù 了凡雜著, in Yuán Liǎofán wénjí 袁了凡文集, vol. 1–6. The Meditation Essentials 
in vol. 1, p. 33a–67b.  
143 Jǐ 紀 and Lù 陸, eds., Sìkù Quánshū 四庫全書. 
144 Huáng Yújì 黃虞稷, Qiānxiàngtáng shūmù 千項堂書目, fasc. 16, p. 12a. 
145 Xī 嵇, Zhèjiāng tōngzhì 浙江通志, fasc. 246, p. 31b.  
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slightly different also in content. Add to these the 1595 Dhyāna Essentials, and we end up 
with three different versions of the Meditation Essentials circulating in the late Míng that we 
know of. (Henceforth I will call these three “redactions”, in order to separate them from later 
derived versions.) If I were to speculate, I would say that it is likely that the only difference 
between the three lies in the preface of the Miscellaneous Writings of Liǎofán version (1605), 
which is likely younger than the pre-1595 edition, considering that it claims that Miàofēng 
Fúdēng no longer lives. (Admittedly this is wrong in 1605 too, but in 1595 Miàofēng would 
have been only 55 years old, and there is thus less reason for Liǎofán to reckon him dead.) 
Possibly, a hypothetical absence of this preface in the redaction listed separately in the 
Bibliography of the Thousand Item Hall accounts for it being one fascicle shorter. In that case, 
lacking the preface yet possessing the updated title, the first publication of that version may 
be situated temporally in between the other two redactions, i.e. between 1595 and 1605. 
 Almost two hundred years after its inclusion in the Zhèjiāng Comprehensive 
Gazetteer bibliography, the Meditation Essentials resurfaces again in 1929, when it is 
published by a monk calling himself Xìnghuái 性懷.146 Besides the 1605 redaction, it seems 
that this is the only redaction that survives—through republications—to this day, all other 
editions being based on either of the two (hence earning my label “redaction”).  
Xìnghuái is kind enough to supply his editor’s preface, which is rich in interesting 
information concerning the motivations of this monk, yet unfortunately short on any 
bibliographical information. Xìnghuái merely notes that the version he is basing himself on is 
printed from movable types. The remaining bibliographical information is all in the negative: 
He tells us that the edition he had in front of him was deprived of such information, and that 
it was impossible to dig up any.147 Yet this tells us that his basis edition must have been 
another than the Miscellaneous Writings of Liǎofán redaction, seeing as that collection is 
prefaced with date of publication.148 Considering its lack of contextual information, it is 
likely that the edition he used was a separate book—possibly the two-fascicle redaction 
included in the Bibliography of the Thousand Item Hall mentioned earlier, or a reprint thereof. 
The content of the two redactions, however, is identical, except for some erroneous 
characters in the Xìnghuái redaction.149 (Because of this, and due to the uncertain origin of 
the Xìnghuái redaction, when translating I have based myself on the 1605 redaction.) 
                                                 
146 The 1985 and 2013 editions, which will be mentioned in a minute, are both based on this one. 
147 Xìnghuái 性懷, “Jiàokān Yuán Liǎofán xiānshēng Jìngzuò yàojué yuánqǐ” 校刊袁了凡先生靜坐
要訣緣起序 (“Origins of the new printing of the Meditation Essentials by Yuán Liǎofán”), in Yán 嚴 
ed., Yuán Liǎofán Jìngzuò yàojué 袁了凡靜坐要訣, 33–5. 
148 Yuán 袁, Liǎofán zázhù 了凡雜著, 3a. 
149 For example, tiáo xí 調習 in the 1605 redaction (ME 37b8) is rendered at one point as tiáo xí 調息 
in the Xìnghuái redaction (Yán 严 ed., Yuán Liǎofán Jìngzuò yàojué 袁了凡靜坐要訣, 31). From the 
context (調習此心) it is clear that 習 is the correct character. 
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 The Meditation Essentials is mentioned by the perhaps most successful author on 
meditation in China the 20th century, Jiǎng Wéiqiáo, in his third and final main publication on 
meditation in 1955.150 In the most recent publication (2009) of his three works in one book, 
the Meditation Essentials is included in its entirety as an appendix. Alas, I do not know if that 
appendix is a novelty of this publication, or if it was already there in any of the earlier 
editions of his three works (which were first published in 1917, 1918 and 1955 respectively). 
Xìnghuái writes in his 1929 editor’s preface (to the Meditation Essentials) that in his efforts 
to find the ideal meditation work, he first read Jiǎng Wéiqiáo before coming across the 
Meditation Essentials.151 This all points to a relationship between the two, although the exact 
quality of this relationship is yet to be established. 
 Another well-known author of early modern China to write about ”jìngzuò”, Dīng 
Fúbǎo (1874–1952)152, is also influenced by the Meditation Essentials, according to the 
editor of the most recent reprint of the Meditation Essentials. He claims that Dīng’s 1920 The 
Essential Meaning of Meditation Methods153, although seemingly tracing its content to the 
Small Calming and Contemplation and the Dàzhì dù lùn, is actually based on the Meditation 
Essentials.154 I can find no proof of this in Dīng’s text, however, there being no mention as 
far as I can see of the Meditation Essentials in it, despite the style of citing extensively and 
explicitly.  
Nonetheless, there does seem to be a connection of some kind between the Meditation 
Essentials and these early modern works on meditation—and the circle around them. At the 
very least it exists retrospectively as a perceived one, judging by the claim of mentioned 
editor. It would seem that the style and vocabulary of the Meditation Essentials, and above all 
using the term jìngzuò, by lucky coincidence made it compatible with the new demands and 
categories of modernity, avoiding the “superstition” label of the new “religion-science-
superstition triangle”.155 
We see this first in the preface of Xìnghuái, where the Meditation Essentials is framed 
in a modern discourse of medicine, health and ”health-preservation” (wèishēng 衛生, today 
meaning more specifically ”hygiene”)—much like Jiǎng Wéiqiáo wraps in his own works.156 
                                                 
150 Jiǎng, Yīnshìzǐ wèishēng shíyàn tán, 101. 
151 Xìnghuái, “Jiàokān …”, 34. 
152 丁福保. Renowned above all for his dictionary Fóxué dà cídiǎn 佛學大辭典 (”Comprehensive 
dictionary of buddhology”).  
153 Dīng 丁, Jìngzuòfǎ jīngyì 靜坐法精儀 (Shànghǎi: Shànghǎi Gǔjí Chūbǎnshè, 1990). 
154 Yán 嚴 ed., Yuán Liǎofán Jìngzuò yàojué 袁了凡靜坐要訣, 25. 
155 On the introduction of these new modern categories to China, including the quoted term (p. 91), 
see Goossaert and Palmer, The Religious Question in Modern China. 
156 Yán 嚴 ed., Yuán Liǎofán Jìngzuò yàojué 袁了凡靜坐要訣, 26–7. Jiǎng, Yīnshìzi jìngzuò 
yǎngshēng fǎ 因是子养生静坐法. For example, Jiǎng avoids certain ”unscientific” words, such as 
dāntián 丹田 (“cinnabar field”), which he replaces with zhòngxīn 重心, ”centre of gravity”, not due to 
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In the latest 2013 edition we see the same in a slightly updated variation, the emphasis now 
being on the stress and unfulfilment of modern city life.157 According to the same editor, 
based on his experience as both student and teacher, “the Meditation Essentials is indeed an 
excellent book in that it suits the demands of modern people studying meditation.”158 
Only a couple of years later, in 1934, the Meditation Essentials was published again 
as a single book, this time by a Buddhist publishing house in Shànghǎi called ”Buddhology 
Publishing House” (佛學書局).159 
 After 1934, the next printing of note is the Quintessence of the Daoist Canon160, 
where according to Mabuchi the Meditation Essentials is included in the second volume.161 
Mabuchi says this was published as early as 1929,162 but from what I can gather, that is 
mistaken; this 75-volume collection of Daoist classics and newer Daoist works from the 
Míng-Qīng period was published between 1956 and 1992.163 Quite regardless of publication 
date, that a treatise on Buddhist meditation written by a Confucian scholar should be deemed 
as belonging to the “quintessence” of the Daoist canon, is fascinating, to say the least.164 
 Xìnghuái’s redaction was republished in 1985 in Taiwan and reprinted in 2004,165 
whereas the redaction from the Miscellaneous Writings of Liǎofán is republished whenever 
that collection is, which happened at least in 1988, as part of the series “Beijing library’s 
collection of rare ancient books”,166 and in 2006, as part of the new Collected Works of Yuán 
Liǎofán (Yuán Liǎofán wénjí 袁了凡文集).167 
                                                                                                                                                        
any discrepancy or novelty in actual content, but because of the unwanted connotations of dāntián. 
Jiǎng, Yīnshìzǐ Jìngzuòfǎ 因是子靜坐法, 20. 
157 Yán 嚴 ed., Yuán Liǎofán Jìngzuò yàojué, i–ii. 
158 Yán 严 ed., Yuán Liǎofán Jìngzuò yàojué 袁了凡静坐要诀, 98. 
159 Yuán, Jìngzuò yàojué 靜坐要訣 (Shànghǎi: Fóxué Shūjú, 1934). 
160 Dàozàng jīnghuá 道藏精華, edited by Xiāo Tiānshí 蕭天石. (Not to be confused with Dàozàng 
jīnghuá lù 道藏精華錄, edited by Dīng Fúbǎo 丁福保 and first published in 1922.) 
161 Mabuchi, “Sòng-Míng shíqí rúxué duì jìngzuò de kànfǎ”, 95. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Rèn 任, 20 shìjì Zhōngguó xuéshù dàdiǎn: zōngjiào xué  20 世纪中国学术大典: 宗教学, 191. 
Verified by searching the catalogues of various university libraries in Taiwan, e.g. that of National 
Taiwan Normal University, where the first entry is from 1958 (http://www.lib.ntnu.edu.tw/, “道藏精
華”). Komjathy has instead 1963, according to Poul Andersen, Review of Title Index to Daoist 
Collections by Louis Komjathy, 407. 
164 And reminiscent of this biographical detail of Liǎofán (that we also visited in chapter one): the 
Daoist prognosticator whom Liǎofán met outside a Buddhist monastery incidentally was surnamed 
Kǒng 孔. Yuán, Liǎofán sì xùn, 876a–b. 
165 Yuán, Jìngzuò yàojué (Taipei: Xīnwénfēng Chūbǎn Gōngsī, 1985). 
166 Yuán, Liǎofán zázhù, in Běijīng túshūguǎn gǔjí zhēnběn cóngkān 北京图书馆古籍真本丛刊, vol. 
80 (Běijīng: Shūmù Wénxiàn Chūbǎnshè, 1988). 
167 Yuán, Yuán Liǎofán wénjí 袁了凡文集 (Jiāshàn: Xiànzhuàng Shūjú, 2006). This is a new 
comprehensive collection of Liǎofán’s works with a beautiful emulation of traditional Chinese thread 
binding current in the late Míng. Responsible for the publishing is a local governmental committee of 
none other than Liǎofán’s home county. 
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 The latest edition from 2013 I have already mentioned.168 This is also based on the 
Xìnghuái redaction, but as opposed to the 1985 edition includes extensive editorial material 
(aimed at neither Buddhist nor academic specialists, i.e. the common man) and is published 
on the mainland. There is, however, also a traditional character version of it, with moderately 
rewritten and extended editorial parts, published in Taiwan.169 
 And so, more than 400 years after its first publication, the Meditation Essentials is 
more alive than ever.  
  
 
  
                                                 
168 Yán 嚴, ed., Yuán Liǎofán Jìngzuò yàojué 袁了凡靜坐要訣 (Shànghǎi: Shànghǎi Gǔjí 
Chūbǎnshè, 2013). 
169 Yán 严, ed., Yuán Liǎofán Jìngzuò yàojué 袁了凡靜坐要訣 (Taipei: Dàzhǎn Chūbǎnshè 
Yǒuxiàn Gōngsī, 2013). The editorial parts are all slightly rewritten. 
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CHAPTER 3:  
THE RELATION BETWEEN MERIT ACCUMULATION AND MEDITATION 
 
 
We have now seen how Yuán Liǎofán’s reconstruction of the Sequential Gateway, though 
subtle, is in fact quite extensive. He strips away much of its theoretical framework, and in the 
arguably only one major such framework he retains, namely its emphasis on sequentiality, he 
makes a very significant adjustment by reordering two of the practices and placing them last. 
By presenting the quality of Zhìyǐ’s sequential scheme, I have already demonstrated one 
aspect of why I think this reordering is significant. In the following I will continue by 
showing why Liǎofán’s reconstruction of the Sequential Gateway entails also a radical 
reconceptualization of meditation. This I will do by turning to the relation between those two 
practices, and their relation in turn to the practice of accumulating merit through the keeping 
of morality ledgers. Or, in terms of the concepts on which these practices depend: the relation 
between “no-desire” and “humaneness” in meditation, and their connection to the ideal “no-
mind” important for merit accumulation. Far more than empty ideas, these three are thought 
to be the attainable mental states: No-mind (wú-xīn 無心) is described as the state of mind 
indispensable for karmically effective accumulation of merit. No-desire (wú-yù 無欲) and 
humaneness (rén 仁), by virtue of concluding the meditative crescendo, in the Meditation 
Essentials are portrayed as the result and goal of meditation. That this is not inconsequential 
for the pivotal question of this thesis—why meditate?—will become clear when we delve 
into the philosophical implications and interrelatedness of the concepts no-mind, no-desire 
and humaneness. 
 Before that, however, we must tackle the question of whether meditation was at all 
part of the same realm, so to speak, of self-cultivation; and look at what concrete evidence 
there is for a connection between the Meditation Essentials and the works collectively known 
as the Four Admonitions of Liǎofán.  
 
3.1. Correspondences between the Four Admonitions and the Meditation Essentials  
Above I have touched upon both the possibility that Liǎofán perceived meditation as 
irrelevant to the practice of “establishing one’s fate” through morality ledgers, and the other 
possibility that they were part of the same program—the inner and outer aspects of self-
cultivation. The question, then, is: Was meditation part of an altogether different realm of 
self-cultivation, transcending any this-worldly concerns; or was it rather the “root” to the 
“branch” in the quest for both moral perfection and material rewards in the present life? 
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 What is clear—but makes the rest of the questions difficult to answer—is that if there 
is any connection between the Four Admonitions of Liǎofán and the Meditation Essentials, it 
is made explicit nowhere in either works. The complete lack in the Meditation Essentials is 
unsurprising, inasmuch as the practices are derived from the Sequential Gateway and Liǎofán 
lays claims to represent the “legacy of the Tiāntāi [tradition]”. The absence the other way is 
more puzzling. The only mention of meditation in all of the Four Admonitions is this slightly 
disdainful remark in the Essay on Establishing One’s Fate: 
 
Because of this [the confirmation of the most detailed of Kǒng’s prognostications], my belief 
that all change is the result of fixed fate, deepened further. I turned indifferent and without 
any aspirations. Then I entered Yàndū [Běijīng] on a gòngshēng scholarship, where I stayed 
for one year. [During this period] I spent my days sitting in meditation (終日靜坐) and did 
not read.170 
 
This comment makes one wonder whether meditation represented merely an early stage in 
the development of Huáng’s outlook—a concomitant of his fatalism and something he 
discarded the moment he had his personal awakening. The placing of that paragraph as a 
setup to the life-changing meeting with Yúngǔ further strengthens this suspicion. 
 As we saw in the previous chapter (section 2.5), however, the Meditation Essentials, 
or at least its preface, was among the last texts Liǎofán ever wrote.  
Furthermore, towards the end of his biography in the Biographies of Laymen, his only 
one to mention meditation, we learn: 
 
He regularly recited sutras and mantras and practiced dhyāna contemplation (禪觀), with 
fixed daily courses (課程).171 
 
The placement of this description towards the end of the biography possibly signifies that it 
pertains to the later periods of his life. It might not, but the presence of daily schedules seems 
in any case incompatible with the “pre-awakening” indifference and introversion he describes 
in the previous account. It seems then that these habits were something that at least took place 
post-awakening also, and with a central role—if we are to believe the Biographies of Laymen. 
For these reasons, although it remains an open question just how crucial mediation 
was for Yuán Liǎofán, I think we at least can exclude relegating it to a discarded stage on a 
developmental path—something he scrapped as soon as he awoke to the theory of 
“establishing one’s fate”. It is necessary then to probe deeper into the texts and contexts, and 
see if any clue to their possible connection may be spotted. One thing we might look for is 
                                                 
170 Yuán, Liǎofán sì xùn, 877a2–3. 
171Péng, ”Yuán Liǎofán zhuàn”, p0267a23. 
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the presence of any elements of an idealist outlook in his theory of ledger use—in the sense 
of attributing importance to intentions, states of mind etc. with regard to moral value and 
karmic efficacy. Brokaw has pointed out his and Yúngǔ’s emphasis on wú-xīn 無心, “no-
mind”, also described through similar terms, such as “no and no thought” 無思無慮. Yúngǔ 
says to Liǎofán: “All supplications to heaven for the establishing of one’s own fate must be 
made from a mind free of reflection and free of deliberation (無思無慮)  in order to evoke a 
response.”172 The actual term “no-mind”, in the previous account replaced by ”no reflection” 
and ”no deliberation” occurs only twice in the Four Admonitions of Liǎofán, and both times 
from the mouth of Yúngǔ. Nevertheless, it does encapsulate a belief that runs through all of 
these works: that good deeds performed with any conscious awareness of possible favourable 
retribution, will not be efficacious at all.173 For example, in “Method for Accumulating 
Goodness” (”Jī shàn zhī fāng” 積善之方, second of the Four Admonitions), in which he lays 
out his conception of the good, Liǎofán codifies ”goodness” (shàn 善) into eight different 
parameters, ”real/fake”, ”upright/crooked”, ”yīn/yáng”, ”correct/wrong”, ”slanted/straight”, ”
half/full”, ”big/small” and ”difficult/easy”.174 The distinctions between them are somewhat 
floating, with some overlaps, but most of them concern the intentions that lie behind actions. 
The latter three make it clear, as Brokaw has also noted, that destitute people has as big a 
potential to amass ”goodness” and good karma as richer people—two pennies being 
potentially much more karmically ”worth”, for example, than a ”thousand gold”. Especially 
evocative of the Meditation Essentials is the ”upright/crooked” parameter:  
 
It goes for all aspirations to accumulate goodness that they cannot submit to [the wants of] the 
eyes and ears; rather, one should follow the latency at the bottom of one’s heart, and 
indistinctly cleanse it from there. A mind set on nothing but the benefits of society is upright; 
if one preserves even the slightest bit of wanting to impress society, it is [instead] crooked. A 
mind set on nothing but the love for others is upright; if one preserves even the slightest bit of 
resentment towards society, it is crooked. A mind set on nothing but respect for others is 
upright; if one preserves even the slightest bit of scorn towards society, it is crooked.175 
                                                 
172 Yuán, Yuán, Liǎofán sì xùn, 881a–b. Translation modified after Brokaw, Ledgers, 83. Brokaw 
renders 無思無慮 as ”free of conscious thought and free of reflection”. Sī 思 and lǜ 慮, both denoting 
something very close to English ”(conscious) thought”, are nonetheless quite complicated to translate, 
especially when there is seemingly made a nuance between them, as in this saying by Yúngǔ. It seems 
to me that Brokaw gets the nuance wrong. Based on my own encounters with them, 思 often has an 
implication of reflection on past events, whereas the object of 慮 is usually in future. No English 
glosses capture these nuances in full, but at least the etymological metaphor implicated in 
English ”reflect”, of turning one’s thought back on something, makes it as I see it the best candidate 
for 思 (and not 慮).  
173 Brokaw, Ledgers, 83–5. 
174 Respectively:  真假，端曲，陰陽，是非，偏正，半滿，大小，難易. Yuán, Liǎofán sì xùn, 7 
883a. 
175 Yuán, Liǎofán sì xùn, 885a. 
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The concern with intentions is equally conspicuous in the content, structure as well as 
selection of types of meditation practices in the Meditation Essentials, as I have already 
demonstrated in chapter two. Of the in all six chapters, three deal exclusively with intentions 
and desire, and one of them, “Chapter on Distinguishing the Will”, serves as the opening 
chapter that frames the rest—and contains moreover the largest amount of original writing 
among all the chapters. The opening of this chapter follows the first chapter of Zhìyǐ’s 
Sequential Gateway, but in Liǎofán’s summation nonetheless closely resembles the 
“upright/crooked” paragraph of goodness quoted above: 
 
In all meditation practices, one must first distinguish intentions. As soon as there is a slight 
error in the will, one will descend into evil ways. Just like how the archer will first establish 
his target: If the target is on his east and his arrow shoots west, how will he hit the mark? 
According to the Tiāntāi school, there are ten forms of heretical cultivation practices, which I 
will here summarize into four: 
[1] If the practitioner vows to meditate for the sake of fame and riches, then his intentions 
classify as deceitful. Thus he sows the karmic cause of ‘hell’. 
[2] If he on the other hand meditates for the sake of turning his stupidity into brightness and 
surpassing others, then his intentions classify as ‘competitive’. Thus he sows the karmic 
cause of ‘demigod’. 
[3] If he meditates for reason of fear towards worldly worries and karmic retributions, and 
admiration towards philanthropy and happiness, then his will classifies under ‘likes and 
dislikes’. Thus he sows the karmic cause of ‘men and gods’. 
[4] If he meditates, not for fame and riches, nor for brightness or good karma, but solely for 
the reason of escaping the “thousand births and myriad kalpas” and the endlessness of life 
and death, only in order to seek the right path and quickly attain nirvāṇa, then his will 
classifies as ‘finishing for oneself’. Thus he sows the karmic cause of ‘the two wagons, 
[‘voice-hearer’ and ‘individually enlightened’]’.  
Although there are differences among these types of practitioners—in the degree to which 
they are either good or evil, and in the extent to which they are either fettered or liberated—in 
terms of heretical practice they are all the same. (ME 33b9–34a8) 
 
Here too, for the practice to be efficacious the practitioner must rid himself of all selfish 
intentions, including even the intention to reach nirvāṇa. When all such intentions are 
discarded, rén 仁 (”humaneness”, but notoriously difficult to translate) remains:  
 
True cultivation practice is encapsulated in the single notion of humaneness (rén 仁). “To 
regard Heaven–and–Earth and the myriad things as one substance” [Chéng Yí], and “to make 
manifest illustrious virtue throughout the world” [Great Learning], this is what is meant by 
‘humaneness’. Translated into Chinese, ‘Ṡākya-muni’ means the two notions “to be able to be 
humane” (néng rén). ‘Bodhi’ means ”enlightened”, or ”to ferry over, liberate”. ‘Sattva’ 
means ”affectionate”, or ”all living creatures”. ‘Bodhisattva’ thus means ”enlightened and 
compassionate”, or ”to save all living creatures”. Buddhism regards only bodhisattva-hood as 
the Middle Way. Arhat-hood, on the other hand, is seen as exceeding the three realms and 
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thus realizing the karmic effect of ‘not returning’. The Buddha deeply detests arhats, 
denouncing them as withered buds and failed seeds, regarding them as only saving themselves 
and no others. The Śūraṃgama-sutra176 states: “As long as there is one among all living 
creatures that has not attained Buddhahood, then one should not obtain nirvāna.” And 
furthermore: ”Offering this body and mind to the defiled, secular world, this is what is 
called ’repaying the benevolence of the Buddha’.” Truly, its purport is profound! (ME 34a8–
34b7) 
 
Though the linking of rén to Buddhist meditation practice would be quite preposterous to 
orthodox Neo-Confucians, the understanding of its (antithetical) relation to selfish intentions 
and desire is quite in line with the Sòng Neo-Confucian masters (whom we will return to 
later). Liǎofán here describes it as the sort of compassionate attitude one must bring into 
meditation in order for it to be efficacious—similar to the role of no-mind in ledger keeping. 
At the same time, however, he also portrays it as an effect of meditation, something one must 
cultivate gradually through meditation practice. For the last chapter entitled “Chapter on 
Expanding Love” is devoted to contemplations that cultivate “love” (ài 愛). “Love” in turn is 
closely connected with “humaneness”—in the view of Liǎofán as well as most Confucians: 
some paragraphs after his definition of humaneness as “regarding the myriad beings of 
Heaven-and-earth as one substance”, he writes that “humaneness is loving others” (ME 35a2), 
which seems to reflect Zhū Xī’s more subtle definition that “humaneness is the not-yet-
materialized state of love; love is the already-materialized state of humaneness.” Or the 
related qualification made by Chéng Yí 程頤 (1033–1107) that humaneness is an aspect of 
man’s nature (xìng 性), whereas love belongs to man’s feelings (qíng 情).177 A more general 
way of stating this is that humaneness is substance (tǐ 體) whereas love is its function (yòng 
用). Analyzing it further, Chéng Yí invokes yet another related term gōng 公, ”impartiality; 
disinterestedness”, and says that the general underlying principle is not humaneness but 
disinterestedness; but this principle when/as embodied in man is called humaneness; and the 
application of benevolence in turn is called love.178 
 Liǎofán’s explication of humaneness as loving others, and then a chapter on 
cultivating love, seems to indicate that the attainment of “humaneness” should also be 
understood as an effect of meditation. This is equally true of the dispelling of personal 
intentions: The mentioned “Chapter on Expanding Love” is preceded—and thus set up—by 
the “Chapter on Eliminating Desire” which deals exclusively with meditative contemplations 
designed to weed out selfish desire. One can only cultivate love and compassion after desire 
                                                 
176 Lèngyán jīng 楞嚴經, Śūraṅgama-sūtra (T19n0945). Immensely popular sūtra during the late 
Míng, also among non-Buddhists. 
177 Zhū Xī, quoted in Qián 錢, Zhūzi xīn xúe’àn 朱子新學案, 167. 
178 Chéng Yí, quoted in Graham, Two Chinese Philosophers, 97. 
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is eliminated (or at least has begun being eliminated). One wonders if Liǎofán would not 
endorse Zhū Xī’s nuancing of the definition by Chéng Yí of humaneness as “regarding the 
myriad beings of Heaven-and-earth as one substance”:  
 
‘Selflessness’ is the antecedent of humaneness. ‘Regarding the myriad beings of Heaven-and-
earth as one substance’ is the consequent of humaneness. Only after selflessness [is attained] 
can there be humaneness; only after humaneness [is attained] can there be ‘regarding Heaven-
and-earth and the myriad beings as one substance’. What humaneness ultimately is must be 
discerned in between these two.179 
 
The structure these two chapters together constitute thus closely parallels the internal 
structure of ”Chapter on Distinguishing the Will” in which one must first distinguish and 
discard attitudes that are adverse to meditation and then apply the correct ”humane” attitude. 
In the first chapter this is presented as a condition for meditation; in the last two as crucial 
effects. This seems to lead to a circular argument, in that absence of desire and presence of 
humaneness are at the same time the precondition and the effect of meditation. However, if 
we think of meditation as a gradual practice, whereby initial effects will propel the long-term 
effects, this circularity is not a problem. 
I propose that it is in this believed effect of meditation of weeding out desire and 
cultivating compassion in its place that the link between the Meditation Essentials and the 
Four Admonitions of Liǎofán is to be sought, and that the point of connection lies in the three 
concepts ‘selflessness’, ‘humaneness’ and ‘no-mind’. The ideal of a no-mind devoid of 
calculation of personal benefits was to be sure a lofty one, and was bound to have met with 
considerable challenges, all the more so when combined with the explicit practice of doing 
just that: calculating personal benefits through Ledgers of Merit and Demerit. It seems likely 
that Liǎofán conveyed his difficulties to Chán master Yúngǔ, who then in true ”skilful means” 
spirit taught the practices he deemed most relevant for this layman. As shown in the previous 
chapter, that the selection of practices in the Meditation Essentials reflects Liǎofán’s own 
concerns more than those of his teacher, becomes evident when we contrast them with the 
types of meditations Hānshān Déqīng practiced, which are altogether different from those of 
Liǎofán, despite the fact that the two shared a principal meditation teacher in Yúngǔ.180  
That the connection between ’humaneness’, ’no desire’ and ’no-mind’ goes deeper 
than a mere superficial semblance becomes apparent when we take a closer look at each of 
them. Seeing that Liǎofán in the Meditation Essentials centres his discussion of these virtues 
on rén, humaneness, I will also make it the starting and revolving point of the following 
                                                 
179 Zhū Xī, Zhūzǐ yǔlèi 朱子語類, ch. 6, para. 109. 
180 Eifring, “Meditative Pluralism in Hānshān Déqīng”, 117, 126. 
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discussion, the main goal of which is to establish the philosophical interrelatedness in Neo-
Confucianism of the terms humaneness, no-desire, and no-mind. 
 
3.2. Rén 仁 
Rén, what I gloss as “humaneness”, is a concept with a history almost as long as Chinese 
culture, and so even beginning to untangle its meanings and genealogy is far beyond bounds 
of feasibility. However, considering its pivotal place in Confucianism and the Neo-Confucian 
quest of sagehood, as well as its decisiveness for understanding the significance of no-desire 
and no-mind, I think a very short historical treatment is in order.  
According to Chén Lái 陳來, rén started out with the very limited denotation as “love 
towards one’s kin” (ài qīn 愛親), which by the time of Confucius (6th Century BCE) had 
been extended to the basic meaning “love towards others” (ài rén 愛人).181 This is a serious 
misconception, which I suspect stems from China’s earliest comprehensive dictionary, the 
Shuō wén 說文 (finished 100 CE), where rén is defined as kinship love (仁親也). It has been 
well established that rén, far from denoting or connoting “love” (in its early stages, that is), 
likely has a martial origin. Lin Yü-sheng argues that rén, derived from the homonymous rén 
人 (”man”), had the pre-Confucian meaning of ”manliness”, or ”manhood”, ”connoting the 
daring quality of man, without any moral implication”.182 Though close to the mark, it seems 
that Lin, too, commits an anachronism. If we believe Graham, 人 at this point in time denoted 
not ”man” generally, but was rather the term the aristocratic clans of Zhōu 周 used to 
distinguish themselves from the common people, i.e. something like ”nobleman”, ”nobility”. 
Accordingly, for its usage in pre- and early Confucianism, Graham glosses rén 仁 as 
“noble”—the stative verb corresponding to the nobleman, and later, to the gentleman (jūn zǐ 
君子).183 
In the centuries the Analects was composed (c. 500–c. 250)184 we find both this 
meaning and a proto-Mencian meaning of a general benevolence towards all people, (as in 
the negative form of the Golden Rule)185, reflecting the evolving meaning of the 
corresponding noun 人 (”nobleman”; ”man”), societal developments, as well as the 
                                                 
181 Chén 陈, Rénxué Běntǐlùn 仁学本体论, 16. 
182 Lin 林, "The Evolution of the Pre-Confucian Meaning of Jen 仁", 178–80. 
183 Graham, Disputers of the Tao, 19. Following Lin, we might specify Eastern Zhōu (770–256), since 
the word is not among the earliest Chinese characters and appears neither in oracle bones and bronze 
inscriptions nor in historical documents dating from the Western Zhōu (1046–771). See Lin Yü-sheng 
林毓生, "The Evolution of the Pre-Confucian Meaning of Jen 仁", 172–5. 
184 Using the revisionist dating by the Warring States Project. See Brooks and Brooks, The Original 
Analects, 5. 
185 “Not to do to others as you would not wish done to yourself”. ICS Lunyu: 12.2/30/24. Translation 
by Legge.  
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philosophical evolution of Confucianism. We might say that the denotation of rén shrinks in 
scope in terms of virtue—from a general characterisation of the noble to a narrower 
empathy—but expands in terms of the universality of this virtue, both who may embody it 
(all people, as part of their heavenly endowed nature) and whom its object is (also all people). 
For comprehending the Neo-Confucian understandings of rén, no classical Confucian 
thinker is more important than Mencius (372–289), who in many respects was more 
influential on Neo-Confucianism than Confucius himself. Mencius consolidates the new 
narrow denotation of rén as benevolence—what Luo Shirong calls a ”single-dimensional, 
first-order virtue”, as opposed to Confucius’ “overarching, multidimensional, second- or 
higher-order virtue”.186 Rén is now one virtue among many—distinct from and juxtaposed 
with ”rightness” (yì 義), ”ritual propriety” (lǐ 禮) and ”knowledge” (zhì 智), together the 
Confucian (or rather Mencian) four cardinal virtues—now strictly moral values firmly 
located within the heart/mind (xīn 心). Its centrality is not diminished, however, as it is by far 
the most important asset of a good ruler (仁政), which in the Analects was instead accorded 
zhī lǐ 知禮, ”knowing propriety”.187  
Mencius’ conception of rén was an important part of his larger claim of the goodness 
of human nature. He couples the four virtues, or “powers” (dé 德), with the four ”emergent 
sprouts” (duān 端), our inborn basis for these virtues. The metaphor is that of a sprout and a 
full-grown plant. If cultivated the proper way, it lies in the nature of the sprout to grow into 
the consummate plant. And if, of two seeds of the same species, one plant turns out 
consummate, the other crooked, this proves only a discrepancy in environment, not an inborn 
difference in the sprouts themselves. Moral growth is just like physical growth.  
The corresponding ”sprout” for rén was a ”sympathetic heart” (惻隱之心).188 
Mencius’ famous analogy is that of a child about to fall into a well. The line of reasoning is 
that any human put in this situation would immediately and inevitably be filled with alarm 
and sympathy—not due to any ulterior motive, like being rewarded for saving it, but out of 
the goodness of his heart. This proves for Mencius the goodness of our nature—in this case 
the part of our nature pertaining to the virtue of rén.189 Furthermore, it points to the 
importance of proper cultivation—assisting the sprouts to fruition so to speak. Another 
Mencius quote on self-cultivation popular with the Neo-Confucians (we will see it in chapter 
four), was ”do not let your heart forget it, but do not help it grow either”.190 This quotation 
                                                 
186 Luo, “Setting the Record Straight: Confucius’ Notion of Ren,” 41.  
187 Ibid., 42. 
188 ”A sympathetic heart is the emergent sprout of rén”. ICS Mencius: 3.6/18/8. Translation modified 
after Graham, Disputers, 126. 
189 ICS Mencius: 3.6/18/4–12. 
190 ICS Mencius: 3.2/16/3. Translation modified after Graham, Disputers, 127. 
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would inevitably evoke the story that follows it, of the farmer who, concerned that his sprouts 
did not seem to be growing fast enough, started tugging at them to assist their growth—which 
of course merely lead to them all having withered the next day.191 
As Graham observes, this view of nature is not only descriptive, but also prescriptive: 
Xìng is both an observable fact about how a thing will become when the required 
circumstances are present, and how it ought to develop: “the course of sheng [生, ”live; life”] 
proper to a thing” (my emphasis).192 
It was largely this view of rén—man’s potential for good, his good nature, brought to 
its utmost fruition (jìn xìng 盡性)—that the Neo-Confucians adopted, and which throws the 
most light on Yuán Liǎofán’s application of it. At the same time, however, 
Confucius’ ”higher-order” conception of rén was to some extent retained in a tendency of the 
Neo-Confucian to regard it also as an all-inclusive virtue, or force, containing within it the 
three other virtues. Moreover, their conception of rén was compounded by everything that 
happened with it in the one and a half millennia between Mencius and the Sòng dynasty. 
Particularly significant was the development in the fields of metaphysics and cosmology. The 
Neo-Confucians retained the Mencian ethics of rén, but at the same timed strived to 
synthesize it with particularly Hàn 漢 (202 BCE–220 CE) cosmology. Indeed, one of the 
most defining characteristics of Neo-Confucian philosophy more generally, was precisely its 
effort to merge ethics with metaphysics and cosmology—to find metaphysical grounds for 
Confucian ethics, spurred on by the challenge posed by Buddhism and its highly developed 
metaphysics.193 Yuán Liǎofán is not notably concerned with such metaphysical aspects of rén, 
except for the concept of everything in the universe sharing the same “body” or “substance” 
(tóng tǐ 同體), so except for this theory I won’t treat the historical development of 
metaphysic rén here in any length.  
Suffice it to say that in the Yì zhuàn 易傳 appendix to the Book of Changes, rén was 
coupled with the “primordial” (yuán 元), a cosmogonical concept denoting the early stages of 
                                                 
191 ICS Mencius: 3.2/16/4–6.  
192 Graham, Disputers, 127. At this point we should bear in mind an aspect of “nature” in Chinese, 
particularly Mencian, philosophy that makes it slightly different from nature as understood in Western 
philosophy, namely its emphasis on potentiality: A man’s nature is not the same as his inborn 
qualities, but rather the natural qualities that will mature if nourished rightly. Thus, man could have 
inborn (故 gù) cravings without them belonging to his nature (xìng 性). This was pointed out by 
Angus Graham, who describes the Chinese “nature” thus: “The xìng (nature) of an animate thing [...] 
meant the course on which life completes its development if sufficiently nourished and not obstructed 
or injured from the outside”. Graham, Disputers, 124. As we shall see in the next section, the most 
significant such obstructions in Neo-Confucianism were those of self-centredness and desire (sī 私, yù 
欲). (And not many qualifications are needed for the same claim to apply to Buddhism and 
philosophical Daosim as well.) 
193 Hon, "Zhou Dunyi’s Philosophy of the Supreme Polarity," 4–9. 
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the cosmos, as well as the creative principles of heaven-and-earth—the ”generation of life” 
(shēng shēng 生生). Rén was now the source not only of good (shàn 善), but of no less than 
the whole cosmos, and the ”moving force and cause” of life.194 Later, the Book of Rites, 
developing a tendency already latent in Mencius,195 couples rén with qì (”ether”196). We see 
this development in Zhū Xī’s saying that “Rén is the creative [shēng] ether of Heaven-and-
earth”.197 Having been associated with qì, rén was then further described as the “mind of 
Heaven” (tiān xīn 天心), and the ”mind of Heaven-and-earth” (tiān-dì zhī xīn 天地之心), 
understood as the source of all movement in the universe—that by which the generation of all 
life (shēng shēng 生生) was guided. By analogy to how the human body is guided by its 
mind, this force was then called the ”mind of Heaven-and-earth” (though any conscious 
primus motor was never implied).198 
When we reach the Sòng dynasty and the advent of Neo-Confucianism, this notion of 
the ”mind of Heaven” was coupled with the ontological theory of tóng tǐ 同體, which situated 
man’s nature not primarily in each individual, where it was for Mencius, but as part of the 
substance of everything. There was to be no distinction between inner and outer. 
Consequently, the mind of Heaven-and-earth was more decidedly understood as a ubiquitous 
(and impersonal) entity, running through man and all other beings.199 Synthesizing pre-
Confucian “noble”, Mencian “benevolence” and Hàn “mind of Heaven”, rén was now 
defined as man’s inherent ability to be conscious of this unity. In the next chapter we will see 
Lǐ Yánpíng’s (1093–1163) definition of rén as “simply perception200 in its thoroughly 
clarified state.” A particularly terse saying by Chéng Yí, who is also the origin of defining 
rén in terms of perception, reads: “Rén then one, not rén then two.”201 
                                                 
194 Chén, Rénxué Běntǐlùn, 16. 
195 The self-cultivation anecdote of the farmer tugging at his seedlings is actually an elaboration of 
Mencius’ idea of a ”flood-like qì”, which though described here as the goal of self-cultivation is 
rather mystic and otherwise never really explained. 
196 In Neo-Confucian metaphysics, qì basically denotes the material force of which everything in the 
universe is constituted, the opposite of lǐ 理, principle. Common translations are “(cosmic) pneuma” 
and “ether” (a less common one is “matter”); I follow Graham and opt for “ether”. 
197 Zhū Xī, quoted in Qián, Zhūzǐ xīn xúe’àn, 379. 
198 Chén, Rénxué Běntǐlùn, 17. 
199 Ibid., 18. 
200 zhījué 知覺. Another possible gloss is ”awareness”. The Chinese term, as conceived by the Neo-
Confucians, involves something more active than what we usually think of as ”perception”. The 
compound word seems to be interchangeable with the second graph jué 覺 (and not with zhī 知), a 
term that is no less complicated, but which never escapes it basic meaning of ”waking up” and ”being 
wake”. Asked what the difference between the two morphs is, Yáng Shí 楊時 (h. Guìshān, 1053–1135) 
replies that zhī (”know”) is what we do with affairs (shì 事), whereas jué is what we do with principle 
(lǐ 理). In other words, we know affairs, and a few of us also perceives lǐ 理. Thanks to Anders 
Sydskjør for sharing this insight. See Zhū Xī, Zhūzǐ yǔlèi, ch. 17, sec. 3, para. 7. 
201 Quoted and translated in Graham, Two Chinese Philosophers, 97. 
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In the Daoist-inspired “monist” tradition of Neo-Confucianism, there was a tendency 
of conceptualising this universality in terms of a common source, either a spring (yuán 源) 
from which everything flows and diverges into streams (liú 流), or a root (běn 本) from 
which branches grow. In the more rationalist ”dualist” tradition, there was a tendency to 
rather reduce everything to a single, underlying ”principle” or “pattern” (lǐ 理).202 These two 
competing trends are in fact represented by the two nearly identical versions of the definition 
of rén as forming one substance with all things. Chéng Hào’s 程顥 (1032–1085) version 
was: ”Rén is being indivisibly of the same substance as all beings”; Chéng Yí’s, which is the 
one Liǎofán employs, reads: ”Rén is regarding Heaven-and-earth and the myriad beings as 
one substance”.203 They seem to express the exact same idea, and was indeed used 
interchangeably by later Neo-Confucians, but, knowing who uttered each of them, reflect two 
slightly different conceptions of rén. Above we saw Chéng Yí’s analysis of the relation of 
rén to ”impartiality”, calling rén the principle of impartiality as it is embodied in man. Both 
are principles, and instantiations of the most generalised ”heavenly principle” (tiān lǐ 天理), 
rén only being a more specific principle than ”impartiality”. Becoming rén is then a matter of 
discovering and extrapolating (tuī 推) this principle through the ”investigation of things”, 
either things and affairs out there in the natural and social worlds, or in bookish learning, or 
in the mind within. Then one will be able to ”regard Heaven-and-earth and the myriad beings 
as one substance.”  
For those with monist inclinations, on the other hand, embodying rén seems to be 
more of a mystic or religious experience, feeling the common source of everything, regaining 
sensation in the parts of one’s being that were previously numb, ”being of the same substance 
as Heaven-and-earth and the myriad beings”. We shall see a quintessential example of such a 
mystic understanding, as applied to meditation, in the next chapter when looking at Luó 
Hóngxiān (1504–1564). In the School of Mind, which roughly corresponds with Graham’s 
monist category, this commonality was to be sought through one’s own mind. 
 
3.3. “No-desire” 
What the monists and dualists share, however—and which makes the distinction not so 
significant for our purposes—is the belief that self-centred desires (yù 欲) and intentions (yì 
                                                 
202 On the monist and dualist traditions in Neo-Confucianism, see Graham, Two Chinese Philosophers, 
xxvii–xx. Graham does not spell it out, but it is my impression that the two categories correspond 
roughly with the School of Mind and School of Principle respectively. 
203 “渾然與與物同體” and “以天地萬物為一體” respectively. In Chéng 程 and Chéng 程, Hénán 
Chéng shì yí shū 河南程氏遺書, fasc. 2a, p. 4b; and ibid., p. 2b. 
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意) are not part of our heaven-endowed nature, either it is understood in terms of principle or 
a common source.  
 The term Liǎofán employs is “(having) no desire”, wú yù 無欲, a term that in pre-
Sòng times had had a Daoist and Buddhist affinity, but which nonetheless took on 
philosophical import for the Neo-Confucians. It was Zhōu Dūnyí (1017–1073) who first 
assigned it a central place. Usually, the terms implied are “no self-centred desire” (wú sī’yù 
無私欲), or “no human desire” (wú rényù 無人欲); most Neo-Confucians did not dispute the 
naturalness or desirability of desires relating to subsistence, like eating, or the desire to 
become a sage (though Wáng Jī is a possible exception)204. What was detrimental, and 
unnatural, were desires that arose from the idea—the illusion—of an essential distinction 
between oneself and others. Such a distinction would lead to craving (yù 欲) that which lay 
beyond oneself, and scheming (yì 意) to obtain them, whereas realizing the unity of things 
would leave one content with the awareness that one is already in possession of them by 
virtue of being human—but also to the will (zhì 志) to ”establish others” (lì rén 立人).205 
 The opposite of sī 私, self-centredness, is gōng 公, ”impartiality”. Common for all the 
Chinese traditions is the idea that self-centredness is a kind of partialness, a failure to remain 
objective. For the Neo-Confucians, due to our attachment to our selves we are unable to 
perceive and judge a thing or situation according to its actual, objective properties, and thus 
to respond to it in an unmediated way in accordance with the Way and our actual nature. 
The locus classicus on ”no-desire” is this exchange between Zhōu Dūnyí 周敦頤 
(1017–1073), and a disciple:  
 
Q. Can sagehood be learnt? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is there any essential [approach]? 
A. Yes. 
                                                 
204 It seems that for Wáng Jī, who took Yángmíng’s emphasis on spontaneity even further, aspiring to 
follow the Way amounts to an externalization that in turn leads to dualism, e.g.: ”The Changes is the 
Way. If you desire to follow it, this will be of a kind with dualism (二). Dualism leads to straying 
away [from the Way].” More generally, the School of Mind emphasised that man by nature already 
possesses sagehood within him; becoming a sage is more a process of realizing and then trusting 
wholeheartedly this inherent goodness than it is searching for the Way in books, past paragons of 
virtue or ”things” in society and nature, i.e. outside the mind, as it was for the Chéng-Zhū school. 
205 The concept of “establishing others” (lì rén) in fact stems from one of the definitions of rén in the 
Analects (c. 262 BCE): “As for the man of rén, wanting position himself, he gives position to others 
(lì rén); wanting to advance himself, he advances others. To be able to judge the needs of others by 
one’s own—this may be described as the method of rén.” We saw the negative form of the Golden 
Rule earlier; this is the positive version. ICS Lunyu: 6.30/14/17. Translation modified after Graham, 
Two Chinese Philosophers, 98–9; and Brooks and Brooks, The Original Analects, 176. Brooks 
renders lì rén politically as ”positioning others”, which I think is correct, yet we should bear in mind 
that Neo-Confucians of the Sòng and Míng would have read this lì rén in a much wider, ethical sense, 
best represented by ”establishing others”. We will meet the phrase again shortly. 
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Q. I request to hear it! 
A. Oneness (yī 一) is of the essence. Oneness is having no desire. When having no desire one 
is void while quiescent and upright while active. [...]206 
 
Zhōu Dūnyí, who was also the first to introduce the centrality of sagehood, deems ”no desire” 
the essential way to obtain it, which when Zhū Xī ranked Zhōu Dūnyí as the first Neo-
Confucian patriarch secured its centrality in later Neo-Confucianism. Indeed, Yuán Liǎofán 
opens his ”Chapter on Eliminating Desire” by referring to it:  
 
In his expositions on the Sagely Learning [i.e. Confucianism], Zhōu Liánxī [Dūnyí] held ‘no-
desire’ to be essential.” (ME 60b5) 
 
We also see that Dūnyí’s definition of “no desire” is basically identical to Chéng Yí’s 
definition of rén, which later lead to their being equated, and subsequently to Zhū Xī’s 
refutation of such a simplistic definition, and his explication of their relation that we saw 
above, calling rén the consequent of selflessness. He was also fond of explaining the 
relationship by resorting to water metaphors:  
 
Water muddled by sand is necessarily not the original [state] of water. When the sand is 
removed, then as a matter of course we have water [in its original state]. It cannot be claimed 
that the absence of sand [per se] equals water.207 
 
What does water represent in this metaphor? Rén of course: 
 
When one achieves [a state in which one is] thoroughly cleansed of selfish desires, so that the 
Heavenly principles may flow [freely], this will be rén.208 
 
And in a similar simile:  
 
Rén may be spotted only when there is no selfish desire. Just like water only can move when 
there is no clogging.209 
 
                                                 
206 Zhōu Dūnyí, Tōng shū 通書, sec. 20. 
207 Zhū Xī, quoted in Qián, Zhūzǐ xīn xúe’àn, 162–3. 
208 Zhū Xī, Zhūzǐ yǔlèi, ch. 6, para. 105. Reminiscent of this saying by Huìnéng 慧能 (for whom the 
concepts “no-thought” (wú-niàn 無念) and “no-mind” were essential): “‘The other shore’ means ever 
separating from all objects so there is no arising-and-perishing, like water constantly flowing 
everywhere without obstruction”. Trans. Yampolsky, quoted in Ziporyn, “The Platform Sūtra and 
Chinese Philosophy,” 172. 
209 Zhū Xī, in Qián, Zhūzǐ xīn xúe’àn, 164. 
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Such a conception may stem from his teacher Lǐ Yánpíng 李延平. Lǐ Yánpíng, paraphrasing 
one of the Chéng brothers—in the same letter as where he eventually advocates the practice 
of meditation, which we will look at in the next chapter—writes to Zhū Xī: 
 
The notion of rén is hard to explicate. In the Analects [Confucius] only tell his disciples how 
to pursue it, so that they may know how to exert their minds. It seems that when selfish desire 
sinks, the Heavenly principles may be viewed, and one will then know rén.210 
 
In all these explications, self-centred desire is an obstruction, preventing us from perceiving, 
embodying and acting out the principle of rén. 
 Overcoming desire was therefore an important gōngfū “spiritual effort” for most all 
the Neo-Confucians, as it also was for Confucius and Mencius. Mencius stressed the 
importance of ”diminishing desire” (guǎ yù 寡欲) for ”nourishing the heart” (yǎng xīn 養心). 
Zhōu Dūnyí advocated the practice of ”maintaining quiescence” (zhǔ jìng 主靜) as a means 
for maintaining the oneness we saw above (zhǔ yī 主一). Zhū Xī and others often 
stressed ”restraining oneself and returning to ritual propriety” (克己復禮) as way of 
overcoming desire (and also of discovering rén).  
Wáng Yángmíng (1472–1529), for whom uncovering our innate knowledge of the 
good (liángzhī 良知) was the overriding concern, ”removing human desire” (qù rényù 去人
欲) became the only essential gōngfū. The term appears 24 times in his collected works. 
Huáng Zōngxī 黃宗羲 (1610–1695) deems ”removing human desire and preserving the 
Heavenly principles” one of Yángmíng’s three essential teachings, the two other being ”the 
unity of knowledge and action” and the ”extension of innate knowledge”.211 For Yángmíng, 
the innate knowledge, a term originating from Mencius and associated with Chéng Hào, is 
emphatically something we are endowed with from birth. Becoming a sage is simply a matter 
of uncovering it. What keeps us from doing that is precisely ”human desire”. ”Simply apply 
                                                 
210 Lǐ Yánpíng 李延平 and Zhū Xī, Yánpíng dá wèn 延平答問, para. 54. This bears conspicuous 
resemblance to, and was likely inspired by, the following saying of Chéng Hào 程顥: ”Rén is most 
difficult to describe in words. Thus, Confucius said only: ‘Wanting to establish yourself, you establish 
others; wanting to advance yourself, you advance others. To be able to judge the needs of others by 
one’s own—this may be described as the method of rén.’ By making us look at rén from this point of 
view, he wanted us to grasp its substance.” Incidentally, Chéng Hào quotes here the saying from the 
Analects that we just met in note 205. Since it here comes from the mouth of a Neo-Confucian, I 
render lì rén instead as “establishing others”. Chéng Hào, Hénán Chéng shì yí shū, fasc. 2a, p. 3a.  
211 ”In teaching people, his most crucial points lay in ‘removing human desire’ and ‘preserving the 
heavenly principle’ (存天理); this was elaborated with the doctrine of the ‘unity of knowledge and 
action’ (知行合一); while the most essential place ultimately was accorded the ‘extension of innate 
knowledge’ (致良知). Even with a hundred thousand words, none would not be somehow derived 
from one of these three sayings.” Huáng Zōngxī, Míng rú xué’àn 明儒學案, fasc. 10, para. 14. 
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effort (用功) to the removal of human desire and the preservation of Heavenly principle, and 
that’s it.”212 
The concern for the removal of desire is no less omnipresent in Wáng Jī (1498–1583), 
213 Yángmíng’s perhaps most influential disciple, and teacher for several years of Yuán 
Liǎofán. Drawing on a distinction made by Yángmíng in his later years, in turn borrowed 
from Buddhism, Wáng Jī emphasises the indispensability of eliminating desire particularly 
for those with a disposition not belonging to the “sharp faculties” (lì gēn 利根). Due to the 
habits (xí 習) such people—most people—have amassed through interaction with an 
imperfect society, they must ”diminish desire” (opting for the Mencian term): ”The human 
mind is originally void (虛)214; that which is not void is due to the piling on of desire. The 
mind having desire is like the eye being covered by dust. (...) The gentleman [avails himself 
of the spiritual effort of] diminishing desire in order to arrive at voidness.”215 Similar 
statements abound.216 The quest for ”no-desire” is no less than the origin of pedagogy: ”The 
establishing of teachings (教) by the men of old was originally devised to counter the 
presence of desire.”217 Moreover, no-desire is for him not only crucial for gōngfū, but also a 
qualifier of ontological substance (tǐ 體): ”No-desire is the original substance (本體) of the 
mind.”218 
 
3.4. “No-mind” 
The water metaphors for selflessness and rén by Zhu Xi and his teacher ring highly 
reminiscent of a description by Wm. Theodore de Bary of what “no-mind” entailed in Neo-
Confucianism: 
 
“Having no mind” meant emptying it of self and simultaneously allowing it to be completely 
filled with the mind of Heaven-and-earth, that is, to reflect the moral universe just as it is. (...) 
                                                 
212 Wáng Yángmíng, Chuán xí lù 傳習錄, ch. 1, para. 4.  
213 As stated by Zhōng 鍾, ”Wáng Lóngxī de běntǐ lùn yǔ gōngfū lùn” 王龍溪的本體論與工夫論, 
104. 
214 Xū. This term is traditionally Daoist, recurring in the Zhuāngzǐ in particular. On the surface, and in 
ordinary parlance, xū is synonymous with kōng 空, ”empty”, the word opted for by the Buddhists to 
render Sanskrit śūnyatā. In order to distinguish the two, the common English translation of xū 
is ”void.” Barry Allen, trying to avoid Western connotations of absolute ”nothingness”, uses 
instead ”virtual”—in opposition to ”actual” (yǒu 有, ”have”), thus foregrounding the Chinese 
keenness for constant transformation, and the quality of this pair of each being able to transform into 
the other. 
215 Quoted in Fāng 方, “Wáng Jī de xīntǐ lùn,” 155. 
216 See for example Zhōng, ”Wáng Lóngxī de běntǐ lùn yǔ gōngfū lùn”, 108.  
217 Ibid., 104. 
218 Ibid.  
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Emptiness was the wellspring of activity in a life that joined the active and contemplative 
modes (...).219 
 
Indeed, for the early Neo-Confucians the denotations of “no-desire” and “no-mind” were 
basically identical, according to Dèng Kèmíng,220 This is true, but only partly so. First, we 
might nuance this (in an analogous way to Zhū Xī’s treatment of selflessness and rén) and 
say that the referent of “no-mind” is a state of mind unclouded by personal cravings, 
intentions and scheming. In other words it is the state of mind resulting from thinking and 
acting selflessly. More importantly, and as Dèng’s account also shows, application of the 
term “no-mind” had a rich history within both the Buddhist and Daoist traditions; therefore, it 
inevitably encompassed if not denotations then at least connotations that were unwelcome to 
strict Neo-Confucians and that entailed possibilities of misunderstanding that rendered its 
application bothersome. Thus, according to Zhū Xī, whenever students used “no-mind”, 
Chéng Yí would reply: “’No-mind’ is not right, one should only speak of ‘no self-centred 
mind’.”221 
The first, most obvious misunderstanding that would have to be avoided was viewing 
the term as an ontological rejection of the existence of the human mind, i.e. “there is no 
mind”, which linguistically speaking is a perfectly sound reading of the term. Indeed, this 
was one of the meanings of the term in Buddhism, i.e. the same as asserting the “empty” 
(kōng 空, Skt. śūnyatā) ontological status of the mind. 
Subtler, and perhaps more consequential, differences lay in the referents of the term in 
Buddhism and Daoism that were basically the same as the Confucian one, namely wú- xīn as 
a state of mind, or attitude. The aspect of “non-attachment” was more explicit and had a 
much larger scope in the applications of “no mind” in these two traditions. As we have seen, 
in early Neo-Confucianism it was mainly the attachment to self, i.e. self-centredness, that was 
seen as incompatible with and detrimental to right judgement-making in all parts of life. The 
Confucian Classics; paragons of virtue; social and moral norms; as well as human rationality 
still had important roles to play in all human effort. In philosophical Daoism, all these were 
part of the obstructions that separated man from the Way. Not only considerations of self, but 
any preconceived standard had to be discarded, and the discriminative and conceptualizing 
powers of the mind dispensed with, were he to approximate the Way. What the Confucians 
deem knowledge—as well as artificial propriety, righteousness and humaneness—is for 
                                                 
219 de Bary, “Neo-Confucian Cultivation and Enlightenment,” 165. See also 184–8 on “Neo-
Confucian ‘emptiness’”. 
220 Dèng 鄧, “Wáng Yángmíng xīnxué zhōng zhī ‘wú-xīn’ de yìyì” 王陽明心學中之「無心」的意
義, 122. 
221 Zhū Xī and Lǚ Zǔqiān 呂祖謙, ed., Jìn sī lù 近思錄, fasc. 2, p. 27b. 
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Zhuāngzǐ “little knowledge”, which is to be dispensed with in Great Knowledge (dà zhī 大
知). The Zhuāngzǐ is a work of many hands, and thus the interpretation of what this Great 
Knowledge actually is, differs. For Guō Xiāng 郭襄, forefigure of Neo-Daoism (xuán xué 玄
學) and most influential commentaror on the Zhuāngzǐ, it is simply the discarding of all 
conceptual knowledge through míng wù 冥物, what Brook Ziporyn creatively translates 
as ”vanishing into things”. In the words of Barry Allen  
 
There is no superior cognition that rises above our aberrant nature and finally gets things right. 
Knowledge at its best cannot penetrate ziran [“self-so”; “natual”] process, which will not stop 
long enough to constitute an “object.” Every “object” is a phase in a network that has already 
transformed by the time we react to its traces. Nothing endures; all that is left are these traces. 
It is these that language names. (...) The alternative to such futile cognition is to vanish into 
things.222  
 
Another important hermeneutical term for Guō Xiāng was in fact no-mind. Allen continues: 
 
To vanish into things is to interact with them without obstructive, forceful desires, or “self”. 
To achieve this trackless mind is to overcome the mind, to reach no-mind (wu 
xin). The heart is not extinguished, only become imperceptible.223 
 
Similar non-attachment was sought by the Buddhists. In Mahāyāna Buddhism, 
dualism, such as existence/non-existence, nirvāṇa/saṃsāra, as well as conceptualization in 
general, were ultimately seen as distortions made by the human mind; and part of the way to 
bodhisattva-hood lay in realizing and then discarding our attachment to the mind and its 
conventional knowledge. This was, especially by Chán monks, occationally referred to as 
“no-mind”.224 
Meditation was in both traditions, especially Buddhism, one of the means by which 
such non-attachment was sought. 
These reasons for the Song Neo-Confucians’ abstentions from the term no-mind 
became precisely the basis, it would seem, for its resurrection and application by the Neo-
Confucian philosophers in the mid and late Míng.  
The great philosophical contribution to Neo-Confucianism during the Míng period 
(1368–1644) was Wáng Yángmíng’s reapplication and reinterpretation of “innate 
knowledge”, or “pure knowledge”, liáng zhī 良知 (literally ”good knowledge”). Ever since 
                                                 
222 Allen, Vanishing Into Things, 104. 
223 Ibid. 
224 In particular the late Táng monk Huángbò Xīyún 黃蘗希運 (d. 850): ”Mind is Buddha; no-mind is 
the Way. Simply do not give rise to conceptual thoughts, thinking in terms of existence and 
nothingness, long and short, others and self, subject and object.” Quoted and translated in Poceski, 
Ordinary Mind as the Way, 170–1. 
 74 
Mencius (who is also the origin of the term), great faith had in Confucianism been accorded 
the moral powers of man; as we saw above, goodness was part of man’s natural inclinations. 
But it was not until Wáng Yángmíng that this trust was formulated so unequivocally and 
formed the absolute basis of not only ethics but all philosophical inquiry. In terms of lǐ 理, 
the heavenly principle was exhaustively represented within the mind (”mind is principle”), 
and seeking it, and the Way, outside the mind—in the Classics or in the phenomenal world—
served merely to divert one’s attention from their actual source—one’s own mind.225 For 
Yángmíng the mind in its pure, original, natural state—liángzhī—was the sole ethical 
standard in relation to which anything could be evaluated. Every man (and woman?) 
possessed this mind—in a more or less tarnished state—and so he himself, based on his own 
conscience, had to make his own decisions between right and wrong. Indeed, preconceived 
conceptions of right and wrong were bound to inhibit the full, unrestrained (and spontaneous) 
exertion of his innate knowledge. Ultimately, even intentions of doing good were if not 
obstructive to innate knowledge then at least rendered useless by it. Yángmíng’s metaphor is 
that of motes of dust (stagnant thoughts) covering the eye (Innate Knowledge); it does not 
matter if the dust consists of gold or jade (good thoughts)—clear sight will be equally 
inhibited.226 Even more recurrent is the mirror metaphor, often seen as an obvious case of 
Chán influence, but going in fact as far back as to the Zhūangzǐ.227 The mind is like a mirror, 
and when in its original untarnished—natural—state (Innate Knowledge for Wáng Yángmíng, 
Buddha Nature for the Buddhists, Great Knowledge for Zhuāngzǐ) like a mirror free of dust 
and scratches, reflecting everything as it is, unmediated, while leaving no trace (jì 跡) of 
them when they disappear.228 
For Wáng Yángmíng too, egoism represented the most grave blemishes to the 
mirror—indeed, we have seen that removing self-centred desire (去私欲) was the most 
crucial gōngfū of all in uncovering the ”innate knowledge”. And yet, the other, less strictly 
                                                 
225 See for example Chuán xí lù, ch. 2, para. 52. 
226 Quoted in Dèng, “Wáng Yángmíng xīnxué zhōng zhī ‘wú-xīn’”, 142. Another metaphor, which 
instead leaves good thoughts irrelevant rather than obstructive, is that of the sun (innate knowledge) 
revealing itself after the dispersing of clouds (evil thoughts); harbouring good intentions in this state 
of mind is like lighting a torch in full sunlight. See Wáng, Chuán xí lù, ch. 13, para. 15. On a side note, 
the fact that Zhū Xī in an analogous metaphor uses instead the moon to symbolize the mind, is 
indicative I think of the differences between the two in the relative significance of the mind. Both 
metaphors seem to be, at least partly, Chán influence. They are in fact combined in this saying by 
Huìnéng: “Good friends, sagacity is like the sun, and wisdom is like the moon. Sagacity and wisdom 
are always bright, but through being attached externally to sensory realms, the floating clouds of false 
thoughts block the self-nature, rendering it obscure.” Liù zǔ tán jīng 六祖壇經 (T48n2008), p0354b27. 
Translation by McRae, The Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch, 51. 
227 See Fraser, “Heart-Fasting, Forgetting, and Using the Heart Like a Mirror”. 
228 For Wáng Yángmíng’s application, see for example Chuán xí lù, ch. 2, para. 7. 
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Confucian, connotations of ”no mind”—of transcending preconceived ethical standards, 
intellectual deliberation, etc.—were not unwelcome either. 
Though Lù Xiàngshān 陸象山 (1139-1192), Yángmíng’s doctrinal forerunner of the 
Southern Sòng, was quite averse to the term “no-mind” per se,229 similar statements on 
goodness can be found in his works.230 Both of them are far from unequivocal on this 
matter—statements to the seemingly contrary also abound—and thus much controversy 
surrounding their ultimate stand on and conception of ethical goodness ensued. One 
conclusion that is commonly agreed upon at least in modern scholarship is that the goodness 
of innate knowledge somehow transcends conventional notions of goodness.231 The latter is 
then the goodness that is to be discarded through the attitude of “no-mind”, whereas the 
transcendent goodness of innate knowledge is discovered and brought into full exertion in the 
state of virtual and spontaneous “no mind”—at which point one will be a sage. 
Where other followers of the Yángmíng School steered away from this unorthodox 
strain in their master, Wáng Jī—perhaps the most influential of his disciples for decades to 
come—instead emphasised it, including the actual term “no mind”, and made it one of his 
key strategies of explicating innate knowledge.232 Wáng Jī picked up on a paradoxical saying 
from Yángmíng’s later years called the “Four Phrase Teaching” (sì jù jiào 四句教): ”There 
being a mind is reality, there being no mind is illusion; there being a mind is illusion, there 
being no mind is reality.”233 According to Móu Zōngsān, Wáng Jī understood the first 
sentence to refer to the ontological status of the mind (mind as běntǐ 本體), and the second to 
refer to its application through spiritual effort (mind as gōngfū 工夫),234 i.e. the spontaneous 
selflessness necessary for letting the Way work through one. 
As we have seen, Wáng Jī was none other than the teacher of Yuán Liǎofán for 
several years. Liǎofán would thus no doubt be very familiar with the term when introduced to 
it by Yúngǔ, and Yúngǔ would no doubt be equally aware of the extent of the term’s 
application in all three traditions. 
 
 
                                                 
229 Dèng, “Wáng Yángmíng xīnxué zhōng zhī ‘wú-xīn’,” 121–2. 
230 Okada, ”Wang Chi and the Rise of Existentialism”, 122. 
231 Deng, “Wáng Yángmíng xīnxué zhōng zhī ‘wú-xīn’,” 146–7. 
232 See Zhōng, ”Wáng Lóngxī de běntǐ lùn yǔ gōngfū lùn”. 
233 Yángmíng, as recorded by Wáng Jī, cited in Zhōng, ”Wáng Lóngxī de běntǐ lùn yǔ gōngfū lùn”, 
110. 
234 Móu Zōngsān 牟宗三 quoted in ibid., 110n17. 
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3.5. Conclusion 
As should be clear by now, in Confucianism having “no mind” was in effect the same as 
possessing—or rather embodying—rén as a result of clearing away its obstructions. For 
practically all Neo-Confucians, “orthodox” and “heterodox” alike (with an exception in Hé 
Xīnyǐn and possibly Lǐ Zhì)235, self-centredness represented the definite bulk of such 
obstructions—for many the sole component. Bringing this finally back to the case of Yuán 
Liǎofán, the prerequisite of having “no-mind” in ledger practice on the one hand and the 
description of meditation practice as encapsulated in the notion of rén on the other, are 
clearly expressions of the same fundamental concern. A mind rid of any considerations of 
personal gain was a precondition for the efficacy of both practices. But the connection 
between the two, is not restricted, I think, to such an attitude having an analogous function 
within each of the two practices; in other words, the Four Admonitions of Liǎofán and the 
Meditation Essentials do not merely each express this common concern independently; there 
seems in addition to be a conditional relationship between the two, in which cultivation of 
virtues through meditation is a precondition for virtuous action through morality ledgers. 
Only after the weeding out of selfish desire and the cultivation of love in its place—through 
sitting in meditation—may one hope to attain “having no mind”.  
One might object that the mere ordering of the chapters hardly is enough evidence for 
postulating a connection between meditation and ledger practice—a connection that nowhere 
is made explicit. However, as I showed in the introductory section on the Sequential Gateway, 
the ordering—sequencing—of the practices in that work is of utmost significance. And this 
emphasis on progression is maintained in the Meditation Essentials, as is indicated by the 
author/editor Yuán Liǎofán in the preface, as well as by the content of the first two chapters 
                                                 
235 Hé Xīnyǐn 何心隱 (1517–1579) radically revalued egoism and human desires. The most telling 
indication of this is his novel interpretation of a famous epithet of Confucius (that we will revisit in a 
minute, when Liǎofán alludes to it): ”The Master eschewed four things: He avoided being opinionated; 
he avoided being apodictive; he avoided being stubborn; he avoided being self-centred.” In Xīnyǐn’s 
reading this was turned on its head: instead of “avoiding being self-centred”, which was the 
undisputed reading, Confucius’ “eschewed avoiding being self-centred”, in other words he embraced 
it! (“Self-centred” here being a gloss of wǒ 我, “me; self”, not sī.) Hé Xīnyǐn was one of the most 
radical of the Tàizhōu affiliates, and indeed of all prominent Confucians throughout history. See de 
Bary, “Individualism and humanitarianism in late Ming thought”, 181–3. Quotation in ICS Lunyu: 
9.4/20/13; translation by Harbsmeier, Thesaurus Linguae Serica. 
As for Lǐ Zhì 李贄 (1527–1602), his affirmation of self-centredness and selfish desire is 
discussed by both Brook and de Bary. On self-centredness de Bary cites Lǐ Zhì as saying: 
“Selfishness is the mind-and-heart of man. Men must be selfish so that what is in their minds can be 
known. If there is no selfishness, there is no mind.” Brook summarizes Lǐ Zhì’s takes on selfish desire 
thus:  “(...) Li Zhi makes an unusual suggestion: Rather than curb selfish behaviour with force or 
restraint, why not mobilize self-interest?” See de Bary, ibid., 200; and Brook, Troubled Empire, 180. 
199–201 and 179–82 respectively for larger discussion. 
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(first “distinguishing the will”, then “preparing practice”). When he then goes in and moves 
the “Four Boundless Mentalities” practice from its original point in the sequence—between 
the “Four Dhyānas” and the “Four Formless Concentrations”—to the very end, after 
his ”Chapter on Eliminating Desire”, this is clearly a consequential recasting—reflecting a 
very conscious choice. It is the only place in the text where Liǎofán’s progression deviates 
from that of Zhìyǐ in the Sequential Gateway. 
 When we add to this fact two facts that I hope I have substantiated in the preceding 
sections, (1) the framing of the whole practice as encapsulated in the Confucian virtue of 
rén, ”humaneness”, and (2), this virtue’s connection with the required mind-set in ledger 
practice as best epitomized in the notion of ”no-mind”—then the connection between 
meditation and ledger practice, as well as the function of meditation, becomes quite clear. 
Through sustained meditation one may hope to weed out self-centred desire and cultivate 
love in its place, thus attaining the no-mind required for karmically effective merit 
accumulation. 
Indeed, the attainment of the ideal of no-mind is set up perfectly in the very last 
paragraph of the final chapter of the Meditation Essentials. After having performed 
sequential contemplations on “boundless loving-kindness”, “boundless compassion” and 
“boundless joy”, the meditator is finally asked to transcend all these in a state of “boundless 
equanimity”: 
 
[4. The Contemplation of Boundless Equanimity] 
From this point in the ‘concentration of joy’, you think of loving-kindness and that you give 
happiness to all the sentient beings, you think of compassion and wish to uproot their 
suffering, you think of joy and that you cause them to be joyful. However, calculating one’s 
own benefit, without forgetting prior events, would not be to practice the superior activities. 
For example, a compassionate father bringing benefit to his son, without seeking favour—that 
is real love.  
Subsequently, you should reflect on the fact that when sentient beings obtain 
happiness, each will owe it to their own particular causes and concomitances, and that it will 
never only be thanks to you. If you on the other hand state, ”I am able to confer happiness”, 
then this is not a mind of modesty.  
Then you reflect that the mind of loving-kindness and its conferring happiness, are 
both but empty aspirations: The sentient being in front of you is not in fact obtaining 
happiness, and believing it to be real is an act of distortion (viparyāsa). 
Then you reflect that if there is even the slightest generation of sadness or happiness 
upon witnessing sentient beings experiencing suffering, then this belongs to the obstructions, 
and any attainment of liberation will thus be complicated. 
Think: ”Now I wish to purify my practices of cultivation, therefore I should not attach 
myself to the dharmas of being opinionated, apodictive, stubborn or self-centred.236 Now I 
                                                 
236 The latter part of this sentence is an allusion to the epithet of Confucius mentioned in the previous 
note (ICS Lunyu: 9.4/20/13). Attachment (著) and especially dharma (法), and on the other hand, are 
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should rid myself of this clinging infatuation.” Consequently, your pure mind (śuddha-citta) 
arises. There will be no hatred and no love whatsoever. At first, pick your loved ones, and 
picture them achieving the power of concentration (samādhi-bāla) while experiencing non-
suffering and non-happiness, clearly, distinctly—finally extending this visualization to the 
Ten Aspects of Time and the Five Paths (pañca-marga), there being no-one in the world that 
are not experiencing this.  
This is what is called the state of Boundless Equanimity (upekṣā). (ME 66a3–b4) 
 
The Meditation Essentials thus ends on a note of—and leaves the meditator in a state of—
complete uninhibited poise, in which even feelings of love and compassion are transcended.  
We might also say that Liǎofán, by moving this “mundane” practice to the end of his 
text, leaves the meditator back in the realm of form (sè jiè), ready to commence on his project 
of altering his own karma for the purpose of material rewards. Indeed, whereas “Liǎofán” 了
凡 (“Overcoming the Mundane”) presents the theory of “establishing one’s fate” and the 
practice of merit accumulation as the perfection of understanding, in monastic Buddhism not 
only bad karma but even good karma is ultimately an obstruction on the path towards 
enlightenment. Karma (yè 業) in itself is part of our clinging to this world; producing 
karma—including accumulating merits (jī shàn 積善)—is ultimately what ties us to the cycle 
of life and death, and what causes our suffering. The accumulation of merit will lead to a 
happier rebirth, from which the prospect of enlightenment might be nearer at hand, but can by 
definition not of itself produce enlightenment. In Theravada (Southern) Buddhism, there is a 
very clear division between the roles of monks and of laity. The principle concern of the 
monk is supposed to be the quest for nirvāṇa, whereas the role of laypeople is to facilitate the 
monk in this pursuit, mainly through almsgiving. By this giving, they will enhance their own 
karma, which in turn will lead to a favourable rebirth later, from which they themselves may 
pursue nirvāṇa—through sustained meditation. 
With Mahāyāna and the introduction of bodhisattva-hood as the primary goal and 
ideal, this division of roles is theoretically obliterated, in that both monks and laypeople may 
reach bodhisattva-hood, and that the referential point of enlightenment is no longer the 
individual, but “all sentient beings”. A bodhisattva will not obtain nirvāṇa, but return to the 
world to pull others onto her “greater wagon” (mahā yāna). Nonetheless, in Mahāyānist 
Chinese Buddhism, too, there is a greater emphasis on karma and retribution (guǒ-bào 果報; 
yīn-guǒ 因果) among commoners and laypeople than monastics. Indeed, karma and 
retribution are aspects of an idea belonging to Indian Buddhism that had clear analogues in 
already extant Chinese popular beliefs—including Daoism and early Confucianism—of 
                                                                                                                                                        
unmistakably Buddhist, making the sentence something of a curiosity. Needless to say, that particular 
sentence stems from Liǎofán’s pen, and not from Zhìyǐ’s. 
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which the idea of retribution (gǎn-yìng 感應) is a prominent feature.237 Unlike several other 
important ideas, it was thus easily translatable and endorsed by the Chinese audience. I would 
think even non-Buddhists (although one should be careful to use this term) would accept 
many aspects of the theory of karma. 
For these reasons, I would claim that Liǎofán’s emphasis on no-desire, no-mind, and 
by implication on karma, reflects concerns typical of laypeople. This “laicization” is one 
aspect of the secularization that is represented by and results in Liǎofán’s new conception of 
meditation. 
The other important aspect is what we might call “confucianization”. In the 
Meditation Essentials this is done by stripping away soteriology from Zhìyǐ’s Mahāyānist 
framework, and erecting in its place a new quasi-Buddhist, quasi-Confucian framework based 
upon the Confucian virtue of “humaneness” (rén) as well as its correspondence to Buddhist 
“compassion” (cí-bēi 慈悲). Appeals to Confucian authorities (Confucius, Mencius, Zhōu 
Dūnyí, the Chéng brothers) stand side by side with quotations from the sutras. A chapter on 
eliminating desire is followed by one on expanding “love”, a term in Buddhist terminology 
basically synonymous with desire. Clearly, Liǎofán’s Confucian commitments, 
psychologically as well as socially, keeps him from taking the last Buddhist step of realizing 
the emptiness (i.e. lack of self-nature) of this world, and from affirming the function of 
meditation as being ultimately an expedient means designed to this end. To me it seems that 
the means in the Meditation Essentials is to a much more morally and ontologically 
affirmative end, namely what we might call, simplifyingly, virtuous conduct. 
Again, this is not un-Buddhist, “compassion” being one of the central tenets of 
Mahāyāna Buddhism. But it is also classically Confucian, and Confucianism seems to be at 
least part of the reason why it is this moral aspect of Buddhism that is emphasised, rather 
than more soteriologically oriented aspects. Indeed, it is possible that Liǎofán’s conception of 
meditation was influenced not only by his Confucian background in a general sense, but also 
more specifically by Neo-Confucian meditation. As we shall see in the next chapter, earlier 
and contemporaneous Neo-Confucian meditators had conspicuously similar conceptions of 
meditation and its function as did Liǎofán, and this too might have exerted some influence 
him. 
 
Before moving on with that discussion, I should make one concluding reservation. The 
emphasis on the functional relationship between meditation and merit accumulation is not to 
say that the preparatory considerations for merit accumulation and ledger practice are in any 
way exhausted by meditation; in other words that successful meditation alone would 
                                                 
237 For a discussion of such correspondences, see Brokaw, Ledgers, ch. 2. 
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necessarily lead to successful ledger practice, as its only prerequisite. As I see it, there are 
two sides to the limits of meditation as it relates to ledger practice. 
First are the aspects of ledger practice that eschews virtues. In the preceding 
discussion of ledger practice I emphasised what I called its ”idealist” aspects, i.e. that what 
matters for the karmic potency of one’s actions is the attitude with which one performs them. 
In ethical terms, this would be characterized as a form of virtue ethics. However, Liǎofán’s 
conception of karma and ledger practice also includes considerations characteristic of 
consequentialist ethics—for which I see no connection with the Meditation Essentials. 
Liǎofán’s conception of the good is laid out in the Method of Accumulating Goodness, which 
I mentioned earlier in this chapter, then emphasising the parallels to the Meditation Essentials. 
However, two of the eight parameters of goodness, ”right/wrong” and ”slanted/straight”, are 
actually consequentialist perspectives on ethics, as far as I can see.238 There is thus also a 
utilitarian nuance to Liǎofán’s ledger practice, which bears no relation to the Meditation 
Essentials. As we saw in section 2.3 on Liǎofán’s intellectual predilections, his main—and 
perhaps only—opposition to the Mohist (consequentialist) notion of ”Impartial Love” was 
that it failed to take regard of the ”right”, yì 義, ”clutching to one extreme”, and not, 
presumably, its utilitarianism per se.  
In other words, successful ledger practice does not rely solely on the excellence of the 
heart/mind and its intentions and will.  
Second, even within what we might characterise as a virtue ethics in Liǎofán’s lì mìng 
theory and ledger practice, there are, in addition to Buddhist meditation, also other practices 
relevant to the cultivation of the heart/mind to be found in his works. For example, in the 
same Method for Accumulating Goodness he mentions his confidence in almsgiving as a 
means not only of helping others but also of ridding the mind of selfish attachment: 
 
Buddhism has a myriad of practices. Almsgiving is regarded as elemental. Almsgiving is 
encapsulated by the single notion of relinquishment/equanimity239. An accomplished 
[practitioner] relinquishes the six roots within and the six objects without; each and 
everything, there is nothing he does not relinquish. If one is not capable of this, one starts with 
the giving of material goods. People of the world regard clothing and food as their lifeblood 
and thus material wealth as the most important. Therefore I relinquish [my own wealth], 
within for the reason of destroying my stinginess; without for the reason of relieving the 
destitution of others. Initially [one’s efforts] are forced; in the end it becomes effortless. [This 
                                                 
238 The former gives the example of Zǐ emphasises example, maintaining that what is seemingly more 
virtuous from an individual’s perspective, might actually not be more moral, if the consequences are 
that 
239 shě 捨. In Chinese used to render both Sanskrit tyāga (”relinquishment”) and upekṣā 
(”equanimity”). The latter is seen in the last chapter of the Meditation Essentials (”On Expanding 
Love”). There it is clear from context; here, the ambiguity is unresolved. 
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practice] is most capable of cleansing out selfish feelings and of dispelling attached 
stingyness.240 
 
Liǎofán prefers, also in his ethics, composite systems that draw upon all that tradition—and 
the different traditions—might offer. Meditation, though certainly accorded a functional role, 
is only a part of this system. 
 Nevertheless, there should be no doubt as to quality of the relation between 
meditation and merit accumulation, and how the conception of meditation is subtly altered as 
a consequence. 
 
  
                                                 
240 Yuán, Liǎofán sì xùn, 891a5–b1. 
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CHAPTER 4:  
NO-DESIRE, RÉN AND NO-MIND IN THE NEO-CONFUCIAN 
DISCOURSE ON MEDITATION  
 
 
According to Mabuchi Masaya in his article on the subject, most Confucians from the Song 
to the end of the Ming, i.e. the approximately seven centuries between the end of the 10th 
until the middle of the 17th century, practiced some form of meditation.241 In this period, the 
debate among Confucians in China on the significance of meditation and what role, if any, it 
should play within Neo-Confucianism never ceased; and towards the end of the period, i.e. 
the late Míng, there finally emerged descriptions of actual methods—a trend of which the 
Meditation Essentials was a part.242 Despite some efforts at tracing the origins of Neo-
Confucian meditation back to early Confucianism—most prominently to The Great Learning, 
Mencius, or even to Confucius—meditation never completely escaped its reputation as a 
heterodox practice. For this reason, with the Qīng 清 reaction against what was perceived as 
the intellectual excesses of the late Míng, affirmations of meditation disappeared and 
practices were largely abandoned by Chinese Neo-Confucians in the remainder of the 
imperial era (17th Century–1911).243 Then, following the advent of Western- and Japan-
influenced modernity, meditation with Confucian characteristics returned in the 20th century, 
first and foremost in the 1914 Meditation Method of Master ‘Therefore’ (Yīnshìzi Jìngzuòfǎ 
因是子靜坐法). 
 An awareness of this debate on meditation within Neo-Confucianism is essential for 
understanding the Meditation Essentials. Although the practices expounded within it are 
exclusively Buddhist, they are understood partly within a Confucian framework, and at 
certain points in the text, especially in the preface and in introductory parts framing the 
chapters (i.e. where wherever we find his unique writing), Liǎofán actively and consciously 
engages with this discourse, thus revealing for us influences and intended audience belonging 
to the Confucian realm. But of course, a full treatment of this debate from the Sòng to the 
Míng will be far too comprehensive for a thesis of this scope.244 Accordingly, after a short 
                                                 
241 Mabuchi, “Sòng-Míng shíqí rúxué duì jìngzuò de kànfǎ,” 63. 
242 Ibid., 91. 
243 Ibid., 101. Though there are exceptions, most notably Zēng Guófán 曾國藩 (1811–1872), the 
famous Qīng scholar and general responsible for quenching the Tàipíng rebellion. On his practice, see 
Nakajima, Jìngzuò, 176–85. 
244 Those interested are instead referred to Mabuchi, “Sòng-Míng shíqí rúxué duì jìngzuò de kànfǎ”; 
Nakajima, Jìngzuò, 81–132; Yáng, ”Sòng rú de jìngzuò shuō”; and for a survey of existing research, 
to Shǐ, “Dōng-Yà rúxué jìngzuò yánjiù de gàikuàng”. To my knowledge, no full historical treatment 
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presentations of the inception of Neo-Confucian meditation, I will turn to the argumentative 
purpose of the chapter, which is primarily to discover parallels and possible influences to 
Liǎofán’s conception of meditation, and secondarily to demonstrate again the connection 
between no-desire, rén and no-mind, now specifically in meditation, thus reinforcing the 
argument made in the previous chapter. This will be done through looking at five short texts 
on meditative practices by four notable Neo-Confucian meditators: Lǐ Yánpíng, Luó 
Hóngxiān, Gāo Pānlóng and Liú Zōngzhōu. 
 The first three are discussed together in the part following the general presentation. 
Here the purpose is to look at parallels to Liǎofán’s application of meditation as weeding out 
desire and cultivating rén. In the next part on Liú Zōngzhōu, I turn to the more specific 
variant of such an application that Liǎofán evinces, namely the view of meditation as playing 
a direct role in relation to the practice of keeping morality ledgers. Intriguingly, Liú 
Zōngzhōu, despite being a critic of Liǎofán’s Ledger of Merit and Demerit, has a remarkably 
similar conception of not only meditation and morality ledgers, but also of their joint practice 
and their functional relation. 
  
Liǎofán’s own short description of the inception of meditation, which constitutes the very 
first paragraph of the preface and thus the whole treatise, provides us with a nice point of 
departure for our discussion: 
 
The knack of sitting meditation originates from the Chán school, and is not something we 
Confucians originally possessed. After Masters Chéng saw people meditate and hailed it as an 
excellent field of study, and Master Zhū used meditation to supplement the skill of restraining 
the mind [expounded] in the Small Learning—only then did Confucians get to know how to 
consult and perform this practice.  
 
The first sentence seems to refer to Zhū Xī’s concession that the practice of meditation was 
brought to China by Bodhidharma, the semi-mythical first patriarch of the Chinese lineage of 
the Chán school.245 Buddhist meditation was in fact practiced in China long before the advent 
of the Chán school, and there were Daoist meditative practices that were even older, but that 
need not concern us here. I will merely point out that Liǎofán’s agreement with Zhū Xī on 
                                                                                                                                                        
exists in English, but Rodney T. Taylor has articles on the meditative practices of Zhū Xī ("Chu Hsi 
and Meditation") and Gāo Pānlóng ("Meditation in Ming Neo-Orthodoxy”). 
245 Zhū Xī making this, albeit inaccurate, concession goes against the picture that is usually painted of 
him as one who borrowed extensively from Buddhism only then to do what he could to hide this 
influence behind harsh criticisms of Buddhism. The cynic would perhaps assert that in this case, 
playing with open cards was his only option, inasmuch as meditation was so closely associated with 
Buddhism that there was no way of obscuring the debt. 
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this point seems to reveal a somewhat superficial knowledge of Buddhist meditation 
literature.246 
 In the next sentence he then reproduces a stock phrase concerning the Chéng brothers’ 
dealings with meditation. Beyond this—that they commended the practice—not much is 
known about what role exactly meditation played in their thought. One modern scholar asks 
what “excellent” in “excellent field of study” actually entailed.247 Liú Zōngzhōu provides an 
answer in his version of the same stock phrase: 
 
Whenever Masters Chéng saw people sitting in meditation, they hailed it as an excellent field 
of study. What is meant by “excellent field of study” is that only this is an appropriate 
spiritual effort (gōngfū 工夫) for the pursuit of letting go of the mind.248 
 
As we shall see later, Liú Zōngzhōu understands “letting go of the mind” (fàng xīn 放心, also 
“calming the mind; calming down”) as closely related to selflessness and no-mind. 
One thing we do know about the meditation practice of the brothers Chéng, is that 
they combined it with the practice of  “observing the equilibrium of the four emotions in their 
incipient (lit. not-yet-manifested) [state]” and “observing the latent signs of the ether of the 
four emotions before they are manifested”.249 More specifically, this observing or 
contemplation was the content of the meditation; or from the opposite perspective: meditation 
                                                 
246 Whether it does in fact reveal a superficial knowledge hinges on two questions: The first is 
whether or not this was a common misconception also in Buddhist circles. If it was, Liǎofán can 
hardly be blamed. This is far from my field of expertise, but I regard it as highly unlikely that anyone 
well versed in the Buddhist Tripiṭaka would be unaware of the translations of Buddhist meditation 
texts by Ān Shìgāo 安世高 (fl. 148–180) and Kumārajīva (334–413), or that these two predated 
Bodhidharma (dates, and even existence, unknown, but conventional dating is 5th century). The other 
question seems more debatable: Might it be that Liǎofán by chán mén 禪門, literally the ”the dhyāna 
gateway” meant not the Chán school, but Buddhism as a whole? The term possesses this meaning as 
well, and thus this is indeed a possibility. My reason for opting out of reading chán mén 
as ”Buddhism” is that I would think that the more common Fó mén 佛門 would have been used if that 
were in fact the intended referent.  
247 Yáng, “Zhǔ jìng yǔ zhǔ jìng” 主靜與主敬, 132. 
248 Liú Zōngzhōu 劉宗周, Liú Jíshān jí 劉蕺山集, fasc. 11, p. 29b. 
249 觀喜怒哀樂未發之中 and 觀喜怒哀樂未發前氣象 respectively. What I render as “latent sign of 
the ether” is qì xiàng 氣象, a word in ordinary parlance meaning among other things ”bearing; 
manner”. Xiàng as a Neo-Confucian technical term denoted basically a latent stage of qì (ether) before 
it takes concrete form, represented also by the diagrams in the Book of Changes, which are also called 
xiàng. Graham translates it as ”image”. (See Graham, Two Chinese Philosophers 19–21.) Graham 
actually also encounters the compound qì xiàng, in a different context, rendering it then as ”outward 
signs of the ether [qì]”, thus demonstrating the relation to ”bearing; manner”. Using ”outward sign” in 
our phrase would be misleading, however, inasmuch as we have here to do with something going on 
inside the body, or inside the mind. Yet as the presence of qì demonstrates, we admittedly seem to be 
dealing with something materialistic here. This is interesting, inasmuch as some Neo-Confucians, 
most notably Wáng Yángmíng, would insist that “mind is principle”, as opposed to being materialistic 
ether. 
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was a technique by which one could practice this contemplation on the four emotions (xǐ-nù-
āi-lè 喜怒哀樂, lit. “joy, anger, sadness and happiness”).250 
 
4.1. Lǐ Yánpíng, Luó Hóngxiān and Gāo Pānlóng 
Lǐ Yánpíng (1093–1163), who will be my first example, further developed this connection 
between meditation as a technique and the struggle for emotional “equilibrium”, and assigned 
both a crucial place in his theories on cultivation. His saying ”sit in silence (默) and purify 
the mind, [thereby] recognizing first-hand the Heavenly principles” indicates this cruciality: 
meditation was not merely a technique by which one could concentrate or calm down the 
mind, but an essential practice for the ultimate purpose of recognizing the Heavenly 
principles, which in Yánpíng’s view must be done through the mind itself.251 
 In a letter to his student Zhū Xī (written in 1162, one year before his passing), we may 
spot how this was connected to selflessness and rén—and to meditation. One of their 
correspondences was dedicated to a broad discussion of rén—what it is and how to achieve it. 
We encountered a quotation from one of these letters in the previous chapter, where Yánpíng 
provided his take on what Confucius’ understanding of rén was. To recapitulate, Yánpíng 
summarizes the spiritual effort required for attaining rén as: “(…) when selfish desire sinks, 
the Heavenly principles may be viewed, and one will then know rén.” Towards the end of 
that same letter he arrives at what in his opinion is the most crucial practice for the actual 
implementation of this spiritual effort, and thus ultimately how to realize rén: 
 
The notion of humaneness is simply perception (zhījué 知覺) in its thoroughly clarified state. 
If you do not put in spiritual effort to make it [humaneness] thoroughly clear, how will you 
make out (jiàndé 見得) the minute distinctions of our root source (běnyuán 本源)? If you do 
not possess thorough understanding of this matter, then you will not be able to simultaneously 
uphold essence and function (tǐ/yòng 體用). This is precisely the point from which we may 
simultaneously uphold both the essence and function of our original source; the establishment 
of the Way of humanity (rén dào 人道) is precisely here. (...)252 Generally speaking, most 
practitioners are diverted [from the Way] by selfish desire. As a result, 
they are unconcentrated (bù jīng 不精) in their exertion of effort (yòng lì 
用力) and derive no effects from it. If you wish to make any progress in 
                                                 
250 Yáng, ”Sòng rú de jìngzuò shuō” 宋儒的靜坐說, 59–60. 
251 Yáng, ”Sòng rú jìngzuò shuō”, 60–3. Yánpíng quotation on p. 61. 
252 The part I have omitted is a short discussion of how rén corresponds to cosmological concepts in 
the Book of Changes, as follows: “The single notion of humaneness is just like the primordial (yuán 
元) of the four virtues [in the qián 乾 hexagram of the Yìjīng 易經], whereas the two notions 
humaneness and duty is just like [the two pairs of Yìjīng divination constituents] 
yīn and yáng—the establishers of the heavenly Way, and róu and gāng—the 
establishers of the earthly way; they are all embedded in these two notions [of 
humaneness and duty].” 
 86 
this matter, you must cut off all [diverting] paths [of study], sit in 
meditation and silently discern—so that the muddy dregs [of the mind] 
gradually vanish. If [you do] not [practice], then it is merely 
[unsubstantial] talk. [I advise you to] consider it carefully!253 
 
 
Though Yánpíng emphasises a slightly different aspect of rén (its connection with 
perception), the function he attributes to meditation, and the effects he believes it to incur, are 
remarkably similar to what we see in the Meditation Essentials. Echoing (or rather being 
echoed by) the water metaphor by Zhū Xī that we saw in the previous chapter, selfish desires 
are likened to “muddy dregs” in water. These must be filtered out by turning the attention 
inward towards one’s own mind while sitting in meditation. Only then may “perception” be 
“thoroughly clarified”—and this state of mind is what is called “humaneness”. Meditation is 
a way to apply the spiritual effort of having selfish desires sink—or what Confucius 
called ”restraining oneself”, Mencius and Wáng Jī called guǎ yù 寡欲, Yángmíng “removing 
human desires”—and, Yuán Liǎofán, qiǎn yù, “eliminating desire”. 
In Luó Hóngxiān 羅洪先 (1504–1564) we see how this effort could be connected 
with—perhaps lead to—a dramatic meditative experience of embodying rén: 
 
(...) Before long I went into the deep mountains, to a quiet and remote place where I was 
completely isolated from human affairs. Every day I sat on a mat by myself, not opening any 
book. Like this I had kept on for over three months, when my illness gradually vanished. 
Then, at a time of extreme quiescence I perceived in a flash the contentless void silence (xū jì 
虛寂) of my mind, penetrating and boundless, like the flow of air (氣) in the sky; it was 
without limit, with no distinction between inner and outer or quiescence and action; all the 
directions of space and ages of time merged into one single mass—like the so-called “being 
[virtually] everywhere without being [actually] present”; my entire person is the aperture 
through which it manifests itself; it is certainly not something that may be limited by outer 
shape. This is why, when I point my gaze at something, Heaven-and-Earth do not lose my 
vision; when I incline my ears, Heaven-and-Earth do not elude my hearing; and when I vanish 
my heart, Heaven-and-Earth do not escape my thinking.254 
The humans of old are long gone. [But] the extent of their spirit is the same as my 
spirit, and is therefore not gone. If this were not the case, would we feel enlightened and 
roused by their conduct? The Four Seas are far away [from each other]. [But] the pains of the 
people [walking the earth between them] are all interconnected—they are my pain too, and 
                                                 
253 Zhū Xī, Yánpíng dá wèn 延平答問, para. 54. 
254 Especially this paragraph is fraught with allusions to this saying by Lù Xiàngshān: ”The four 
directions and up and down are what is called yǔ 宇. From antiquity to present is what is called zhòu 
宙. Yǔzhòu (”universe”) is my (or ”our”) mind; my mind is yǔzhòu. When sages emerged a thousand 
myriad years ago, [theirs] was the same as this mind and this principle; when sages emerge a thousand 
myriad years from now, [theirs] will be the same as this mind and this principle. Sages emerging from 
the Eastern Sea and the North-Western Sea are of the same mind and the same principle.” Lù Jiǔyuān 
陸九淵 (Xiàngshān 象山), Lù Jiǔyuān jí 陸九淵集, fasc. 22, para. 16. 
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are therefore not far away. If this were not the case, would we feel pity and sorrow when we 
learnt of the misfortunes of others? 
 For these reasons, we are moved by our kin to act out our kinship-love (qīn). There is 
no distinction between ourselves and our kin. If we make a distinction between ourselves and 
our kin, then it is not kinship-love. [Correspondingly,] we are moved by the people to act out 
humaneness in relation to them. If we make a distinction between ourselves and the people, 
then this is not humaneness (rén). [Lastly,] we are moved by beings to act out love in relation 
to them. If we distinguish between ourselves and other beings, then this is not love (ài).  
This is obtaining it from heaven. Only when it has become a matter of course can you 
match Heaven [pèi tiān]. Therefore it is said [by Chéng Hào]: ’Humaneness’ is being of the 
same substance as other things. ‘The same substance’ means: what is present in oneself is also 
present in others; uniting oneself and other beings and sharing one substance. Hence the 
above-mentioned ‘penetrating insight from void silence, regarding all as one by merging all 
directions of space, all ages of time, inner and outer, action and quiescence’—making them 
one. 
 
For Hóngxiān, rén is more unequivocally a matter of—what we might call mystic—
experience. The unity of all things is not first and foremost something to be rationalized by 
appealing to a common principle. Rather, it is to be experienced first-hand, through our mind 
that by nature is connected to everything else in the world. It might not be coincidence, then, 
that he avails himself of Chéng Hào’s version of this unity (“rén is being indivisibly of the 
same substance as other beings”) rather than that of Chéng Yí (“rén is regarding Heaven-and-
Earth and the myriad beings as one substance”).  
For Hóngxiān it was sustained, quite extreme, meditation that led to this experience of 
mystical unity—as embodied, in his opinion, in the notion of rén.  
Gāo Pānlóng 高攀龍 (1562-1626), too, speaks of rén in relation to meditation, and 
also explicitly of recognizing something first-hand (tǐrèn 體認), in his case the “original form 
of our root nature”—which, if we invoke the language of Hóngxiān, Chéng Hào and Lù 
Xiàngshān, is precisely what connects us to each other and everything else. Gāo Pānlóng was 
one of the initiators of the Dōnglín movement, a reaction to the corrupted state of the 
government and the perceived moral relativism of the Tàizhōu school, two phenomena that 
its affiliates saw as interrelated. Their antagonism towards Buddhism did not keep him from 
assigning meditation a central place in his thought, however—though it did preclude him 
from drawing explicitly on Buddhist meditation as Liǎofán did. In his writings we find some 
of the most detailed and original descriptions of meditation by any Confucian thinker. 
Mabuchi sees him, along with Liǎofán, as representing a very important trend in the late 
Míng of providing Neo-Confucian meditation with concrete techniques and standards.255 
As for the purpose of meditation, he lays that out in Sayings on Meditation (Jìngzuò 
shuō 靜坐說), a small text written some years after the Meditation Essentials in 1613: 
                                                 
255 Mabuchi, “Sòng-Míng shíqí rúxué duì jìngzuò de kànfǎ,” 91. 
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(...) [The aim of meditation is] simply to recognize first-hand [tǐrèn] the original form of our 
root nature—returning it to its pellucid state. Generally speaking, if you attach yourself to 
even the smallest intention or the slightest judgement, you will not obtain [this state]. As soon 
as a single thought is added, the original form is lost. Proceeding from quiescence to action, is 
simply acting from this constant256 and pellucid state. While quiescent and while active, it is 
one form; while active and while quiescent, it is one form. It is one form because it is constant. 
Therefore it is said: ”There is no action and no quiescence”. Practitioners are simply availing 
themselves of meditation in order to recognize the substance of this ”no action and no 
quiescence”. Deriving strength (dé lì 得力) from quiescence is the true deriving of strength 
from action. Deriving strength from action is the true deriving of strength from quiescence. 
What is called ’reverence’ is this; what is called ’humaneness’ is this; what is called ’sincerity’ 
is this. It is the Way of returning to one’s nature.257 
 
For Gāo Pānlóng humaneness, along with sincerity and reverence, is part of “returning to 
one’s nature”, which in turn can be achieved through the practice of meditation.  
Through these examples we see not only the connections between no-desire and 
humaneness and their relation in turn to sitting meditation; moreover, it is possible to spot 
how the quest for becoming selfless and humane is part of the essential Neo-Confucian 
project of becoming a sage, expressed in the previous quotations as “discerning our original 
source” (Lǐ Yánpíng), “perceiving the virtual silence of the mind”, “matching heaven” (Luó 
Hóngxiān) and “recognizing first-hand the original form of our root nature” (Gāo Pānlóng). 
Indeed, another way of describing the self-cultivational goal of “becoming a sage” (chéng 
shèng 成聖) for the Neo-Confucians was ”becoming rén” (chéng rén 成仁). How ”no-desire” 
is connected to this quest we saw also in the previous chapter, above all through the 
authoritative statement by Zhōu Dūnyí. His terse reply to how sagehood may be learnt 
deserves repetition:  
 
Oneness (一) is of the essence. Oneness is having no desire (無欲). When having no desire 
one is void while quiescent and upright while active. [...] 
 
Meditation is a way to apply the spiritual effort of “maintaining oneness”, or in the 
words of Lǐ Yánpíng, having “selfish desires sink”. This in turn will lead to the “discerning” 
and “understanding” (Yánpíng), or the experience and embodiment (Pānlóng, Hóngxiān), of 
rén. And this, finally, is “the Way of returning to one’s nature”, of “seeing the Heavenly 
principles”—of becoming a sage. 
                                                 
256 píngpíng chángcháng 平平常常. Reminiscent of (and probably influenced by) Chán monk Mǎzǔ 
Dàoyī’s 馬祖道一 (709–788) seminal adage: ”the ordinary mind is the Way” (平常心是道), which 
according to Allen is another version of Chán ”no-thought” and no-mind. See Poceski, Ordinary Mind 
as the Way, 182–6; and Allen, Vanishing Into Things, 152 (151–8 for no-mind in Chán in general). 
257 Gāo Pānlóng 高攀龍. Gāozǐ yí shū 高子遺書, fasc. 3, para. 83. My emphasis. 
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We will continue to see these connections when we now turn to Liú Zōngzhōu, who 
furthermore brings no-mind into the equation. However, as will become clear, this 
individual’s conception of meditation is analogue to Liǎofán’s also in a much more concrete 
way than the previous three. Accordingly, after a general presentation of his meditation 
practice and its application of no-mind and no-desire, my discussion will turn to his thoughts 
on the “roots and branches” of self-cultivation, and the integral role accorded to meditation. 
 
4.2. Liú Zōngzhōu 
Towards the last decades of the Míng, the rhetoric against Buddhism and Daoism—and the 
Confucians associating with them—grew even harsher. Liú Zōngzhōu 劉宗周 (1578–1645), 
also a Dōnglín affiliate and regarded as the last of the great Neo-Confucian philosophers, 
criticized Pānlóng for incorporating Buddhist elements in his teachings, but nevertheless 
accorded sitting meditation a prominent place in his self-cultivation program. Inasmuch as 
Zōngzhōu was still greatly invested in the quest for sagehood, this incidentally seems to 
indicate that the reason for the loss of Confucian interest in meditation in the Qīng was due 
more to the fading away of the quest for sagehood than the rejection of Buddhism.  
According to Huáng Zōngxī (1610–1695), author of Míng rú xué’àn 明儒學案 (”Case 
studies of Míng Confucians”) and student of Liú Zōngzhōu, the doctrinal essence of his 
teacher was that of shèn dú 慎獨 (”vigilance in solitude”), a doctrine all Confucians spoke 
of ”but only he acquired the truth”.258 Shèn dú, also translated as being ”watchful over 
oneself when alone”, is an expression that appears in both the Doctrine of the Mean and the 
Great Learning, the two Confucian self-cultivation classics. In both it denoted a cautiousness 
against the incipient tendencies of evil thoughts and self-deception when alone. For Zhū Xī, 
dú 獨, ”solitude”, meant not simply the state when one is physically alone, but also ”when 
one is mentally alone, that is, the state of one’s innermost being which is known only to 
oneself”.259 Wáng Yángmíng, committed to his project of erasing the borders between 
quiescence and action (靜/動) and essence and function (體/用), further emphasised the 
timelessness of shèn dú; along with the “extension of knowledge” (zhì zhī 致知) and 
“rectification of affairs” (gé wù 格物), it runs through inactivity and activity, and is in the end 
the same task as these two, though it emphasises a different aspect.260 For Zōngzhōu, through 
vigilance in solitude the ether (qì 氣) of the mind can be made perfectly still, a state from 
                                                 
258 Huáng Zōngxī, Míng rú xué’àn, f. 62, para. 15. Translation modified after Cheng, ”Liu Zongzhou 
on Self-Cultivation,” 338. 
259 Cheng, "Liu Zongzhou on Self-Cultivation", 339. 
260 Shun 信, ”Three Kinds of Confucian Thought,” 24–5. 
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which one then can proceed to observe and direct the stirrings of the mind’s ether, i.e. the 
arising of thoughts.261 
 Sitting meditation was one of the most important techniques for practicing vigilance 
in solitude—the ”point from which one could set about” (xià shǒu chù 下手處) being vigilant: 
 
At this time [c. 1631] he concentrated on revealing the doctrine of vigilance in solitude for the 
practitioners [in his Zhèngrén huì 證人會, “Society for bearing witness to humanity”]. 
Someone asked of the point from which one sets about on vigilance in solitude. [Zōngzhōu] 
replied: “Just sit in meditation”. [The student] further asked: “If while meditating [lit. “in 
quiescence”] one is increasingly aware of the disturbance of deluded thoughts, what should 
one do?” He replied: “If the mind is not able to quiet down, it is only because there are roots 
[for disturbance] still present. For this reason, Liánxī [Zhōu Dūnyí] taught people to make 
sure that they first are without desire (wú yù 無欲). This [desire] is the reason [for the 
disturbance from deluded thoughts].262 
 
In Sayings on Meditation (Jìngzuò shuō 靜坐說), a text from the year after the Q&A 
above took place, Zōngzhōu elaborates his thoughts on sitting in meditation as an effort for 
practicing vigilance in solitude as well as the related “mastering quiescence” (zhǔ jìng 主靜). 
Significantly for our purposes here of establishing the connections between meditation, 
humaneness, ”no desire” and ”no-mind”, although he opposed the Tàizhōu school and also 
the teachings Wáng Jī developed from Wáng Yángmíng, he nevertheless employs the term 
“no-mind”: 
 
From birth, man spends his day in disorder. The only point at which he goes back to his roots 
and returns to his heavenly fate, is at dusk. Of the myriad beings of Heaven-and-Earth, none 
eludes this principle (lǐ 理). Hence, one may realize (wù 悟) that the primary purpose of 
scholarly enterprise is simply ’maintaining quiescence’ (zhǔ jìng 主靜). This spiritual effort is 
most difficult to set about, and so I have tentatively devised a provisional method for 
practitioners, teaching them to sit in meditation.  
In your daily practice, if you find yourself with some spare time apart from dealing 
with affairs, then sit in meditation. While sitting, all matters are gone, and thus you respond 
with having no matters yourself. There are no matters, and also no mind. The mind of no-mind 
is none other than the original mind. If [a thought] fleetingly arises, simply let it go; if [the 
mind] is slightly obstructed, then sweep [the obstruction] away. Simply sustain your clear-
headedness. The trick at this point is to not close the eyes, not cover the ears, not be seated in 
lotus position, not count the breath, not examine huàtóu (話頭), but merely implementing it in 
the midst of your daily tasks. Whenever you get fatigued, rise; whenever you are moved [into 
action by something], respond. While walking, standing, sitting and lying—always maintain 
this [mode of] quiescent contemplation; while eating, resting, rising and abiding—always 
bring about this quiescent intuitive comprehension. 
                                                 
261 Brokaw, Ledgers, 131. 
262 Liú Zōngzhōu, quoted in Fān, “Liú Zōngzhōu duìyú ‘zhǔ jìng’ yǔ ‘jìngzuò’ de fǎnxǐng,” 67–8. 
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  This [meditative mode] is the true essence of what men of old called between ”not 
letting [your heart] forget and not helping [it] grow”,263 and not to occasion the slightest strain 
(lì 力). For this reason, whenever Masters Chéng saw people meditate, they hailed it as an 
excellent field of study. What is meant by “excellent field of study” is that only this is an 
appropriate spiritual effort for the pursuit of letting go of the mind. By way of this [i.e.. 
meditation], one both sets out and reaches the ultimate limits [of scholarly enterprise]; it is not 
merely some small provisionality. When you master it, you establish yourself in the realm of 
sages; when you don’t, you spend your whole days in a frenzied gallop. There are no other 
methods from which to proceed.  
If you don’t yet master sitting in meditation, then simply learn to sit. If you can’t 
[even] learn how to sit, then what other learning can there possibly be to speak of? [At first,] 
sit like a corpse; when you are thus seated, you proceed from an orderly and solemn [attitude 
and posture], upon which you slowly enter into a natural [effortlessness]. (...)264  
 
When the mind is not stimulated into action by external affairs, the mind can respond itself 
by not giving rise to any internal affairs (thoughts). This is the state of “no-mind”, which 
equals the “original mind”, i.e. the true nature of the mind—the goal of self-cultivation. It 
seems that this “no-mind” refers to the same state as the “solitude” mentioned earlier, in 
which the ether is perfectly stable. Having experienced and maintaining this state of mind, it 
is then possible to while “walking, standing, sitting and lying—always maintain this [mode of] 
quiescent contemplation”. Stated in terms of ether, this would mean that when the ether of the 
mind is stirred, it is held in equilibrium. As he states elsewhere: “If a thought is like its origin 
[i.e. purely good], then the feeling (情) returns to its nature. Where there is movement 
containing nothing that is not good, then movement is also stillness.”265 
A striking quality concerning Liú Zōngzhōu as I see it is that unlike most Neo-
Confucian meditators, he developed a repertoire of different kinds of meditation.  This 
provides us with the opportunity to compare the meditation outlined above with his other 
meditations, and see whether the purpose of meditation, and its connection with “no-mind”, 
is presented in any equal or similar manner. In Rén pǔ 人譜 (”Schemata of Man”, or ”Manual 
for Man”), his seminal work on self-cultivation, he details a technique-heavy repentance-like 
method highly different from the one described above. The professed effects and purpose of 
the two, however, closely resemble each other. There is no mention of “no-mind” explicitly, 
but in a conspicuously similar turn of phrase he uses instead (another Buddhism-inspired 
term) ”true face” (zhēn miànmù 真面目), and just before that speaks of ”being at one with the 
great void” (tài xū 太虛): 
 
                                                 
263 A paraphrase of the same Mencius quote we saw in chapter three (ICS Mencius: 3.2/16/3). 
264 Liú Zōngzhōu, Liú Jíshān jí 劉蕺山集, fasc. 11, pp. 24a–25a. My emphasis. 
265 Zōngzhōu quoted and translated in Brokaw, 131. 
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... Shortly after [having performed the repentance], a thread of clear and bright ether slowly 
comes forth, as if [you are] facing the Great Void. This mind [of ours] “is of the same 
substance” as the Great Void. Then you know that the past [transgressions] were all [due to] 
‘false conditions’ (wàng yuán 妄緣)266. Being false, they are not true, and as soon as [you 
regain the] truth, you also regain your natural self-composure. 
Pellucid and limpid; when you receive it nothing comes, when you follow it nothing 
leaves; it is in fact the original true face [of the mind]. At this moment, you must preserve it 
[i.e. the true face]; if suddenly a mote of dust [i.e. a thought] arises, you blow it away. You 
then preserve it a while longer, and when again a mote of dust suddenly arises, you blow it 
away. This is then repeated several times. “Do not [let your heart] forget it, but do not help it 
[grow] either.” Do not enquire of its effects. Then swiftly straighten yourself and rise. Stay 
shut in your apartment the whole day.267 
 
The subsection where this repentance is found is called ”Method for Litigating 
Transgressions” (Sòng guò fǎ 訟過法), and is part of the chapter ”Ledger for Mending 
Transgressions” (gǎi guò gé 改過格). The observant reader will recognize the similarity of 
this chapter title to the name for the morality ledgers our own Yuán Liǎofán used, gōng-guò 
gé 功過格. The similarity is not coincidental. As already hinted at above, Liú Zōngzhōu in 
fact wrote the whole Manual for Man mainly as a response to Liǎofán’s method of merit 
accumulation.268 Here he criticizes Liǎofán for distancing himself from the Way by 
associating with the Buddhists and their doctrine of retribution (yīn-guǒ 因果), thus  turning 
to the way of profit (lì 利) and selfishness (sī 私). Following the approach to morality ledgers 
of more orthodox Confucians such as Liǎofán’s contemporary Lǚ Kūn 呂坤 (1536–1618), 
Zōngzhōu eliminates merits from the equation, leaving only demerits—
or ”faults”, ”transgressions”, since they are not defined in opposition to merits. Or rather 
there is no longer any ”equation” at all, since retribution plays no role. If we invoke the 
distinction between ”moral fate” and ”material fate” used earlier, Zōngzhōu is as Mencius 
only interested in the moral fate—fulfilling one’s heaven-endowed moral potential.269 In 
other words, the ”demerit ledger” is kept simply to make oneself aware—vigilant—of one’s 
faults and help one correct them, thereby assisting the project of returning to one’s nature. 
Performing good deeds is not inconsequential for this project, but they are left out from the 
act of recording, for fear that this would lead to profit-seeking and the dangerous thought that 
                                                 
266 Also a Buddhist term, consisting of two equally undeniably Buddhist concepts wàng 妄 (”deluded”, 
mithyā) and yuán 緣, (”conditions”, pratyaya). 
267 Liú Zōngzhōu, Rén pǔ 人譜, end of ch. 4 (”Gǎi guò gé” 改過格). My emphasis. I must admit that 
this rather enigmatic quotation has been especially challenging to translate, as is presumably reflected 
in its awkwardness. The translation should be regarded as tentative, and anyone is more than welcome 
to improve it. 
268 Liú Zōngzhōu, Rén pǔ, preface (“Zì xù” 自序). 
269 Brokaw, Ledgers, 136–7. 
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merits may cancel out demerits. In the opinion of Zōngzhōu, this is exactly what Liǎofán’s 
approach degenerates to. 
 Nevertheless, the two approaches are in practice very similar, and so are the larger 
systems of self-cultivation of which they are part. Significantly, Liú Zōngzhōu explicitly 
places meditation in a context of keeping morality ledgers—which is only implicit in Liǎofán. 
 Not only that: elsewhere he also explicitly draws upon the ”root-and-branch” 
paradigm to explain this relationship. When confronted by a student with the common 
criticism pitted against him that his emphasis on quiescence and solitude neglected action and 
its gōngfū, Zōngzhōu replies: 
 
It is like trees: Only when there is a root will there be branches and leaves. If one does not 
derive strength from preservation in quiescence (jìng cún 靜存), as soon as joy and anger 
arise, they will go awry. At this point how may one apply spiritual effort?270 
 
His point with invoking the root-and-branch metaphor is to emphasise the integrity, 
interrelatedness, mutual dependence and synchronic application of action- and quiescence-
based effort, while at the same time giving quiescence priority.271 From the question we can 
see that the “root” refers to practices such as vigilance in solitude, and thus also sitting in 
meditation. The “branches” refer, I think, to such practices as recording and mending one’s 
transgressive actions, as in ledger keeping. The two are integrated to the point that it is hard 
to delineate where quiescence starts and action begins.  
The comparison with Liú Zōngzhōu and the resultant “root-and-branch” 
generalization furthermore points back to a possible further distinction to be made for 
Liǎofán’s self-cultivation program. For the “branch” in Zōngzhōu’ program, though a ledger 
practice just as that of Liǎofán, concerns itself only with faults, corresponding to the demerits 
in Liǎofán’s scheme. This brings to mind one work in Liǎofán’s corpus of self-cultivation 
texts, namely the Repentance Method of Mr Yuán (Yuán-shēng chànfǎ 袁生懺法). I have not 
had the occasion to look at this text yet, but as another pointer beyond this thesis I would like 
to raise the possibility that this work plays a role in relation to “correcting faults” analogue to 
that of meditation in relation to accumulating merit. Another of the Four Admonitions of 
Liǎofán, that has received relatively little attention in this thesis, is the “Method for 
Correcting Demerits” (Gǎi guò zhī fǎ 改過之法), where Liǎofán explains how one should 
weed out and avoid faults—demerits. Just as “Method for Accumulating Goodness”, this text 
has a clear orientation towards changing behaviour, yet at the same time emphasises the need 
for a ”pure mind”, without which the mere avoidance of bad deeds is fruitless, and quite 
                                                 
270 Liú Zōngzhōu, quoted in Fān, “Liú Zōngzhōu duìyú ‘zhǔ jìng’ yǔ ‘jìngzuò’ de fǎnxǐng,” 78. 
271 Ibid., 78–9. 
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likely unsustainable. Where meditation is the root to merit accumulation, could repentance 
function as the root to “demerit annulation”? Where mediation transforms the psychological 
source for merit, is repentance the way to thoroughly transform the source of demerit? 
 Finally, the wheel has turned full circle, and we return again to our etic definition of 
meditation posed in the introduction. By now the reader is forgiven for having forgotten what 
that was, so I will repeat it: Meditation is “attention-based techniques for inner 
transformation.”272 I admitted in the introduction that this definition might be problematic, as 
etic definition are concerned, due to its focus being so exclusively on psychological 
phenomena. But when juxtaposed with how, as I argue, some Míng meditators conceived of 
meditation, we see that it fits perfectly. I have argued that the function of meditation as 
conceived by Yuán Liǎofán (and Liú Zōngzhōu) is as a requisite for successful ledger 
practice—and that this relationship is best represented by the root-and-branch paradigm of 
the Great Learning.  The root in this paradigm concerns itself with the inner (nèi 內) aspects 
of self-cultivation, of the underlying source or substance (tǐ 體)—or even virtuality (xū 虛)—
for our actual (shí 實) actions and functions (yòng 用). Where ”branch” cultivation goes in on 
the function end of self-cultivation, to transform our habits and patterns of behaviour ”root” 
cultivation instead aims to transform directly the source of those habits—to bring about our 
inner transformation.  
One important characteristic of late Míng self-cultivation was its emphasis on action 
(branch) and the often concomitant belief that by their transformation one could slowly 
effectuate also a transformation of one’s person (root). Be that as it may, the two remarkably 
similar cases of the highly different individuals Yuán Liǎofán and Liú Zōngzhōu demonstrate 
with full force that this could nonetheless be combined with more introvert attention-based 
practices aimed directly at the unmediated transformation of one’s inner being.  
Another mantra of much late Míng thought was the “unity of substance and function” 
(體用合一). For some this meant the impossibility and fallacy of making a distinction 
between the two at all. It would seem that another way of conceptualizing this unity was by 
giving space in one’s self-cultivation both to practices that sought a transformation of the 
substance and those that sought a transformation of its functions—and, rather than positing 
an opposition between the two, emphasised the mutual enrichment of their joint practice. 
 Meditation as an aid in merit accumulation instantiates, I think, such a perspective on 
self-cultivation. 
 
 
 
                                                 
272 Eifring and Holen, “The Uses of Attention”, 1. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
Buddhist meditation and its experiences of transformation and enlightenment are not 
reifyable constants; neither can there be an isomorphic relationship between meditative 
techniques and meditative experience.273 Rather, the application of a technique and its 
resulting experience, as well as the interpretation of that experience, will inevitably depend 
upon context: upon the individual and his or her cultural, social, economic and intellectual 
surroundings. 
 In this thesis I have made an attempt to assess the meditative experience of one 
individual living in 16th century China, by way of first contrasting the short text he edited 
with the longer text on which it was based, and then fitting the text into his larger program of 
self-cultivation. Although the focus has been placed firmly on this individual’ unique 
conception of meditation, by pointing out its possible underlying causes and comparing it to 
contemporary intellectuals, it is hoped that the study may contribute also to our 
understanding of the late Míng intellectual landscape in general, as well as to the cultural 
history of meditation in China. In particular, the discovery of a link between the two practices 
of meditation and morality ledgers possesses such a potential for wider implications. The 
same is true for the related but more general application of meditation to weed out desire and 
cultivate rén. Indeed, I have shown that these are not mere potentialities—in the former case 
through a comparison with Liú Zōngzhōu, in the latter case through a discussion of Neo-
Confucian meditation more generally, as well as specific examples by Lǐ Yánpíng, Luó 
Hóngxiān and Gāo Pānlóng. 
 Owing to the same considerations for wider implications, I have also all the while 
strived to throw light on the underlying processes responsible for this new conception of 
meditation. Significantly, I argue that one of them might be termed “confucianization”. This 
might also be described more generally as secularization, due to the reorientation of 
meditation towards this-worldly concerns that the Confucian framework occasions. It is for 
this reason that I title the inner transformation of Yuán Liǎofán’s meditation “cultivating 
Confucian virtues”. This is not to say that these virtues are not also Buddhist; the 
correspondence between humaneness in Confucianism and compassion in Buddhism is 
precisely the foundation for the attractiveness of Buddhist meditation. Rather, what I mean to 
argue is that the Meditation Essentials, as well as its author’s conception of meditation, was 
shaped—in partially predictable ways—by his Confucian background, and that it situates 
                                                 
273 A point made by Sharf in "Buddhist Modernism", p. 269, though to a different effect, as elaborated 
in the introduction. 
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itself within a Neo-Confucian discourse on meditation, without which it would not exist as it 
does. As we have seen, the function Liǎofán accorded meditation had clear analogues in the 
Neo-Confucian discourse on meditation from the 12th to 17th centuries. In a way, we may 
view the Meditation Essentials as a culmination of this discourse. It thus represents an 
apotheosis of two crucial characteristic and concurrent developments in China’s Míng 
dynasty: on the one hand, the discourse on meditation within Neo-Confucianism; and on the 
other, the syncretism of the Three Teachings, more specifically in our case the general 
tolerance for Buddhism within Confucian circles. Both these developments were then slowly 
reversed towards the end of the Míng dynasty, a reversion further fuelled and then fixed after 
the Manchu takeover in 1644. 
Were we to broaden our perspective even further, we may say that the Meditation 
Essentials also, in its concern with egoism, reflects a characteristic of Chinese thought more 
generally. Whether we call the ultimate goal of self-cultivation discovery of our “original 
nature”, approximation of “the Way” or attainment of “nirvāṇa”, it is clear that in all the 
Three Teachings, at least in their late Míng manifestations, egocentrism in its different forms 
represents the most crucial obstacle on the road to its fruition. Here we see not only a reason 
for the Neo-Confucian interest in meditation, but also, I think, one important basis for the 
ecumenical atmosphere of the late Míng.  
In this concern for egocentrism—“egocentrism-centrism”—we see also yet another 
paradox, inasmuch as a third important characteristic of the late Míng was the development 
of a “Chinese individualism”, seemingly at odds with the ubiquitous call for selflessness. 
Yuán Huáng is part of this trend too, evidenced not only by his intellectual independence, but 
also his development of the lì mìng theory, through which the individual was thought to be in 
complete—almost existential, to use a term from Western philosophy—power of his own 
moral and material fate. Thus, two developments in the late Míng of on the one hand a 
“Chinese individualism” and on the other a profound philosophical distrust of the value of 
egoism, come together and are both expressed in Yuán Liǎofán’s program of self-cultivation. 
I believe an appeal to the socio-economic conditions of the period might help explain 
this seeming paradox. As I see it, the “selfless self-promotion” we see in Yuán Huáng’s 
thought answers one very basic characteristic of late Míng society: the unprecedented 
competitiveness and social mobility. Of the gentry, many were eager to seize the 
opportunities suddenly available to them and climb the social ladder, yet at the same time 
distressed by the immorality created by that very same ambitiousness. The self-cultivational 
scheme of Yuán Huáng was a way to affirm personal ambition while at the same time 
alleviating the moral distress this ambition created. While a complete lack of selfish 
intentions may have been philosophically and psychologically impossible, is it not probable 
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that a conscious gradual weeding out of egoism did in fact lead to more genuinely selfless 
behaviour, thus alleviating one momentous moral problem with the practice of merit 
accumulation? From the practitioner’s point of view, the selflessness may very well have 
been perceived as complete. At the very least, it seems probable that such a program had the 
potential of leading to an overall feeling of clean consciousness and moral fulfilment. Where 
Yuán Huáng’s critics, both in his day and today, emphasized the mutual incompatibility 
between on the one hand doing something for oneself and on the other hand for other people, 
and between karmic considerations and spontaneity free of intentions and deliberations, Yuán 
Huáng viewed humaneness rather as a compatible corrective to selfishness. Yet at the same 
time, neither self-centredness (sī 私) nor material desires (rényù 人欲) are by any means 
ascribed any positive valour in his system. Yuán Huáng was no rigorous philosopher. Rather, 
in the context of a dynamic late Míng society and economy, as well as an emerging 
intellectual trend of valuing practicality, he answered to an intuitive ethics he perceived in 
himself and others. He devised a program of self-cultivation that secured him both moral and 
material fulfilment in a highly competitive society.  
In common with the other radical intellectuals of the late Míng, Liǎofán had 
recognized the new potentialities of the individual. His program of self-cultivation was a way 
of harnessing, yet at the same time affirming and spurring on, individual ambition—placing it 
firmly within both Buddhist and Confucian moral frameworks. As a consequence, however, 
those frameworks were also reshaped. The fixed hierarchy of Confucianism and its social 
obligations were reconciled with social fluidity and individual ambitiousness. The Buddhist 
concern for enlightenment, on the other hand, was reconciled with the highly secular concern 
for individual fulfilment and societal harmony, becoming enlightenment as “a natural 
condition or quality, something man may employ in his striving for integrity as a man, not 
Enlightenment as the final and transcendent goal of Buddhism.”274  
Buddhist sitting meditation possessed the potential of being a means by which both 
types of “enlightenment” could be sought. Thus, when in the hands of Yuán Liǎofán it was 
recontextualized and reconceptualized within the system of merit accumulation through the 
keeping of Ledgers of Merit and Demerit, its function was subtly yet radically transformed. 
No longer a step on the path toward nirvāṇa, it became an affirmation rather than 
renunciation of saṃsāra—an expedient means for the continuous perfection, fulfilment—and 
regeneration—of self and of society. 
                                                 
274 de Bary (on the Chéng brothers), “Neo-Confucian Cultivation and Enlightenment”, 165. 
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Appendix A:  
Partial Translation of the Meditation Essentials 
 
A1. Notes on translation and conventions 
The following partial translation of Jìngzuò yàojué 靜坐要訣 is based on the redaction in the 
Miscellaneous Writings of Liǎofán (Liǎofán zázhù 了凡雜著) from 1605 (2006 reprint)275, 
which is the only one without textual errors, as far as I have been able to detect. This 
redaction is without punctuation, so where unsure about parsing I have consulted the 1985 
reprint of the 1929 Xìnghuái redaction,276 which contains simple traditional Chinese 
punctuation. 
In the resulting translation, I have for reasons of readability strived to keep additions 
in square brackets to a minimum. This does not mean that I have not added English words 
that were not there in the original—this is necessary in any translation both in order to 
produce idiomatic language and to try convey the original meaning, and all the more so when 
the input language Classical Chinese, which is highly elliptic; it rather means that I do not 
bracket this information, except for cases where I have deemed that not doing so presents a 
distorted picture of the original. 
The bulk of such brackets appear where I have added subheadings (which do not 
appear at all in the original) or numbers in listings (which the author sometimes employs, 
sometimes not—in the former case they will of course not be bracketed). 
 
Abbreviations (seen in annotation): 
 
DDB 
HDC 
Digital Dictionary of Buddhism 
Hànyǔ dà cídiǎn 汉语大词典 (“Chinese Comprehensive Dictionary”) 
PDB Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism 
 
  
                                                 
275Yúan 袁, Liǎofán Zázhù 了凡雜著, in Yuán Liǎofán Wénjí 袁了凡文集 (Jiāshàn 嘉善: Xiànzhuàng 
Shūjú 線裝書局, 2006). The Meditation Essentials is found on pp. 33a–67b. 
276 Yuán 袁, Jìngzuò yàojué (Taipei 台北: Xīnwénfēng Chūbǎn Gōngsī 新文豐出版公司, 1985, 
second print 2004). 
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A2. Translation of Preface and Chapters 1, 5 and 6 
 
Preface 
The knack of sitting in meditation originates from the Chán school, and is not something we 
Confucians originally possessed. After Masters Chéng watched people meditate and hailed it 
as an excellent field of study, and Master Zhū used meditation to supplement the skill of 
restraining the mind—only then did Confucians get to know how to consult and perform this 
practice.  
 In former times, there was the case of Chén Liè, who suffered from memory loss but 
after having meditated for a hundred days suddenly obtained perfect memory. This is merely 
a case of rudimentarily restraining the floating dust, of slightly purifying our lucid qì. Still, 
mediocre Confucians hold it as a supreme standard, without pursuing advancement beyond it. 
This is a mistake. For ever since birth, the human mind spends its days galloping about277; it 
pursues things and forgets to return. When we are moving, it is certainly muddled; when we 
are sitting, it is also in chaos. In this state of mind, if we restrain our thoughts just a little bit, 
we will perceive the resulting state as limpid. If we then skew out of course, and have no 
wise teacher to guide us, to show us the cruces, then some of us will regard what little we 
have obtained as complete, others will on the contrary contract illnesses. I truthfully lament 
this situation! 
 Generally speaking, as for the methods of meditation, there are steps through which 
one embarks on cultivation, and there are truths of which one strives for realization. Make a 
slight inaccuracy, and you will never be able to develop deep dhyāna. 
 My teacher, Great Master Yúngǔ, meditated for over twenty years, and possessed 
subtle understanding of the doctrinal legacy of the Tiāntāi tradition, which he discussed in 
detail with me. I have also associated with Master Miàofēng, who believed deeply in the 
teachings of Tiāntāi, and viewed dhyāna as an essential gateway to the Pure Land278.  
The Great Dharma has been abandoned for a long time, and I wish contribute to its 
revival. The two masters, too, have both passed away. For the sake of expounding the purport 
of the teachings they left behind as well as exploring the legacy of the Tiāntāi school, I have 
compiled this treatise. I now share it with the aspiring. 
                                                 
277 This word, 馳驟 chízhoù ”gallop”, has a secondary metaphorical meaning of ”struggle for fame 
and wealth”, which is presumably also active here. Using horse (and also monkey) metaphors for the 
wandering mind was common in Chinese Buddhism. 
278 Pure Land is also the name of a school within East Asian Buddhism, so in addition to the meaning 
which is chosen in the translation, the meaning of ”an essential gateway for Pure Land Buddhism” is 
also in play (淨土要門). Chán and Pure Land mixing was one important characteristic of late Míng 
Buddhism. 
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Chapter [1:] On Distinguishing the Will279 
[1. Heretical Meditation Practice] 
In all meditation practices, one must first distinguish one’s will. As soon as there is a slight 
error in the will, one will descend into evil ways. Just like how the archer will first establish 
his target: If the target is on his east and his arrow shoots west, how will he hit the mark? 
According to the Tiāntāi school, there are ten forms of heretical cultivation practices, which I 
will here summarize into four: 
[1] If the practitioner vows to meditate for the sake of fame and riches, then his intentions 
classify as deceitful. Thus he sows the karmic cause of ‘hell’. 
[2] If he on the other hand meditates for the sake of turning his stupidity into brightness and 
surpassing others, then his intentions classify as ‘competitive’. Thus he sows the karmic 
cause of ‘demigod’. 
[3] If he meditates for the reason of fear towards worldly worries and karmic retributions, 
and admiration towards philanthropy and happiness, then his will classifies under ‘likes 
and dislikes’. Thus he sows the karmic cause of ‘men and gods’. 
[4] If he meditates, not for fame and riches, nor for brightness or good karma, but solely for 
the reason of escaping the “thousand births and myriad kalpas”280 and the endlessness of 
life and death, only in order to seek the right path and quickly attain nirvana, then his will 
classifies as ‘finishing for oneself’. Thus he sows the karmic cause of ‘the two wagons, 
[srāvakayāna and pratyekabuddhayāna]’.  
 
Although there are differences among these types of practitioners—in the degree to which 
they are either good or evil, and in the extent to which they are either fettered or liberated—in 
terms of heretical practice they are all the same. 
 
[2. True Meditation Practice] 
                                                 
279 辨志 biàn zhì. The folk etymology of the character 志, and also how Zhū Xī explained it, was 心之
所之, ”where the heart goes”. ”Intentions” is another possible gloss, especially considering its Latin 
etymology (intendere, in “towards” and tendere “stretch; tend”), which is similar to that of zhì. 
However, “intention” is commonly used to translate yì 意 (which, by the way, is the character used to 
define none other than zhì in the Shuō wén 說文, thus indicative of their similarity).  
280 千生萬劫 qiān shēng wàn jié. I have chosen a literal, Buddhist translation over the more ideomatic, 
vernacular sense of ”generation after generation”. 劫 jié is the shortened form of 劫波 jiébō, phonetic 
loan of Sanskrit kalpa, the Buddhist concept of ”eon”. 
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True meditation practice is encapsulated in the single notion of ’rén’ 仁. [“]To regard 
Heaven–and–Earth and the myriad things as one substance[”]281, and [“]to make manifest 
illustrious virtue throughout the world[”]282, this is what is meant by ‘rén’. Translated into 
Chinese, ‘Ṡākyamuni’ means the two notions néng rén 能仁, [“to be able [to be]” rén]. 
‘Bodhi’ means ”enlightened”, or ”to ferry over, liberate”. ‘Sattva’ means ”affectionate”, 
or ”all living creatures”. ‘Bodhisattva’ thus means ”enlightened and compassionate”, or ”to 
save all living creatures”. Buddhism regards only bodhisattva-hood as the Middle Way. 
Arhat-hood, on the other hand, is seen as exceeding the three realms and thus realizing the 
karmic effect of ”not returning”. The Buddha deeply detests arhats, denouncing them as 
withered buds and failed seeds283, regarding them as only saving themselves and no others. 
The Śūraṃgama-sutra states: “As long as there is one among all living creatures that has not 
attained Buddhahood, then one should not obtain nirvāna.” And furthermore: ”Offering this 
body and mind to the defiled, secular world, this is what is called ’repaying the benevolence 
of Buddha’.” Truly, its purport is profound! 
 Some might ask: “How is this different from Mòzǐ’s 墨子 theory of ‘Impartial 
Love’284?” My answer is: ‘Self-Preservation’285 and Impartial Love are both commendable. 
Impartial Love is rén; Self-Preservation is yì 義—how indeed are these not virtues! Mencius’ 
reason for being hostile towards Yángzǐ and Mòzǐ, was simply their clutching to one extreme: 
Either clutching to Self-Preservation and neglecting Impartial Love, thereby harming rén; or 
clutching to Impartial Love and neglecting Self-Preservation, thereby harming yì. It is merely 
for this reason that Mencius remained hostile towards these doctrines. 
 The scholars of antiquity practiced Self-Preservation; so how can Confucians not be 
self-preserving? Rén is loving other people; so how can Confucians not practice Impartial 
                                                 
281 以天地萬物為一體. Direct quotation of a saying attributed to Chéng Yí 程頤. See discussion in 
chapter three. 
282 明明德於天下. Direct quotation from the Dàxué 大學 (“Great Learning”), originally a chapter of 
Lǐjì 禮記 (Book of Rites, 42/2). 
283 bài zhòng 敗種, ”failed seed”. The two characters are usually taken together as a word 
meaning ”coward” or ”scoundrel”. However the seed metaphor seems here not to be coincidental. 
284  兼愛 jiān’ài. Utilitarian ethical system advocated by and attributed to Mozi (c. 470–391 BC), 
pacifist philosopher of the Warring States period (戰國時代 zhànguó shídài). Popular in that period, 
together with the larger Mohism tradition (墨家 mò jiā) of which it was part, but gradually lost 
influence to Legalism (法家 fǎ jiā) and later Confucianism. 
285 為我 wèi wó. Ethical system attributed to 楊朱 Yáng Zhū (c. 440–360 BC), contemporary of Mòzǐ. 
Less is known about this theory and its originator, but they are generally agreed to be ”somehow 
related to Taoism” (Cree 1970: 38). Graham glosses it instead as “doing for oneself”. I opt for “self-
preservation” in order to preserve the terseness of Liǎofán’s paragraph. Doing so I must specify that 
this Yangist concept has little to do with Wáng Gěn’s bǎo shēn 保身, which is also translatable 
as ”self-preservation”. For his acute speculations regarding the Yangist school, see Graham, Disputers, 
53–64. 
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Love? Confucianism regards striving for rén as the ethos of its doctrinal transmission. At the 
same time it has never abandoned yì. The parallel application and mutual compatibility of rén 
and yì is what is regarded as the Middle Way. If one did not practice Self-Preservation or 
Impartial Love, then how indeed could one do what is right? Clutching to the theories of 
Yáng and Mò, and clutching to Confucianism, are equally perverse! 
 Some might ask: “The way of the bodhisattva specializes in saving all sentient beings. 
Why then would one seclude oneself in the deepest mountains, abandon all the living, sit in 
meditation and pursue dhyāna?”286 My answer would be: This is what makes bodhisattva-
hood the Middle Way. Saving all living beings requires that one’s virtues are lofty and one’s 
actions well prepared, that one’s awakening is sublime and gnosis divine.287 Without dhyāna 
any virtuous behaviour is without depth; without dhyāna any awakening and any wisdom will 
remain undeveloped. For this reason one temporarily abandons the sentient beings to sit in 
meditation and pursue the Way.  
Just like when people fall ill they consume medicine and take temporary leave from 
their undertakings. Only when they have recovered will their activities return to normal. The 
bodhisattvas are also like this. Even when their body temporarily abandons the sentient 
beings, in their minds they still take pity. Situated in a serene place they administer the 
medicine of dhyāna-samādhi, attain real gnosis, expel the afflictions, give rise to the six 
supernormal powers, and extensively save all sentient beings. Just like Confucians when they 
live in seclusion: Can it be that they simply purify themselves and forget about this world? 
This is precisely what is called the will of ‘[regarding] the myriad things [of heaven 
and earth] as one entity. When they live in seclusion, they never fail to constantly bear in 
mind the will of ‘the myriad things are one body’; when they come out, they never fail the 
Way of ‘the myriad things are one body’. Consequently, the reason why the exploits by Yǔ 
and Jì of ’passing [the house] three times without entering’ cannot be said to exceed Yánzǐ’s 
happiness from living miserly, is precisely because that when it comes to this will, there is no 
differentiation.288 
                                                 
286 Zhìyǐ and Liǎofan here tackles what was one of the most common criticisms launched at Buddhist 
(as well as Daoist) meditation by Confucian scholars, namely that is self-centred (私). By those Neo-
Confucians who embraced meditation practice, this view was also used to distinguish the kind of 
meditation they advocated from Buddhist (and Daoist) types of meditation. See for example the 
summation of the differences between the meditation practices of the three traditions made by Sòng 
Neo-Confucian scholar Chén Chún 陳淳 (1159–1223, student of Zhū Xī), quoted in Nakajima, 108. 
287 Syntactic reordering of júemiào 覺妙 and shénzhì 神智. 
288 Two allusions are invoked in this last sentence, the first from Mencius (in the fifth chapter 滕文公
上), the second from the sixth chapter 雍也 of the Analects. The first tells of how Yǔ 禹 (c. 21st 
century BC, mythic inventor of flood control and founder of the semi-mythic Xià 夏 dynasty (2nd 
millennium BC) during his eight years of designing and constructing China’s irrigation and flood 
control sytem, passed his house own house three times without ever entering to visit his family or 
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Chapter [5:] On Eliminating Desire 
[1. Introduction] 
In his expositions on the Sagely Learning [i.e. Confucianism], Zhōu Liánxī289 held no-desire 
to be essential. 
 Desire is born out of affection. The method of diminishing desire starts from cutting 
off affection. The opposite of affection is detestation. If one habitually observes what is 
detestable with an object, then that will be the end of one’s attachment to it. For this reason, 
Śākyamuni provided the Contemplation on Impurity.  
 Whenever there is birth, there must also be death. Death is eternal separation from the 
realm of gracious love, invariably detested by those who possess life. Even though we know 
it is detestable, none of us are able to escape it. At present I am alive; before long I will 
certainly die. One day passed entails one day closer [to death], for we are scurrying along 
while gazing at death. How then can we hanker after music and sex, and fame and wealth? It 
is truly like the moth throwing itself at a lamp, admiring void names while willingly seeking 
real misfortune. How foolish! 
 
[2. The practice] 
 The student who wishes to practice the Contemplation on Impurity should first 
contemplate on the time of recent death. Words of disconsolation, smells of incense; the last 
breath having departed, never to return; the body cold, without consciousness; the four 
elements without a master; the deluded consciousness gone off to some unknown place. 
Frightening. Dreadful. Hence, attachment and desire will weaken and diminish by themselves; 
compassion and wisdom will increase and brighten by themselves. 
                                                                                                                                                        
plow the fields, thus being a paragon of unrelenting service and self-sacrifice. Jì 稷, though not said to 
have done the exact same thing, is treated in the same paragraph on sagely self-sacrifice, in his case 
through educating the people in tilling. 
The second tells of the thriftyness of Yánzi, disciple of Confucius. He lived and ate extremely 
frugally, and did not let the happiness he found in this be affected by other people not being able to 
endure it.  
The two anecdotes are then brought together and likened in the eight chapter 離婁下 of 
Mencius. Yǔ and Jì, in a time of the world being brought to order, ”passed the house three times 
without returning”, whereas Yánzi, in a time of disorder, lived and ate in poverty and reclusion. 
Mencius goes on to say that the three in effect ”followed the same Way” and each would all have 
done the same thing as the others if their places were swapped. The word zhì 志 is not explicitly 
mentioned, but the reason for their compatability seems to be the underlying extreme sense of 
empathy and responsibility—thus a sagely ”will”. 
289 周濂溪 (1017–1073), better known as Zhōu Dūnyí 周敦頤, see subsection “No-desire” in chapter 
three. 
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 From this point onwards, there are many approaches.  
 
[2.1. The Nine Contemplations] 
One approach is the Nine Contemplations, [which consist of the following nine steps]:  
1. Contemplation on Swelling, denoting the swelling like a leather bag of a corpse.  
2. Contemplation on Destruction, denoting the dismemberment of the four limbs and the foul 
bodily fluids of the five viscera.  
3. Contemplation on the Smearing of Blood, denoting the smearing of blood on the ground, 
the desecration and foulness.  
4. Contemplation on Putrefaction of Pus, denoting the stream of pus and putrefaction of the 
flesh.  
5. Contemplation on Bruises, denoting the blackening of clogged blood and the stench of 
bruises, after the clearing up of pus and blood. 
6. Contemplation on Eating, denoting being devoured by maggots, and the resulting rupture 
and dilapidation. 
7. Contemplation on Disintegration, denoting the breaking off of sinew and separation of 
bones, head and feet lying across each other. 
8. Contemplation on Bones, denoting the disappearance of skin and flesh, leaving only the 
white skeleton. 
9. Contemplation on Cremation, denoting cremation of the corpse; the fracturing of the bones, 
and the stench of the smoke. 
 Then you will understand that speech and laughter, mirth and amusement, all belong 
to provisional syntheses; that freshness and warmth, that slenderness and softness in the end 
are all empty. Ultimately, the same is true even for this body of mine. What indeed then is it 
that is so worthy of our attachment, of our craving? After mastering the Nine Contemplations, 
you must continue contemplating and repeat practicing, thus making yourself skilled and 
sharp in this meditation.  
 Along with these contemplations, your mind will accordingly reach concentration; 
your thinking and attitude will be clear and unchaotic. There is simply nothing that surpasses 
the destruction of desire and elimination of craving. 
 
[2.2. The Ten Contemplations] 
Another approach is the Ten Contemplations: 
1. Contemplation on Impermanence, denoting how conditioned factors are subject to a 
process of endless renewal and arising and ceasing, changing with every instant, 
never pausing for even a moment. 
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2. Contempletion on Suffering, denoting the oppression of the six sense organs, the 
torment of the myriad things, the suffering of sentient beings and the non-existence of 
happiness. 
3. Contemplation of No-Self, denoting how factors are born out of conditions, inherently 
without self-nature. 
4. Contemplation on the Impurity of Eating, denoting that even when the food is still in 
the mouth, there is brain saliva running down. After mixing290 with the saliva, thereby 
producing taste, the food is then swallowed—really no different from spitting it out—
upon which it enters the stomach, and finally turns into shit. 
[No. 5 is missing!291] 
6. Contemplation on Death, denoting the fact that as soon as breath is disconnected, you 
will perish. 
7. Contemplation on Impurity, denoting the Thirty-Six Parts of the human body, as well 
as the Five Bodily Impurities. 
8. Contemplation on Severance [of the passions and delusions]. 
9. Contemplation on Detachment. 
10. Contemplation on Exhaustion [of karmic bonds].292 
 
Attaching oneself to nirvāṇa and severing the fetters of affliction is called Contemplation on 
Severance. Thus severing and thereby attaining detachment is called Contemplation on 
Detachment. Thus attaining detachment and thereby attaining exhaustion is called 
Contemplation on Exhaustion. 
 The Nine Contemplations is an introductory practice; the Ten Contemplations is the 
accomplishment. The Nine Contemplations can be likened to binding a thief, the Ten 
Contemplations then killing him off. Herein lies the only difference between them. 
 
[2.3. Skeleton Contemplation] 
Yet another approach is the Skeleton Contemplation, which is extracted from the Nine 
Contemplations.293 Whenever you perform the Nine Contemplations or the Ten 
Contemplations, you should always keep your posture straight and sit upright, and adjust the 
                                                 
290 For the very concrete mixing of two substances here, Liǎofán (or rather Zhìyì) uses the same verb 
as in the more abstract ”synthesis” used in relation with ”causes and concomittances”. 
291 In Sequential Gateway the fifth is “Contemplation on the Impossibility of Happiness in the World” 
(yíqiè shìjiān bù kě lè xiǎng 一切世間不可樂想, SG p0539c22–p0540a14). As for the reasons for the 
omission, we can only speculate. That Liǎofán simply accidently skipped it seems to me to be the 
most likely candidate.  
292 On the last three Liǎofán offers no explanation.  
293 I am not quite sure what he means by this. Possibly the eighth of the Nine Contemplations? 
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breath. Only after having your mind stilled for a good while should you commence the 
[Skeleton] Contemplation. 
 Now, commencing the Skeleton Contemplation, you should at first bind your thoughts 
to the big toe on the left foot. Carefully contemplate on the outer half of the toe, and have a 
blister grow from it. Make it extremely distinct. Then have it burst. Visualize this half toe, 
and make it extremely white and clean, as if there were white light emanating from it. Then 
contemplate on the whole toe. Have the flesh cut away, all now covered in white light. Then 
contemplate on the second toe and the third toe, then all five toes, up till all ten toes of the 
feet. The bones should be distinct. Bind your mind like this, and don’t let it wander off. If it 
does, retain it and have it return. When the contemplation is accomplished, you will notice 
that your whole body is warm. Thereupon, the gastral cavity turns hot, the name for this 
being ”the binding of the mind becoming settled.” 
 Now that the mind is settled, you should again take up your contemplation. Split open 
the flesh at the instep of the foot, so that you see the knuckles. Make this picture extremely 
distinct. Next, turn your attention to the anklebone, then the shinbone, and after that the 
hipbone, all being stripped to the bone. Picture the bones as white as pure snow. After this 
you turn to the ribs, and the spine and shoulder blades. From the shoulder you reach the 
elbow, from the elbow down to the wrist; from the wrist to the palm, from the palm to tips of 
the fingers. In all cases you have the flesh split open, revealing the skeleton—of, at this point, 
half the body.  
 Now move on to the scalp. See the meninges, see the brain, see the fat, see the 
pharynx and larynx, see the lungs, the heart, the liver and the gallbladder, the spleen and the 
stomach, the large and small intestines, the kidneys—all the organs of the heart, being 
covered by countless worms savouring the pus and blood! Make the visualization distinct. 
Next, watch as the worms exit through the throat. Then have the small intestine, liver, lungs, 
spleen and kidneys flow into the large intestine before they too come out through the mouth 
and fall to the ground in front.  
 On this stinking spot, the shit and urine and the roundworms get tangled up. In the 
mouths of the worms, pus and blood comes pouring out. Everything is suffused with impurity! 
 After this part of the contemplation is complete, you picture your own body as white 
snow [i.e. as a skeleton]; again, joint after joint connected to each other. If you see yellow or 
black, then you should repent.  
 This was the first Skeleton Contemplation. 
 
[2.3.2. Second Skeleton Contemplation] 
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In the second Skeleton contemplation you bind your thoughts to the forehead, settling in on 
the centre of the forehead, an area the size of a nail. Be careful lest scattered thoughts appear. 
Contemplating the forehead like this will allow your mind to calm, not producing other 
thoughts, thinking only of the forehead. 
Thereafter, you contemplate the skull: white as the colour of glass294.  
 Picture all the bones of the body like this, one after the other—shiningly white, every 
joint mutually connected. 
 Having completed this part of the contemplation, you turn next to a second skeleton, 
and then a third, all the way up to ten skeletons. When you have pictured ten skeletons, you 
move up to twenty, then thirty, then forty—picture a whole room full of skeletons! In front of 
you, behind you, to the left and to the right, they line up in columns next to each other, each 
raising their right hand, facing you. At this point, you gradually expand the visualization. 
First you picture a large hall full of skeletons, lined up in columns next to each other, their 
bones white as clean snow. Next, picture a whole town of skeletons, then a city, a province, 
and finally the whole world under heaven, populated by nothing but skeletons. Having 
pictured this, your body and mind will be peaceful and happy, without alarm, without fear. 
Having pictured this, you will see skeletons both when you leave and enter samādhi. You 
will see that mountains, rivers, cliffs—and all the things in the world, are all going through 
change, just like a skeleton. Having seen this, you picture the four oceans in the four 
directions, their currents swift and their colour white as milk. Picture all the skeletons sinking. 
When you have finished this contemplation, repent. Picture purely water, surging to the sky. 
Then have the water calm. 
 This is called the Contemplation of the Mind-Sea of Ordinary Men and Objects of 
Life-and-Death. 
 
Chapter [6:] On Expanding Love 
[Introduction] 
Confucius once said: ”[My aspirations are:] To bring peace to my elders, to place trust in my 
friends, and to take good care of my juniors.”295 In society there are only these three kinds of 
[relationships between] people. Of seniors, there are two types: My elders and the elders of 
other people. Of friends, there are close ones and distant ones; there are those that were close 
at first, but later became distant; there are relations of gratitude as there are of animosity. Of 
                                                 
294 白如玻璃色. Whether he means the same colour as what we think of when we read ”glass” is open 
to question. I myself was expecting something whiter in this simile. 
295 “老者安之，朋友信之，少者懷之。” ICS Lunyu: 5.26/11/20. 
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juniors, there are also two kinds: My juniors and the juniors of others. Of my elders and 
juniors, even among immediate family there are gradations; and among the elders and juniors 
of others is included gradations of gratitude and animosity, distance and proximity—all kinds 
of variables. 
 
[The practice] 
Initially, I proceed from my elders. I vow to do what I can to bestow calm, to make sure that 
they have what they need in terms of food, drink and dwelling. When you begin this practice, 
pick the persons most beloved to you, such as your parents or the like. Wholeheartedly attach 
your thoughts to this person. If other thoughts arise, retain them and make them return. Make 
the visualization in your mind distinct. Picture the elders among your close relatives 
experiencing peace, and then expand this vision to the elders of other people, ultimately 
extending it to those of your enemies and barbaric tribes. There are none for whom you do 
not wish peace. Repeat the practice for friends and juniors. 
Chán masters call this the Contemplation of a Compassionate Mind, or the Four 
Boundless Mentalities296. The merit of this practice is immense. The Four Boundless 
Mentalities are: (1) loving-kindness, (2) compassion, (3) empathetic joy and (4) 
equanimity297. 
 
[1. Boundless Loving-Kindness] 
At first, you think with compassion on all people, bestowing calm on your elders, trust on 
your friends, and care on your juniors. Have one thought follow the next, and keep your 
efforts firm. Approaching calmness of mind, visualize your beloved ones experiencing 
                                                 
296 Sì wúliàng xīn 四無量心. This rendering of the term is borrowed from Sheng-yen, Hoofprint of the 
Ox. DDB (Muller and Achim Bayer, “四無量心”) has ”four immeasurable states of mind”, PDB 
(”apramāṇa”) has the four ”boundless states”. The meanings of the Chinese character liàng 量 
contains both ”measure” (v/n) and ”limit” (n), and xīn in this context covers all the different 
renderings, so really all options are sound. 無量 describes first the extent of the intent to benefit 
others in the mind of the bodhisattva, secondarily the objects of that intent and benifit (all sentient 
beings), and, according to Dīng Fúbǎo 丁福保, the good fortune/blessings/merit (fú 福) thus produced, 
quoting Jùshè lùn 俱舍論—an aspect invoked also by our author in the section under the first 
subheading (using gōngdé 功德 instead of 福). 
297 The Chinese characters are cí 慈, bēi 悲, xǐ 喜 and shě 捨, in everyday language with the 
respective meanings ”compassion”, ”grief”, ”delight” and ”to abandon”. In the Buddhist 
nomenclature, they take on slightly different connotations. The Sanskrit terms they are used to render 
are respectively maitrī, karunā, muditā and upekṣā, the common English translations in turn 
being ”loving-kindness”, ”compassion”, ”(empathetic) joy” and ”equanimity” or ”impartiality”. 
Confusingly, the 喜 used in Chapter 3 on the dhyāna stages, which I there translated as ”rapture”, 
translates Sanskrit prīti. Conversely, the dìngxīn 定心, ”equanimity”, of the same chapter, is in 
Sanskrit the same term (upeksā) as that which in Chinese is rendered 捨 in this chapter. 
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happiness. Their bodies and minds are delighted, their countenance carefree; make them clear 
and distinct. Picture your loved ones attaining joy. Then picture strangers, and at last your 
enemies in the same situations. While in the calmness of mind, first picture one person, then 
ten, then thousand, then ten thousand—ultimately reaching all people in the world, each and 
every one experiencing joy. While abiding in concentration, you picture strangers 
experiencing joy, and so your inner concentration deepens, transparently calm and unmoving.  
This is what is called Boundless Loving-Kindness. 
 
When people of this world are at odds with the masses, the first thing that arises within us is 
aversion. This aversion steadily grows, while we mull it over and become attached to it, 
causing it to take up residence in the mind. At this point it is called hate. When this hate 
accumulates, we wish to hurt others. At this stage it is called vexation. Everything that ruins 
and damages virtue, originates from aversion, hate and vexation; while the only thing that can 
get rid of them is the compassionate mind. From this we understand that the merit of a 
compassionate mind is boundless. 
Further, the compassion of the Buddha298 has three levels: (1) the compassion based 
on awareness of the suffering of all sentient beings; (2) the compassion based on awareness 
of the true nature of phenomena; and (3) compassion without attachment. 
Not trying to bring benefit to one person, but seeking benefit on behalf of all the 
countless, borderless people—that is the compassion based on awareness of the suffering of 
all sentient beings. 
Not thinking merely of the physical calm of one’s seniors, but also their mental calm, 
causing them to achieve real happiness—this is the compassion based on awareness of the 
true nature of phenomena. 
As for “compassion without attachment”, it is something possessed only by sages. A 
sage does not dwell in conditionality, nor does he dwell in unconditionality299. He wants 
                                                 
298 Shì shì 釋氏. A highly polysemous term. 釋 is an abbreviation of Shìjiā 釋迦, the Chinese 
transliteration of Śākyamuni’s (i.e. the historical Buddha) surname Śākya. 氏 means (roughly) “clan”, 
and when following a surname denotes either a particular clan with that surname, or, more commonly, 
one particular member within that clan in a respectful manner, thus approximating English ”mister”. 
In our case the referent would with the former interpretation be the Śākya clan, and with the latter, 
Śākyamuni (”Mr. Śākya). Yet another meaning is “Buddhist practioner”, and by extension 
even ”Buddhism”. 
299 Wú wéi 無為 and yǒuwéi 有為 respectively. The Sanskrit terms are asaṃskṛta and saṃskṛta. Here 
we touch upon the laws of causality so fundamental to Buddhism. Saṃskṛta, “conditioned” describes 
impermanent phenomena, those that are produced through the never-ending process of the 
concomitance of causes and conditions, and asaṃskṛta, “unconditioned”, the opposite, i.e. the few 
factors that are, according to some schools, not conditioned nor impermanent, most commonly 
nirvāṇa. (PDB: “saṃskṛta”, “asaṃskṛta”). 
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peace for his seniors, trust for his friends, and care for his juniors. But he himself cannot 
know whether they are peaceful, whether they are trusted, whether they are cared for. The so-
called ”compassion without attachment”, means to devote oneself to all living things. 
 
[2. Boundless Compassion] 
When the practitioner is in the concentration of compassion, he incessantly reflects on the 
desire to realize all the wishes of all sentient beings. Whenever he sees sentient beings 
experiencing toil and suffering, pity arises in his mind. Thus he vows to rescue them. At first 
he picks a visualization of one of his loved ones experiencing suffering. He ties his mind to 
this thought, and the compassion he then feels will be without limit. Then he expands this to 
all the people in one particular locality and then to all people under the four heavens, 
picturing them all suffering, and yearning for their rescue. His compassionate mind thus 
deepens, transparently calm and unmoving.  
This is what is called Boundless Compassion. 
 
[3. Boundless Joy] 
Upon entering the concentration of compassion, you take pity on all the sentient beings and 
wish to remove all their sufferings and joys. At this point, deeply contemplate on sentient 
beings: Even though they experience suffering and vexation, this is nevertheless illusory and 
unreal. There was never anything to get rid of to begin with. So you teach them the wondrous 
method of purification, so that they can obtain nirvāṇa and eternal happiness. Retain your 
mind, enter into concentration, and picture all the sentient beings experiencing joy, also here 
proceeding from your loved ones and finally to the whole world.  
This is what is called Boundless Joy. 
 
[4. Boundless Equanimity] 
From this point in the concentration of joy, you think of loving-kindness and that you give 
happiness to all the sentient beings, you think of compassion and wish to uproot their 
suffering, you think of joy and that you cause them to be joyful. On the other hand, 
calculating your own benefit, without forgetting prior events, that would not be to practice 
the superior activities. For example, a compassionate father bringing benefit to his son, 
without seeking favour, that is real love.  
Subsequently, you should reflect on the fact that when sentient beings obtain 
happiness, each will owe it to their own particular causes and concomitances, and that it will 
never only be thanks to you. If you on the other hand state: ”I am able to confer happiness”, 
then this is not a mind of modesty.  
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Then you reflect that the mind of loving-kindness and its conferring happiness, are 
both but empty aspirations: The sentient being in front of you is not in fact obtaining 
happiness, and believing it to be real is an act of distortion. 
After which you reflect that if there is even the slightest generation of sadness or 
happiness upon witnessing sentient beings experiencing suffering, then this belongs to the 
obstructions, and any attainment of liberation will thus be complicated. 
Think: ”Now I wish to purify my practices of cultivation, therefore I should not attach 
myself to the dharmas of being opinionated, apodictive, stubborn or self-centred.300 Now I 
should rid myself of this clinging infatuation.” Consequently, your pure mind arises. There 
will be no hatred or no love whatsoever. At first, pick your loved ones, and picture them 
achieving the power of concentration while experiencing non-suffering and non-happiness, 
clearly, distinctly; finally extending this visualization to the Ten Aspects of Time and the 
Five Paths, there being no-one in the world that is not experiencing this.  
This is what is called Boundless Equanimity. 
  
                                                 
300 The latter part of this sentence, “不應著意必固我之法” contains an allusion to an epithet of 
Confucius which appears in The Analects: ”The Master eschewed four things: He avoided being 
opinionated; he avoided being apodictive; he avoided being stubborn; he avoided being self-centred.” 
(“子絕四：毋意；毋必；毋固；毋我”, ICS Lunyu: 9.4/20/13; translation by Harbsmeier, TLS.) 
This is thus the second comparison of the meditation described in the present chapter to sagely 
behaviour (the second being the more explicit one that appears towards the end of the first 
subheading ”[1. Boundless Loving-Kindness]”). 
 Incidentally, this paraphrase is reminiscent of the statement that immediately precedes the 
quotation by Confucius (ICS Lunyu: 5.26/11/20) that introduces the present chapter, namely Yán 
Huí’s 顏回 take on his own aspirations: ”I hope not to brag about excellence, and not to make a show 
of my own efforts.” (“願無伐善，無施勞”, ICS Lunyu: 5.26/11/19, trans. by Harbsmeier.) 
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Appendix B:  
Copy of The Original Text (靜坐要訣) 
 
For referrals, and also in order to make available the most reliable version of the text, the 
1605 edition of the Meditation Essentials is appended below. It is copied from Yuán Liǎofán 
Wénjí 袁了凡文集 (“Collected works of Yuán Liǎofán”), edited by Hé Huìqín 何慧琴 et al. 
(Jiāshàn 嘉善: Xiànzhuàng Shūjú 線裝書局, 2006), where it covers pages 33a to 67b. These 
page numbers are retained and can be found on the bottom right of each double-page, and 
correspond to the page referrals made throughout the thesis. Line numbers are counted from 
right to left on each single page. For example, “ME 36b7” would be double-page 36, side b, 
line 7, which is on the bottom left quarter of page number 115 of this thesis. Two double-
pages from the original are fitted into one single page here. 
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